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ARTICLES
Women's Freedom to Contract at Divorce: A
Mask for Contextual Coercion
PENELOPE EILEEN BRYANt
INTRODUCTION
Current wisdom favors the private settlement of divorce
disputes. Allowing men and women to enter enforceable
divorce contracts recognizes their rights-bearing
citizenship,' honors their autonomy,2 and places them on
equal legal footing with one another. Moreover, the parties
themselves generally prefer settlement to adjudication,
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver, College of Law,
B.S., Rollins College, 1978; J.D., University of Florida, 1981; M.A.
(Sociology), University of Florida, 1989. I gratefully acknowledge Albert
W. Alschuler, Arthur Best, and Steve Pepper for their helpful comments
on earlier drafts of this article.
1. See Robert H. Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining: The Limits on
Private Ordering, in THE RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLICT:
COMPARATIVE LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 364, 366-67 (John M. Eekelaar &
Sanford N. Katz eds., 1984).
2. See Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553,
558-59, 575 (1933) (concluding that foundation of contract law is the
freedom of individuals). But see CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL




believing rightly or wrongly that an agreement reached
through negotiation will better reflect their private
preferences than would an adjudicated result.' Liberal
theory maintains that, unless private preferences severely
compromise important state interests, the state should not
interfere.4 Feminist theorists also observe that honoring
women's freedom to contract is a step away from
patriarchy, which historically considered women unsuited
for autonomous decision-making.'
Practical arguments also seem to favor settlement.
Settlement, some claim, promotes the efficient resolution of
divorce disputes, lowering the costs of divorce for
disputants' and for the legal system.' Proponents also argue
that settlement produces results superior to those
3. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial
Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1350
tbl.1 (1994). Galanter and Cahill caution, however:
The existence of a general preference for settlement does not
mean that the pursuit of settlement in any particular instance
is an informed and uncoerced expression of such a preference.
The selection of settlement in a particular instance may be
based on incomplete or inaccurate information about
alternatives. Or it may be based on accurate information that
indicates that adjudication or other alternatives that might be
preferred are so flawed that settlement, although
unsatisfactory, is the best of all available evils. In some
settings, lawyers spend a great deal of effort "educating" their
clients about the virtues of settlement compared to the cost,
uncertainty, and arbitrariness of adjudication.
Id. at 1352.
4. See generally CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE, A THEORY
OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 2 (1981); Cohen, supra note 2, at 563;
Debora L. Threedy, Feminists and Contract Doctrine, 32 IND. L. REV.
1247, 1260 (1999).
5. See DAVID L. KIRP ET AL., GENDER JUSTICE 21 (1986); PATEMAN,
supra note 2, at 184. Pateman, however, exposes the inherently
patriarchal nature of contract theory and cautions that feminists'
entanglement with contract ultimately subverts the feminist dream. See
PATEMAN, supra note 2, at 188.
6. See, e.g., Mnookin, supra note 1, at 367.
7. See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 3, at 1350 (acknowledging cost
reduction as one justification advanced by settlement proponents).
These authors simultaneously caution that settlement may reduce
transaction costs for individuals at the expense of substantive justice,
particularly for less advantaged persons. See id. at 1360-64. They also
question whether the legal system actually conserves resources by
promoting settlement, particularly when judges actively participate in
the settlement process. See id. at 1364-71.
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generated by adjudication.8 Parties, they claim, posses more
information than courts and thus can make better
decisions.9 Disputants can incorporate a wider range of
values and interests than courts, generating agreements
more responsive to individual needs and interests than
judicial orders."0  Divorcing husbands and wives can
"enhance their personhood" through respectful negotiations,
rather than demean one another in the dehumanizing
process of adjudication." Moreover, by compromising or
trading off their interests, spouses can avoid the destructive
winner-take-all results sometimes produced by
adjudication. 2 Finally, proponents claim that negotiated
settlements generate greater party satisfaction and
compliance than do judicial orders, ' an attractive argument
in a system currently riddled with dissatisfaction and
noncompliance.
Yet many women and children needlessly live
impoverished lives after divorce,' and settlement and
8. See Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach
About Legal Process, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 268, 274 (1984).
9. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 367; see also Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Post-Modern,
Multi-Cultural World, 1 J. INsT. STUD. LEGAL ETHICs 49, 56-57, 60-61
(1996).
10. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A
Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83
GEO. L. J. 2663, 2670, 2692 (1995); Mnookin, supra note 1, at 367.
11. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 52 & n.20; Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 10, at 2669-70, 2692 (arguing that settlements
honor, among other things, dignity, respect, empathy, emotional
catharsis, and provide the possibility of transformation); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Is Altruism Possible in Lawyering?, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 385
(1992) (arguing that the adversary system suppresses altruism and
empathy).
12. See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 3, at 1351; Menkel-Meadow,
supra note 10, at 2672-75.
13. See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 3, at 1350; Menkel-Meadow,
supra note 10, at 2673.
14. See, e.g., TERRY ARENDELL, MOTHERS AND DIVORCE: LEGAL
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DILEMMAS 154-56 (1986); LENORE J. WEITZMAN,
THE DIVORCE REvOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES FOR
WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 323-56 (1985); Marsha Garrison,
Equitable Distribution in New York: Results and Reform: Good
Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's Equitable Distribution
Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 720-23 tbl.55 (1991)
(noting that the average post-divorce per capita income of wives and
children approximates 68% of their before-divorce per capita income,
whereas the per capita income of husbands increases by 182% after
1155
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default resolve approximately ninety to ninety-five percent
of divorce cases,' triggering doubts about the desirability of
settlement. 6
The divorce rate in the United States remains high, 7
divorce); James B. McLindon, Separate But Unequal: The Economic
Disaster of Divorce for Women and Children, 21 FAM. L. Q. 351 (1987);
Robert S. Weiss, The Impact of Marital Dissolution on Income and
Consumption in Single-Parent Households, 46 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 115,
116-17 (1984). The post-divorce decline in standard of living affects
women at all socioeconomic levels and impacts women of upper
socioeconomic status most severely. See Paul R. Amato, The Impact of
Divorce on Men and Women in India and The United States, 25 J.
CoMP. FAM. STUD. 207, 211 (1994).
15. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SoC'y REV. 95, 108
(1974); Robert J. Levy, Comment on the Pearson-Thoennes Study and on
Mediation, 17 FAM. L. Q. 525, 530 (1983) (noting that 85% to 90% of
divorce cases settle); Marygold S. Melli et al., The Process of
Negotiation: An Exploratory Investigation in the Context of No-Fault
Divorce, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1133, 1142 (1988) (finding that 217 of 349
Wisconsin divorce cases settled); Mnookin, supra note 1, at 364
(observing that the vast majority of divorce cases are resolved by
negotiation). The rate of settlement for divorce cases mimics the rate for
civil cases generally. See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of
Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About
Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 27
(1983).
16. Galanter and Cahill question the arguments in favor of
settlement and urge policy makers to give more attention to the quality
of settlement agreements. See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 3, at 1351-
78; see also Cohen, supra note 2, at 587 (arguing that the state should
not use its power for unconscionable purposes, such as enforcing
contracts that exploit the needs or weaknesses of certain parties);
Donald J. MacDougall, Negotiated Settlement of Family Disputes, in
THE RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLICT: COMPARATIVE LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 26, 32 (John M. Eekelaar & Sanford N. Katz eds., 1984)
(recognizing that none of the available methods for resolving divorce
disputes adequately protect the social interests at stake).
17. In 1994, 1,191,000 marriages ended in divorce, a rate of 20.5
divorces per 1,000 married women. See Laura Gatland, Putting the
Blame on No-Fault, 83 A.B.A. J. 50, 52 (1997) (citing The National
Center for Health Statistics). In 1988, the rate was higher-37 divorces
per every 1,000 married women. Nevertheless, every year since the late
1970s more than one million marriages have ended in divorce. See
Patricia H. Shiono & Linda Sandham Quinn, Epidemiology of Divorce, 4
TEE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: CHILDREN AND DIVORCE 14, 18 (Richard E.
Behrman ed., 1994). Some predict that more than one-half of all
marriages in the United States will end in divorce. See, e.g., Arland
Thornton, Comparative and Historical Perspectives on Marriage,
Divorce and Family Life, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 587, 595. Some predict an
[Vol. 471156
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supporting the prediction that before they reach sixteen, at
least forty percent of America's children will experience the
divorce of their parents. 8 At divorce, these children
frequently experience a precipitous drop in their standard
of living. 9  Many sink into poverty." This financial
even higher percentage. See Gary B. Melton, Children, Families, and
the Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1993, 2011
n.87 (1993) (stating that two out of every three first marriages will end
in divorce or separation) (citing Teresa Castro Martin & Larry L.
Bumpass, Recent Trends in Marital Disruption, 26 DEMOGRAPHY 37, 40-
41 (1989)). Approximately 60% of these divorcing couples will probably
have minor children. See Mary Ann Glendon, Family Law Reform in the
1980's, 44 LA. L. REV. 1553, 1555 & n.9 (1984) (citing U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SPECIAL STUDIES SERIES P-23,
No. 84, DIVORCE, CHILD CUSTODY, AND CHILD SUPPORT (1979)). Second
and third marriages have even higher divorce rates, and remarried
couples with children have higher rates still. See Melton, supra, at 2011
n.87 (citing Lynn K. White & Alan Booth, The Quality and Stability of
Remarriage: The Role of Stepchildren, 50 AM. Soc. REV. 689 (1985)).
Demographers predict that between 1988 and 2000, single-parent
families headed by men will increase by 42%, and those headed by
women will increase by 31%. See id. The percentage of married-couple
families, which was 57% in 1980, is expected to decline to 47% by 2000.
See id. Widespread concern over the high divorce rate and the
consequences of divorce has led some states to consider abandoning no-
fault divorce. See Gatland, supra, at 52.
18. See WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 352; see also Frank F.
Furstenberg, Jr., History and Current Status of Divorce in the United
States, in THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: CHILDREN AND DIVORCE 29, 35
(Richard E. Behrman ed., 1994).
19. Beginning in 1983 Suzanne Bianchi and Edith McArthur used
Census Bureau data to track 20,000 households for 32 months,
interviewing members at four month intervals. Within 16 months of
divorce, after adjusting for the decrease in family size, the income of the
family in which the child lived dropped by 29%. See Jason DeParle,
Child Poverty Twice as Likely After Family Split, Study Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 2, 1991, § 1, at 8; see also SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE,
GENDER AND THE FAMILY 4 (1989) (stating that approximately 65% of
single-parent families result from marital separation or divorce) (citing
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS, at 79
(1987)); WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 352-56; Ruth A. Brandwein et al.,
Women and Children Last: The Social Situation of Divorced Mothers
and Their Families, 36 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 498, 500 (1974) (explaining
that financial difficulties plague most single-mothers); Mary Corcoran
et al., The Economic Fortunes of Women and Children: Lessons from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 10 SIGNS 232, 240-41, 244, 247 (1984);
E. Mavis Hetherington et al., Marital Transitions: A Child's Perspective,
44 AM. PSYCHOL. 303, 305 (1989) (stating that approximately 90% of
divorced children live with a single-parent mother); Leslie N. Richards
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deprivation inhibits their academic, social, and
psychological development." Many children become
& Cynthia J. Schmiege, Problems and Strengths of Single-Parent
Families: Implications for Practice and Policy, 42 FAM. REL., 277-278,
280 (1993) (noting that single-parents head approximately 25% of
American families and stating that women head 87% of single-parent
families). See generally, e.g., LESLIE A. MORGAN, AFTER MARRIAGE
ENDS: ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR MIDLIFE WOMEN (1991).
20. In their study described in note 19, Bianchi and McArthur found
that children are nearly twice as likely to live in poverty after a divorce
than before; specifically, the percentage of impoverished children
increased from 19% to 36% within four months of divorce. See DeParle,
supra note 19, § 1, at 8; see also, e.g., ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 153-
57; CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN 23,
25 (1991) (showing that approximately one in five children in the
United States lives in poverty, one in two children living in a female-
headed, one-parent home lives in poverty, and that approximately one
in ten children living with both parents lives in poverty); Jay D.
Teachman & Kathleen M. Paasch, Financial Impact of Divorce on
Children and Their Families, 4 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: CHILDREN
AND DIVORCE 63 (Richard E. Behrman ed., 1994);.
21. For example, in a two-year study of a random nationwide sample
of 699 elementary grade children, Guidubaldi and Perry found that
divorced children performed more poorly on nine of 30 mental health
measures than children from intact families. For example, divorced
children evidenced higher frequencies of dependency, irrelevant talk,
withdrawal, blaming, inattention, decreased work effort, inappropriate
behavior, unhappiness, and maladaptive symptoms. Men the
researchers controlled for income level of custodial households, the
group of divorced children scored differently on only two mental health
measures. Boys from divorced homes, however, performed lower on four
mental health measures than boys from intact families. The only
difference remaining between girls from divorced homes and girls from
intact families concerned internal locus of control, a self-esteem
measure. Girls from divorced households actually exhibited higher
internal locus of control than did girls from intact families. See John
Guidubaldi & Joseph D. Perry, Divorce and Mental Health Sequelae for
Children: A Two-Year Follow-Up of a Nationwide Sample, 24 J. AM.
ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 531, 533-34 (1985); see also WEITZMAN, supra
note 14, at 354; Alan C. Acock & K. Jill Kiecolt, Is it Family Structure or
Socioeconomic Status? Family Structure During Adolescence and Adult
Adjustment, 68 SOC. FORCES 553, 556-57 (1989); David H. Demo,
Parent-Child Relations: Assessing Recent Changes, 54 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 104, 110 (1992); Hetherington et al., supra note 19, at 304
(citations omitted) (reporting that the most common problems of
divorced children are aggression, non-compliance, acting-out behaviors,
decreases in prosocial behavior, poorer academic achievement and
school adjustment, and disruptions in peer and heterosexual relations);
William F. Hodges et al., The Cumulative Effect of Stress on Preschool
Children of Divorced and Intact Families, 46 J. MARRIAGE FAM. 611,
614 (1984) (explaining that children of divorced families with
1158 [Vol. 47
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depressed' and perform more poorly at school,'
inadequate income had substantially higher levels of anxiety and
depression); Lawrence A. Kurdek, An Integrative Perspective on
Children's Divorce Adjustment, 36 AM. PSYCHOL. 856, 858, 860 (1981);
Judith A. Seltzer, Consequences of Marital Dissolution for Children, 20
ANN. REV. SOC. 235, 244 (1994). Despite the overwhelming number of
studies identifying the ways that divorce harms many children, a
cautionary note seems appropriate. Some of the negative research
findings on divorced children come from populations of children in
therapy. Moreover, many early studies do not compare the findings on
divorced children to findings on children from intact families. Others
fail to control for socioeconomic variables or assess the effects on
children of their downward financial mobility. See ARENDELL, supra
note 14, at 88. Some studies suggest that many of the negative
symptoms of divorced children existed prior to the divorce. See, e.g.,
Jeanne H. Block et al., The Personality of Children Prior to Divorce: A
Prospective Study, 57 CHILD DEV. 827 (1986); Hetherington et al., supra
note 19, at 304-05; J. M. Jenkins & M. A. Smith, A Prospective Study of
Behavioural Disturbance in Children Who Subsequently Experience
Parental Divorce: A Research Note, 19 DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE, 143
(1993). But cf., ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 81 (finding that children
from abusive households especially may prosper in their less stressful
post-divorce homes); Demo, supra, at 110; Guidubaldi & Perry, supra,
at 531 (stating that some children respond well to divorce);
Hetherington et al., supra note 19, at 304 (citations omitted) (explaining
that researchers consistently find that children adapt better in a well-
functioning single-parent family than in a conflict-ridden two-parent
family); Seltzer, supra, at 239. Nevertheless, result replication and
more recent methodological refinements have confirmed that many
divorced children suffer as noted in this text. But see Seltzer, supra, at
239-40. Even divorced mothers who express outrage at the negative
stereotypes of divorced children also recognize the hardships their
children experience as a result of financial impoverishment. See
ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 49, 100-01; NANCY E. DOWD, IN DEFENSE
OF SINGLE-PARENT FAMILiES 25-27 (1997).
22. See Hodges et al., supra note 21, at 614 (explaining that children
of divorced families with inadequate income had substantially higher
levels of anxiety-depression).
23. See ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 124-26; Seltzer, supra note 21,
at 238. One researcher, for instance, found that children in single-
mother and in single-father households performed equally well in
school, but that both groups performed more poorly than did children
from intact families. Economic deprivation explained the poor
performance of children in single-mother households, whereas
interpersonal deprivation explained the poor performance of children in
single-father households. See Douglas B. Downey, The School
Performance of Children From Single-Mother and Single-Father
Families, 15 J. FAM. ISSUES 129, 144-45 (1994); see also Sara
McLanahan, Family Structure and the Reproduction of Poverty, 90 AM.
J. SOC. 873, 888-89, 897 (1985) (finding that the economic deprivation of
white children living in single-mother households substantially
1159
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compromising their success.24 Inadequate food,25 housing,26
and medical care27 threaten children's physical health.
Many divorced children28 grow angry and bitter at the
financial discrepancy between their homes and the homes
decreased the children's success in school).
24. Divorced children attain lower levels of educational and economic
achievement than children raised in intact families. See DOWD, supra
note 21, at 25-26; JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE,
SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN & CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER
DIVORCE 160 (1989) (noting that divorce chills the hopes, aspirations,
and achievements of children); see also Paul R. Amato & Bruce Keith,
Separation from a Parent during Childhood and Adult Socioeconomic
Attainment, 70 Soc. FORCES 187, 193-98, 200, 202-03 (1991); Verna M.
Keith & Barbara Finlay, The Impact of Parental Divorce on Children's
Educational Attainment, Marital Timing, and Likelihood of Divorce, 50
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 797, 798-99 (1988); Sheila Fitzgerald Krein &
Andrea H. Beller, Educational Attainment of Children From Single-
Parent Families: Differences by Exposure, Gender, and Race, 25
DEMOGRAPHY 221, 222-24 (1988).
25. Consider, for example, the voices of mothers in Weitzman's
study:
We ate macaroni and cheese five nights a week. There was a
Safeway special for 39 cents a box. We could eat seven dinners
for $3.00 a week .... I think that's all we ate for months. I
applied for welfare.... It was the worst experience of my
life.... I never dreamed that I, a middle class housewife, would
ever be in a position like that. It was humiliating... they make
you feel it.... But we were desperate, and I had to feed my
kids. You name it, I tried it-food stamps, soup kitchens,
shelters. It just about killed me to have the kids live like
that .... I finally called my parents and said we were
coming ... we couldn't have survived without them.
WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 339. Another mother observes:
In addition to scaled-down budgets for food ("We learned to love
chicken backs") and clothing ("At Christmas I splurged at the
Salvation Army-the only "new" clothes they got all year"),
many spoke of cutting down on their children's school lunches
("I used to plan a nourishing lunch with fruit and juice; now
she's lucky if we have a slice of ham for a sandwich") and school
supplies and after-school activities ("he had to quit the Little
League and get a job as a delivery boy").
Id. at 340.
26. See Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of
Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2233-34 (1994).
27. See ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 17, 40; PETER J. CUNNINGHAM &
BETH A. HAHN, 4 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: CRITICAL HEALTH ISSUES
FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH 24 (1994).
28. Throughout the article the term divorced children refers to
children of divorced parents.
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of their fathers.29 Multiple moves, undertaken for economic
reasons, deprive children of familiar peers, neighborhoods,
and schools."° Divorced children's diminished financial
circumstances oftentimes depress their social status and
their self-esteem,"' and they may join more marinal groups
of children.32  Criminal behavior increases. Divorced
children from middle class families frequently receive no
financial assistance for college, and consequently do not
29. See JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING
THE BREAKUP: HOW CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 231
(1980); WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 353; Seltzer, supra note 21, at 244.
30. See DOWD, supra note 21, at 26; see also WALLERSTEIN & KELLY,
supra note 29, at 183; Seltzer, supra note 21, at 245. High degrees of
environmental change also correlate with children's depression, social
withdrawal, aggression, and delinquency. See Kurdek, supra note 21, at
858.
31. A mother in Terry Arendell's study, for instance reports:
I had $950 a month, and the house payment was $760, so there
was hardly anything left over. So there we were: my son
qualified for free lunches at school. We'd been living on over
4,000 a month, and there we were. That's so humiliating. What
that does to the self-esteem of even a child is absolutely
unbelievable. And it isn't hidden; everybody knows the
situation. They knew at his school that he was the kid with the
free lunch coupons.... My son is real tall and growing. I really
didn't have any money to buy him clothes, and attorneys don't
think school clothes are essential. So he was wearing these
sweatshirts that were too small for him. Then one day he didn't
want to go to school because the kids had been calling him
Frankenstein because his arms and legs were hanging out of his
clothes-they were too short. That does terrible things to a kid,
it really does. We just weren't equipped to cope with it.
ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 49.
32. Melton notes, "poverty accounts for the greatest portion of
variance in community rates of delinquency and child maltreatment,
neighborhood quality accounts for much of the remainder." Melton,
supra note 17, at 2003 (citations omitted).
33. See DOWD, supra note 21, at 25-26 (noting that poverty in single-
parent families correlates with children's criminal activity); Demo,
supra note 21, at 110; Seltzer, supra note 21, at 238. In the United
States, more than 70% of all juveniles in state reform institutions come
from fatherless homes. After controlling for income, boys from single-
mother homes are significantly more likely than others to commit
crimes that place them in the criminal justice system. The relationship
between crime and one-parent families is so strong that when family
configuration is controlled, the relationship between race and crime and
between low income and crime disappears. See Lynn D. Wardle, The
Use and Abuse of Rights Rhetoric: The Constitutional Rights of
Children, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 321, 329 (1996) (citing Barbara D.
Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1993).
1161
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go.' Divorced children whose economic situations do
improve over time typically face years of interim hardship."
They cannot reclaim the potential lost during those years.36
Many divorced children live with financially and
logistically stressed single parents who become less
available to the children than before the divorce. 7 Not only
must these children adjust to less contact with non-
34. Most of the youngsters in Wallerstein and Blakeslee's study
came from middle-class families where one or both parents had college
degrees, and most of the children attended high schools where 85% of
all students went to college. Yet, at ten-year follow-up interviews, only
one-half of the divorced children were attending or had completed a
two-year or four-year college. One-third of them, including many highly
intelligent children, had dropped out of high school or college. Of the
children attending college, only one in ten received full financial
support from one or both parents. Others received no help at all or only
limited financial help-even from wealthy fathers who could afford to
help much more. Among the fathers in the study who could afford to
help with college expenses, only one-third assisted their children. Two-thirds provided no help. See WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 24,
at 156; see also ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 25, 44; WEITZMAN, supra
note 14, at 353; Barbara Grissett & L. Allen Furr, Effects of Parental
Divorce on Children's Financial Support for College, 22 J. DIVORCE &
REMARRIAGE 155, 159-61 (1994) (finding that divorced children
attending college received significantly less parental financial support
than children from intact families and that the custodial parent likely
provided whatever support they did receive); Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, Towards a Revitalization of Family Law, 69 TEX. L. REV.
245, 269 (1990).
35. When their mothers remarry, the financial situation of divorced
children generally improves. See Hetherington et al., supra note 19, at
307 (citations omitted). More than one-half of the children whose
parents divorce, however, spend at least six years with only one parent.
See Demo, supra note 21, at 109.
36. See WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 352-54. A highly intelligent
child, for instance, might perform poorly in school for three of his four
high-school years because of stress and depression caused by his
family's financial hardship. Even if his custodial mother improves the
family's financial position by remarrying at the end of his junior year,
he cannot change his earlier grades. His choice of college becomes
restricted, and he may not achieve what he could have achieved had his
family remained economically sound.
37. See, e.g., ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 61-68, 155-56; DOWD,
supra note 21, at 26; Paul R. Amato & Sonia Partridge, Widows and
Divorcees with Dependent Children: Material, Personal, Family, and
Social Well-Being, 36 FAM. RELATIONS 316, 316 (1987); Nancy Donohue
Colletta, Stressful Lives: The Situation of Divorced Mothers and Their
Children, 6 J. DIVORCE 19, 23-27 (1983); Demo, supra note 21, at 110-
11; Hetherington et al., supra note 19, at 308; Richard & Schmiege,
supra note 19, at 280 fig.6.
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custodial parents,38 they also must cope with the diminished
capacity 9 and availability of the custodial parent.40
The logistical strains on their households force many
divorced children to assume adult responsibilities,
sometimes compromising their academic achievement and
their social development. Moreover, many children are
caught in the hostile cross-fire between parents 4 and some
38. Some non-custodial fathers find intermittent parenting painful
and withdraw from their children, and most non-custodial fathers
rapidly become less available to their children. See Hetherington et al.,
supra note 19, at 309; Seltzer, supra note 21, at 254-55, 258; Judith. S.
Wallerstein & Shauna B. Corbin, Father-Child Relationships After
Divorce: Child Support and Educational Opportunity, 20 FAM. L.Q. 109,
114 (1986); see also ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 109-24. Non-custodial
fathers become even less available after they remarry. See
Hetherington et al., supra note 19, at 309.
39. See DOWD, supra note 21, at 26-27; Seltzer, supra note 21, at 254;
Judith S. Wallerstein, The Overburdened Child: Some Long-Term
Consequences of Divorce, 30 SOc. WORK 116, 117 (1985).
40. See ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 81-82; WALLERSTEIN & KELLY,
supra note 29, at 25; WETZMAN, supra note 14, at 319; Hetherington et
al., supra note 19, at 304. Successful adjustment, however, usually does
occur. See ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 82-88; Kurdek, supra note 21, at
859-60.
41. See ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 91-92; Hetherington et al.,
supra note 19, at 305, 308. While the early assumption of
responsibilities can lead to maturity, approximately one-third of older
children and adolescents disengage from their families. See
Hetherington et al., supra note 19, at 305. If these disengaged children
become involved in pro-social peer groups, academic achievement, or
constructive relationships, their disengagement can be a positive coping
mechanism. On the other hand, if these disengaged children become
involved with anti-social groups and activities without adult
monitoring, destructive results can occur. See id.
42. See ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 106, 123-27 (explaining that
children frequently suffer when divorced parents remain hostile). Many
studies establish that intense conflict between divorced parents
strongly correlates with children's poor adjustment to divorce. See, e.g.,
Christy M. Buchanan et al., Adolescents and Their Families After
Divorce: Three Residential Arrangements Compared, 2 J. RES.
ADOLESCENCE 261, 287-88 (1992); Andre P. Derdeyn & Elizabeth Scott,
Joint Custody: A Critical Analysis and Appraisal, 54 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 199,204 (1984); Denise Donnelly & David Finkelhor,
Does Equality in Custody Arrangements Improve the Parent-Child
Relationship?, 54 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 837, 843-44 (1992); Hetherington
et al., supra note 19, at 307; Marsha Kline et al., The Long Shadow of
Marital Conflict: A Model of Children's Postdivorce Adjustment, 53 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 297 (1991); Seltzer, supra note 21, at 253-54. Despite
an abundance of research confirming the negative effects of parental
conflict on children, courts continue to order children into joint physical
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are forced to visit with those who have abused them,43
stressing further their emotional reserves. Worse yet, the
custody of some children is given to those who have abused
theme:--or to those who have abused their mothers.45
custody arrangements with hostile parents. See Robert H. Mnookin et
al., Private Ordering Revisited: What Custodial Arrangements are
Parents Negotiating?, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 37, 54
(Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1985).
43. See REPORT OF THE GENDER BIAS STUDY OF THE SUPREME
JUDICIAL COURT, COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 69-70 (1989)
[hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT]; Report of the
Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Commission, 42 FLA. L. REV.
803, 867 (1990) [hereinafter Florida Gender Bias Report]; Report of the
Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice, 58 MO. L. REV. 485, 513,
567 (1993) [hereinafter Missouri Gender Bias Report]. Court cases
provide numerous examples. In a Massachusetts case, for instance, the
court granted visitation rights to a father who fired a gun into the home
of his ex-girlfriend, killed her friend, and was charged with attempted
murder of his child. In another Massachusetts's case the court asked a
man who pled guilty to raping a woman whether he wanted visitation
rights to the child conceived as the result of the rape. See
MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra, at 69. In a Florida case a
father, uncle, and grandfather sexually assaulted a five-year-old girl in
front of her eight-year-old brother. The past president of the board of
Women in Distress stated:
[ift took us 18 months-this happened in the last two years-18
months to be able to stop the man from visitation rights[,]
during which time he continued to abuse the child.... But the
judge said to me: "Do you as a counselor, do you as a
professional, believe that this child [has been abused]" - "[Yles,
absolutely." She said, "[Olkay, thank you," and went ahead and
let him visit her alone.
Florida Gender Bias Report, supra, at 867. For numerous reasons,
negotiated settlements reflect this pattern. An abused mother, for
instance, may agree to a custody or visitation arrangement that fails to
protect her and her child because she fears losing custody altogether.
See infra notes 298-408, and accompanying text. Moreover, guardians
ad litem and custody evaluators frequently disbelieve or minimize a
mother's allegations of abuse. They consequently may recommend that
the alleged perpetrator receive custody. With no support from these
professionals, the mother may agree to generous visitation in order to
avoid losing custody altogether.
44. One Missouri attorney observed: "Judges and attorneys have
difficulty believing sex abuse allegation by women and children and
sometimes place children back with abusers. In a recent case, the male
guardian ad litem didn't want to believe allegations of sex abuse
against the father because he seemed like a nice guy." Missouri Gender
Bias Report, supra note 43, at 568. Court cases provide additional
examples. In one case, the Massachusetts Department of Social Services
substantiated the mother's allegations of child sexual abuse of the
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The suffering and lost potential of divorced children
should themselves prompt humanist concern. A more
selfish concern, however, also is warranted. We all suffer
when the results reached in divorce settlements com-
promise the physical and mental health, and the academic
achievement of these children. They may not grow into
productive and responsible citizens. Even if they do, their
full potential may remain undeveloped.46 Sometimes they
become embittered, dysfunctional adults, unable to help
themselves or contribute to our collective well being.
Likewise, we all suffer when many divorced children engage
in criminal behavior. The cost of policing and punishing
juvenile offenders keeps rising. And some of us,
undoubtedly, will become their victims.
We not only lose the potential of our children, we also
needlessly harm many divorced women. Women, trapped in
the poverty or economic deprivation that frequently follows
divorce,48 have difficulty obtaining the job experience and
daughter by the father. See In re A.F. v. N.F., 549 N.Y.S.2d 511, 513
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989). The trial court ignored this and other evidence of
sexual abuse, and awarded custody to the father. See id. at 513, 514. In
a rare moment, the appellate court substituted its judgment for that of
the trial court, ordering that custody be returned to the mother, and
that the father have only supervised visitation with the child. See id. at
513, 515.
45. See PHYLLIS CHESLER, MOTHERS ON TRIAL: THE BATTLE FOR
CHILDREN AND CUSTODY 81 (1987) (finding that 59% of the fathers who
won custody in litigation and 50% of the fathers who obtained custody
through private negotiations had abused their wives).
46. See Henrik H.H. Andrup, Divorce Proceedings: Ends and Means,
in THE RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLICT: COMPARATIVE LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 163, 166 (John M. Eekelaar & Sanford N. Katz eds.,
1984); see also DOWD, supra note 21, at 17 (acknowledging that our
punitive approach to children who live in single-parent families is
socially destabilizing).
47. See Donald S. Moir, No Fault Divorce and the Best Interests of
Children, 69 DENV. U. L. REV. 663, 672 (1992) (noting that if
Wallerstein and Kelly are correct that more than one third of divorced
children are chronically impaired, and if 50% of our children experience
the divorce of their parents, then one-sixth of our population will face a
disabled adulthood because of divorce).
48. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 19;
MORGAN, supra note 19; WEITZMAN supra note 14; Brandwein et al.,
supra note 19, at 500; Corcoran et al., supra note 19, at 240-41, 244,
247; Peggy S. Draughn, Divorcees' Economic Well-Being and Financial
Adequacy as Related to Interfamily Grants, 22 J. DIVORCE &
REMARRIAGE 23, 24-25 (1994) (citing numerous studies establishing
that women's economic well-being suffers more than men's at divorce).
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education that would help them contribute as much as they
could to themselves,49 their children, and society.0 Many
divorced mothers struggle to find work and make ends
meet.5' Not all succeed." Financial desperation keeps many
women trapped in low-paying jobs.5  Rising numbers of
49. See ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 50-51; DOWD, supra note 21, at
22.
50. In her study of 60 divorced mothers, Terry Arendell found that
ten mothers did not experience serious depression or despair after
divorce. She comments:
But the reasons they gave simply reemphasize the central
importance of economic loss in the lives of divorced women.
Four of these ten had various sources of income that protected
them from poverty and enabled them to work actively toward
improving their situation. Two of them were using income from
the divorce property settlement to attend graduate school, and
they hoped to regain their former standard of living by pursuing
professional careers. Two were receiving financial support from
their parents while they sought employment and planned for
the possible sale of their homes as part of the property
settlement. The remaining six said they were generally
optimistic in spite of their poor economic positions. Like the
others, they found the financial hardships imposed by divorce
surprising and difficult to handle; they simply found these
hardships easier to cope with than the despair they had known
in their marriages.
ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 51.
51. See id. at 53-79. Seventy-eight percent of the single-parent
mothers studied by Richards and Schmiege identified financial
difficulties as a major problem. All of these single-parent mothers came
from middle class backgrounds. One mother who remarried quickly
noted flinancially it got pretty bad towards the end. It was like I was
selling a lot of our stuff like the freezer, and whatever else we had, just
to keep going. It was a trying time." Richards & Schmiege, supra note
19, at 280. In contrast, only two of the 11 single-parent fathers in their
study mentioned financial problems. One of these fathers complained
that he had to reinvest too quickly in order to avoid capital gains tax.
See id.
52. One study found that prior to divorce, 33% of wives worked full
time. At four months and at one year after divorce, the percentage of
divorced women working full time was 41%. The study also indicated
that, within four months of divorce, wives who had not worked during
the marriage had found part-time employment, decreasing wives' over-
all unemployment rate from 43% to 31%. This change did not last,
however. Within a year of divorce ex-wives' unemployment rate had
returned to 43%. See DeParle, supra note 19.
53. See ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 55-61; DOWD, supra note 21, at
19-22; MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 33.
Arendell notes that of the 60 mothers she interviewed:
[Bleing underemployed was common: nearly a third of the women
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divorced mothers must hold two jobs to survive."' Their
financial worries compromise their physical and emotional
health55 as well as their parenting skills." Their anger at
doing clerical work had college degrees, as did the one blue-collar
worker. One woman earned over $2,000 a month and another less than
$600, but these extremes were the exception. The majority had net
incomes of between $800 and $1,200 a month, or $9,600 to $14,400 a
year.
ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 56. The mothers' dependency on their
meager earnings made them reluctant to ask for higher wages. See id.
at 59.
54. See Peter T. Kilborn, For Many Women, One Job Just Isn't
Enough, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1990, at Al. See also ARENDELL, supra
note 14, at 63-64.
55.
Data from national samples consistently document the
disruptive effects of divorce on the mental and physical health
of both sexes.... [D]ivorced men and women exhibit more
symptoms (such as "nervous breakdown" and "inertia"), and in
more serious degree, than do persons of other marital statuses.
Divorced and separated people have the highest admission rates
to psychiatric facilities (compared to married, widowed, and
never married people)... Divorced people have more illness,
higher mortality rates (in premature deaths), higher suicide
rates, and more accidents than those who are married. In fact,
the marital status of a person is one of the best predictors of his
or her health, disease, and death profile. While both sexes
"share" some of the psychic and physical distress of divorce,
women seem to experience the greater stress and their stress
seems to take a higher toll. Beyond question, much of the
women's stress is attributable to their economic condition. This
is to be expected in light of the well-known relationship between
low socioeconomic status and both mental and physical illness.
Three decades of research have shown a strong correlation
between low income and both stress and psychiatric disability.
Having a low socioeconomic status and being a single mother is
"additively and cumulatively associated with physical morbidity
among mothers."
WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 349-50 (citations omitted); see also
ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 46-52, 61-63; Hetherington et al.,
supra note 19, at 307-08; Gay C. Kitson & Leslie A. Morgan, The
Multiple Consequences of Divorce: A Decade Review, 52 J. MARRIAGE
& FAM. 913, 913-14 (1990). But see WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at
345-49 (stating that within a year of their divorce women and men
report higher self-esteem and competence); Alan Booth & Paul
Amato, Divorce and Psychological Stress, 32 J. HEALTH & SOC.
BEHAVIOR 396, 400-05 (1991) (illustrating that two years after
divorce psychosomatic symptoms, depression, and unhappiness of
divorced persons become comparable to those of married persons).
56. See generally ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 49, 90, 93-101;
Hetherington et al., supra note 19, at 308. But see Richards & Schmiege,
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ex-husbands mounts as they and their children go without
resources and opportunities that they once had-and that
the ex-husband often retains.5
Perhaps we do not take the plight of divorced women
seriously because we expect them to recover. 8 Some women,
of course, do manage to improve their financial situation by
obtaining education, training, or higher paying jobs, or by
increasing their work hours. " Yet the financial desperation
of many others induces them to take whatever low-paying
jobs they can find.60 Many women under thirty, and some
women under forty, remarry"1 and improve their financial
positions.62 Yet they, like their children, face interim years
of hardship that compromise their lives.63 Moreover, many
supra note 19, at 281 (finding that many single parents take pride in
their parenting skills and in their ability to communicate well with
their children).
57. See ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 40-41, 44, 46-52; WALLERSTEIN
& KELLY, supra note 29, at 231; WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 347, 353;
see also MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 33
(noting the lifestyle differences between middle-aged (40 to 50 year-old)
women and their ex-husbands).
58. See WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 150 (explaining how a Los
Angeles judge stated that he "'[wiould think she is entitled to some
severance pay... that's probably not the right terminology but
something to give her an opportunity to have a year or two where she's
not hurting and maybe she'll find some other doctor to marry her and/or
get a chance to try to get herself reoriented to her new status'");
MORTON DEUTSCH, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE 59 (1985) (explaining that the belief that a victim's
situation will improve can inhibit action to assist the victim).
59. See generally ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 44-45; 51.
60. See id. at 55-59.
61. See ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 142-45 (explaining that many
divorced women, however, express extreme ambivalence about
remarriage); Paul C. Glick & Sung-Ling Lin, Recent Changes in Divorce
and Remarriage, 48 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 737, 739-44 (1986); Richards
& Schmiege, supra note 19, at 278 (finding in their study of 60 single
parents from middle class backgrounds, that 57% of the women and
55% of the men had remarried).
62. See Hetherington et al., supra note 19, at 307 (citations omitted)
(finding that remarriage tends to improve the financial status of single-
parent mothers and their children, although the new family faces other
difficult issues).
63. See ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 46-52; MORGAN, supra note 19,
at 131-33, 134-42 (finding that in addition to interim hardship,
remarriage does not guarantee that a woman will improve her financial
well-being).
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divorced women never remarry 4 or remarry out of economic
desperation65 and enter into poor relationships with men
who abuse them and/or their children.66 Many remarriages
end in divorce, perpetuating the cycle and again disrupting
the children's lives. 7 Many women and their children do not
recover from the financial hardships of divorce. 8 Settlement
contributes to these results and deserves closer scrutiny.69
This article explains why many wives enter unfair
divorce settlements. It first explores the context in which
wives negotiate divorce contracts. Part I describes the
financial, social, and psychological circumstances that
create an unlevel playing field upon which wives must
bargain. Part II reveals how indeterminate divorce law,
grounded in norms of patriarchy, individualism, and formal
equality, contributes to the uneven playing field. Part III
explores the role that lawyers play in inducing wives to
enter unfair settlement agreements and the unwillingness
of trial judges to intercept and alter unfair provisions. In
the end, coercive and unequal social conditions,70 rather
64. See ARENDELL supra note 14, at 144; MORGAN, supra note 19, at
125, 128.
65. See ARENDELL supra note 14, at 143; see also MORGAN, supra
note 19, at 35-38; Glick & Lin, supra note 61, at 743 (speculating that
the greater financial needs of divorced women with children likely
encouraged them to remarry more quickly than their childless
counterparts). But see MORGAN, supra note 19, at 141.
66. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, CHAPTER 5:
COMPENSATORY SPOUSAL PAYMENTS 392-93 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
1996) [hereinafter CHAPTER 51.
67. See MORGAN, supra note 19, at 139-40; Hetherington et al., supra
note 19, at 303 (explaining that children require a longer period to
adjust to the remarriage of their custodial parents than to the initial
divorce); Melton, supra note 17, at 2011 n.87 (stating that remarried
couples with children show an even higher rate of divorce than
remarried couples without children) (citing Lynn K. White & Alan
Booth, The Quality and Stability of Remarriage: The Role of
Stepchildren, 50 AM. SOC. REV. 689 (1985)). Because divorce occurs
more rapidly in remarriages, sometimes a child confronts a second
divorce before adapting to the remarriage.
68. See ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 44-45, 50-52; MORGAN, supra
note 19, at 27.
69. A few settlement advocates recognize that some limits on the
enforceability of divorce agreements might be appropriate. See, e.g.,
Mnookin, supra note 1, at 370.
70. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 184-88 (1987); Alan
Wertheimer, Remarks on Coercion and Exploitation, 74 DENV. U. L.
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than the free exercise of individual will, explain why wives
routinely enter unfair divorce settlements.
Wives who realize the injustice they have suffered can
petition the court to set aside or vacate unfair agreements if
they have the necessary emotional and financial resources
to do so. Part IV notes that these petitions normally fail,
primarily because contract doctrine fails to comprehend-
and sometimes perverts-women's experiences during
marriage and during divorce negotiations. Part IV
illustrates that divorce settlements, contrary to popular
wisdom, frequently restrict rather than enhance women's
life choices by leaving them impoverished and embittered.
The paper concludes with the suggestion that judges should
not privilege divorce contracts. Instead they should
scrutinize them carefully and refuse to accept unfair
settlements. Even after judges accept agreements at final
hearing, they should remain willing to review and to set
aside or vacate those that, in retrospect, seem unfair.
I. PRACTICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND SOCIAL IMPEDIMENTS
CONFRONTING WOMEN IN DIVORCE NEGOTIATIONS
To understand how wives are induced to enter unfair
agreements, one must know something of the situation of
wives at divorce. In this section, when I speak of women
and their circumstances, I necessarily speak in statistical
generalities that may not apply to any particular woman. I
thus risk the "essentialist error"-the assumption that all
women are, at their core, somehow the same, or the
assumption that generalizations capturing the concern of
high-status white women necessarily capture the concerns
of all women.7' While I recognize this risk, I believe it must
be taken. Silence bred by fear of essentialism threatens to
leave women without the collective voice required for
change. 72 Moreover, the patterns discussed in this paper
REV. 889, 895-901 (1997).
71. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585, 588 (1990). See generally ELIZABETH
V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN
FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics and Violence Against Women of Color,
43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1245-51 (1991).
72. See Williams, supra note 26, at 2247-48 ("But this fear of
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capture the experiences of far too many divorced women,
without denying that race, class, and other categories may
compound or fundamentally alter the problem.
I also reject the conception of wives as formal equals to
their husbands. Rather, I describe how wives tend to differ
from their husbands at divorce and show how those
differences disadvantage them during negotiations.7"
Portraying women as victims in a coercive context poses
risks.7 These risks seem justified, however, in order to
expose how "patriarchal subordination"75 contaminates
women's "freedom" to contract at divorce and to challenge
the legal system's blind preference for private settlement.76
essentialism, with which I am in full sympathy, should not prevent us
from painting vivid word pictures of predominant sociological
patterns."); see also OKIN, supra note 19, at 6-7; PATEMAN, supra note 2,
at 17-18; Crenshaw, supra note 71, at 1241 ("[O]ver the last two
decades, women have organized against the almost routine violence
that shapes their lives. Drawing from the strength of shared experience,
women have recognized that the political demands of millions speak
more powerfully than the pleas of a few isolated voices. This
politicization in turn has transformed the way we understand violence
against women."); Harris, supra note 71, at 586, 607.
73. In so doing, I hope to challenge law's "tendency to privilege the
abstract and unitary voice," of a masculine law that ignores or perverts
the experience of many women. Harris, supra note 71, at 585. As
Crenshaw notes: "[T]he social power in delineating difference need not
be the power of domination; it can instead be the source of social
empowerment and reconstruction." Crenshaw, supra note 71, at 1242.
74. Portraying women as victims can obscure women's efforts to
escape oppression, inaccurately depicting their reality and denying
their strength. The legal system may respond negatively to women
labeled "victims," perhaps by finding them unfit custodians of their
children. Finally, women may internalize the stereotype of victim,
discouraging their resistance to oppression. See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS,
BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE
POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 67-114 (1991) (describing Black women's
struggle to avoid internalizing negative cultural stereotypes about them
specifically and about beauty generally); Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars
Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 304 (1995).
75. See PATEMAN, supra note 2, at 17 (arguing that ignoring sexual
differences presupposes that the concepts of the civil (public) realm and
the individual are "uncontaminated by patriarchal subordination").
76. As I have written elsewhere:
[I] choose to recognize, rather than ignore, the burdens under
which women labor in their struggle for equality. In no manner
does this.., imply women's inferiority. The hostile world in
which women live, not women's inherent weaknesses, creates
each of the... differences I describe.... Moreover, those who
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I, in no way, however, mean to portray all divorcing women
as passive victims who lack the agency necessary to pursue
their interests. Rather, I simply recognize that many
women's socialized subordination to male dominance
discourages them from acting in their own best interests. I
also note that contextual constraints severely impede the
success of the women who do assertively pursue their
interests at divorce. Rather than stigmatize women as
victims, I hope this reinterpretation of women's freedom to
contract will expose an inherently coercive practice and
encourage divorcing women to resist their socialized
acquiescence to male dominance and the coercive context of
divorce.7
A. Financial Dependency
I first turn to the financial world of wives at divorce.
Women's caregiving responsibilities almost inevitably
constrain their participation in the marketplace."
Moreover, women who work outside the home face
continuing discrimination that often confines them to jobs
with low income and prestige, depressing their earnings
and making advancement difficult. 9 Over forty percent of
married women and married women with children in the
home do not participate in the labor force and earn no
income. ° Wives who work outside the home receive on
design dispute resolution systems harbor a moral responsibility
to promote the equality between men and women this society
allegedly reveres. Without acknowledging the world in which
most, if not all, women live and struggle, this responsibility goes
unfulfilled.
Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics
of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441, 448-49 (1992).
77. See Abrams, supra note 74, at 337 (identifying a feminist critique
of dominance feminism similar to the view and goals expressed in this
text); see also Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing
Differences: The Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REV.
25 (1990).
78. See DOWD, supra note 21, at 22; VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S
QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 62 (1988); OKN, supra note 19, at 155-
56.
79. See, e.g., DOWD, supra note 21, at 20-21; OKIN, supra note 19, at
144-46.
80. In 1987, 51% of married women did not participate in the paid
labor force. See ARLENE F. SALUTER, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
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average less than half the income of married men.8'
Consistent with their caregiving responsibility, wives with
births spaced over many years and wives with many
children have the lowest wages of all wives. 2 As a result,
wives, especially those with children, usually are financially
dependent upon husbands. Their financial dependency
creates severe pressure to settle unwisely.
Characteristically the husband controls the marital
financial resources," restricting the wife's access to the
funds she needs to survive. Moreover, many husbands
refuse to pay temporary child support and/or spousal
maintenance. The wife then cannot meet her and the
children's basic needs. Utility companies threaten to
discontinue services. Mortgage companies warn of
foreclosure. The family can no longer afford enough healthy
food.' Medical and dental care become luxuries.
If the wife can afford a lawyer or if she has sufficient
sophistication to represent herself, she can request a
temporary support order. Yet a hearing on a _petition for
temporary support may not occur for months" and many
judges refuse to make such awards.88 Even when judges do
DEP'T OF COMMERCE,CURRENT POPULATIONS REPORTS SPECIAL STUDIES,
SERIES P-23, No. 163, CHANGES IN AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 18 (1989). A
1991 U.S. Bureau of the Census report indicates that 58% of married
women participate in the paid labor force. See Amato, supra note 14, at
208 (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
1991, Tbl. 131).
81. See SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT, A LESSER LIFE: THE MYTH OF
WOMEN'S LIBERATION IN AMERICA 82 (1986). Garrison found that in
contested divorce cases husbands' incomes averaged approximately
three times those of wives. See Garrison, supra note 14, at 652.
82. See HEWLETT, supra note 81, at 81-83.
83. The husband's authority or power over financial matters stems
from his individual possession of resources, such as wages and prestige,
that are given value in the world outside the family. See PHILIP
BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES 52-93 (1983); see
also OKIN, supra note 19, at 156-59.
84. See, e.g., WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 339-40. See generally In re
Marriage of Gurin, 571 N.E.2d 857, 864 (Ml. App. Ct. 1991).
85. See Judge James Delaney, How to Bring Legal Sanity to
Domestic Relations: Civilizing Family Courts, 2 FAM. ADvoC. 20, 23
(1980).
86. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 21;
Karen Czapanskiy, Domestic Violence, the Family, and the Lawyering
Process: Lessons from Studies on Gender Bias in the Courts, 27 FAM.
L.Q. 247, 250 n.11 (1993); Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 43, at
187-88; Missouri Gender Bias Report, supra note 43, at 550-51.
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order temporary support, many husbands fail to comply.8 7
During divorce negotiations, the wife's desperate financial
situation may encourage her to accept a poor settlement
offer. On the streets, attorneys call this well-known tactic
"starving her out."88
The wife's relative lack of financial resources hampers
her ability to pay attorney fees.89 Many wives proceed
without lawyers" or agree to joint representation by
lawyers their husbands have chosen.9' Wives who seek
87. Karen Winner relates one woman's story:
After divorce proceedings began, a judge ordered Mr. Miller to
continue supporting his wife and their three young sons. But
Miller stopped sending checks after a few months. At the sametime, Merrily was working for a weekly wage of $75 as a part-
time teaching assistant-clearly not enough 
to support herself
or their young children. Merrily Miller had to find a law firm
that would help her collect child support. [Aifer three years the
law firm had not collected a single penny for her, and she and
her three young sons fell into desperate poverty .... But the
ruling by New York State Supreme Court Justice Vincent
Gurahian only made matters worse. The judge forgave Merrily's
husband the $88,000 he owed to Merrily in child support and
maintenance ....
KAREN WINNER, DIVORCED FROM JUSTICE: THE ABUSE OF WOMEN AND
CHILDREN BY DIVORCE LAWYERS AND JUDGES 23-24 (1996); see also
FLORENCE W. KASLOW & LITA LINZER SCHWARTZ, THE DYNAMICs OF
DIVORCE: A LIFE CYCLE PERSPECTIVE 66 (1987).
88. See WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 161-62; Florida Gender Bias
Report, supra note 43, at 810; Missouri Gender Bias Report, supra note
43, at 535. As Winner notes:
In divorce court, some lawyers use so-called scorched earth
tactics against wives in a campaign to wear them down and
starve them out. They attempt to outspend the wife by legally
obstructing the proceedings and delaying an agreement until
she finally runs out of money and patience and gives up.
WINNER, supra note 87, at 58. Cases challenging settlement agreements
frequently reflect the circumstances that Winner describes and that
courts largely ignore. See generally Penelope E. Bryan, Reclaiming
Professionalism: The Lawyer's Role in Divorce Mediation, 28 FAM. L. Q.
177, 177-88 (1994).
89. See ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 12; Florida Gender Bias Report,
supra note 43, at 808-11; Missouri Gender Bias Report, supra note 43,
at 528-30.
90. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 20;
WINNER, supra note 87, at xviii-xxxix; Czapanskiy, supra note 86, at
250 n.11; In re Marriage of Broday, 628 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
91. See In re Marriage of Brandt, 489 N.E.2d 902 (fll. App. Ct. 1986).
Judges, however, typically hold wives without funds responsible for
"choosing" to proceed pro se and refuse to vacate allegedly unfair
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independent legal representation often cannot find it.
Lawyers know that wives frequently cannot pay their fees
and that courts commonly refuse to order husbands to pay
those fees.92
Even if both spouses can afford attorneys, frequently
the wife is forced to hire a less expensive and less
competent lawyer.93 Wives who initially can afford to hire
lawyers also may run out of money during the lengthy
divorce process' and many courts refuse to award her
attorney fees during the pendency of the divorce.95 Limited
financial resources leave wives vulnerable to numerous
agreements. See, e.g., In re Broday, 628 N.E.2d at 795-96. Courts also
presume that wives receive adequate independent representation from
attorneys their husbands have chosen represent them. See, e.g., In re
Brandt, 489 N.E.2d 902.
92. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 21;
Czapanskiy, supra note 86, at 250 n.11; Florida Gender Bias Report,
surpa note 43, at 808-11; Garrison, supra note 14, at 712; Missouri
Gender Bias Report, supra note 43, at 531-34 (noting that many
attorneys admitted their reluctance to represent women in divorce
proceedings because they knew they would not get paid); Lynn Hecht
Schafran, Gender and Justice: Florida and the Nation, 42 FLA. LAW
REV. 181, 187-88 (1990).
93. See Bryan, supra note 88, at 177-88; Florida Gender Bias Report,
supra note 43, at 810. Many lawyers, particularly good and expensive
lawyers, admit that they prefer to represent husbands because
husbands can pay their fees. Winner states:
The man who controls the family's money-and his wife's
share-is in a position financially and legally to overpower his
spouse in the divorce proceeding. In 1991 Barbara L. Paltrow,
President of the Nassau County Women's Bar Association,
described the prototypical case in a letter to her peers: 'He had
access to high priced legal talent from the start, access to
lawyers who knew how to use the system to great and often
unfair advantage. The wife, on the other hand, quickly
discovered that most lawyers would not represent her on the
promise of getting paid, eventually, from family resources
controlled by the husband. In order to have any representation
these women had to exhaust their life savings, if they had any,
and borrow to the hilt from family or friends. Even this was
rarely enough to pay for the protracted litigation forced upon
them.
WINNER, supra note 87, at 13.
94. See Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 43, at 808-09;
Missouri Gender Bias Report, supra note 43, at 535.
95. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 21;
Czapanskiy, supra note 86, at 250 n.11; Florida Gender Bias Report,




adversarial tactics that prolong the divorce process and
increase their expenses." Husbands' attorneys may delay,
file frivolous motions, and fail to comply with discovery
requests.97 Husbands themselves may foil discovery and
conceal assets.98 When women clients can no longer pay,
lawyers sometimes abandon them or provide inadequate
representation.99
96. One seasoned family law attorney put it this way:
The inability of the economically dependent spouse to
participate on equal footing in litigation in the areas of domestic
relations ... creates bias in my opinion in favor of men and
against women and runs to all areas, all issues in domestic
relations. The party with the control of the finances literally has
such a significant advantage in my opinion that they cannot
only control the litigation but also wind up with a great
advantage on every issue and I think if played right can succeed
in almost every issue. We see this more and more.
Missouri Gender Bias Report, supra note 43, at 530.
97. See WINNER, supra note 87, at 66-70. Winner tells of Charlotte
Bogart, who in 1981 at the age of 58 separated from her husband
Donald after a 26-year marriage. During the marriage, Donald had
beaten Charlotte, breaking her leg and injuring her shoulder on
separate occasions. Donald's lawyer requested bifurcation of the divorce
from the maintenance and property issues. Charlotte had to change
lawyers during the divorce. Her former lawyer wrote her new lawyer a
letter warning of Donald's lawyer's threats to delay the ultimate
settlement for years. The judge granted the divorce in 1988, retaining
jurisdiction over the remaining property and support issues. Once the
divorce was final, Donald, who had control over the $1,000,000 marital
estate, lost all motivation to settle the remaining issues. Thirteen years
later, at the age of 71, Charlotte finally gave up her fight and accepted
her ex-husband's settlement offer. She had paid over $100,000 in
attorney fees during her 13-year struggle for justice. See id. at 66-69.
Many times divorce cases are settled before the parties exchange basic
financial information. In their study of 349 Wisconsin divorce cases,
Melli et al. found that only 90 case files contained mandatory Financial
Disclosure Sheets from both parties. One hundred twenty-six case files
contained little or no financial information. See Melli et al., supra note
15, at 1146-47.
98. See 1VIASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, 22-23;
WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 342-43 (noting that some men delay a
bonus, commission, or raise until after the divorce, minimizing the
income available for child support or spousal maintenance).
99. See WINNER, supra note 87, at xix, 13. Winner tells Ginger's
story:
Barkley [Ginger's brother] related how his sister's first attorney
had walked off the case. Her siblings had sunk more than
$30,000 into legal fees for the lawyer to defend their sister's
rights in court, only to see him withdraw from the proceeding
after his bill climbed to $70,000. He had already threatened to
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The wife's inadequate financial resources may prevent
her and/or her attorney from conducting her case in a
manner that effectively protects her interests.0 0 Because
husbands generally control the marital financial resources
and sometimes conceal assets' or deliberately
misrepresent the value of these assets,0 2 the wife frequently
must conduct expensive discovery. If she cannot afford
discovery, she will lack the information she needs to
negotiate effectively and to determine whether a settlement
offer is fair.0 3 Many wives simply cannot afford discovery.0
quit unless he got more money, so one of Ginger's sisters, a
retired school teacher, had borrowed $23,000 on her credit cards
to pay him to continue representing Ginger. They had also
signed a promissory note. Despite these payments, the attorney
dropped Ginger's case four months later. He had the judge's
permission to do so.
WINNER, supra note 87, at 17; see also Florida Gender Bias Report,
supra note 43, at 809. As an alternative to abandonment, a lawyer may
insist that the client sign a confession of judgment or a promissory note
that can later serve as the basis for the lawyer's lien on the client's
property, sometimes the marital home. See WINNER, supra note 87, at
85-88.
100. See WISCONSIN EQUAL JUSTICE TASK: FINAL REPORT 237-38
(1991) [hereinafter WISCONSIN GENDER BIAS REPORT]; Missouri Gender
Bias Report, supra note 43, at 528-30.
101. See PATRICIA PHILLIPS, DIVORCE: A WOMAN'S GUIDE TO GETTING
A FAIR SHARE 94, 101-09 (1995); WINNER, supra note 87, at 64-65; see
also In re Marriage of Palacios, 656 N.E.2d 107, appeal denied, 662
N.E.2d 427 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (finding that husband concealed $5.38
million in lottery winnings from his wife); In re Marriage of Frederick,
578 N.E.2d 612 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Ridgway v. Ridgway, 497 N.E.2d
126 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); In re Marriage of Broday, 628 N.E.2d 790 (I1l.
App. Ct. 1993); Bellow v. Bellow, 352 N.E.2d 427 (M1. App. Ct. 1976).
102. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 22-
23. See generally In re Marriage of Brandt, 489 N.E.2d 902 (Ill. App. Ct.
1986).
103. See, e.g., MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43,
at 22-23; OKIN, supra note 19, at 152; Florida Gender Bias Report,
supra note 43, at 810; Melli et al., supra note 15, at 1146-47; see also
MacDougall, supra note 16, at 34 (discussing the importance of
information to effective negotiation). Cases challenging settlement
agreements abound with examples of wives and/or their attorneys
failing to conduct discovery. Typically, courts either perceive the wife's
or her attorney's failure to conduct discovery as the product of the wife's
negligence. See, e.g., In re Broday, 628 N.E.2d at 795. They fail to
acknowledge that the wife's meager financial resources may
compromise her ability to discover. For instance, in In re Marriage of
Broday, the court cites the wife's negligence to discover in denying her
later claim of concealment or misrepresentation by her husband. See id.
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If the wife's attorney attempts discovery, often the courts do
not enforce the request."5
Once the marital assets are identified, they must be
valued. Appraisers or financial consultants must be
retained. Their services add expenses the wife can ill-
afford.0 6 Moreover, courts rarely award adequate expert
witness fees in divorce cases.'0 7 Even if the wife can afford
to employ some experts, the husband often can hire more
convincing experts with better credentials.
The wife's caretaking responsibilities within the family
can create additional financial pressures. Despite the
growing prevalence of egalitarian sex-role attitudes, wives
still retain primary responsibility for homemaking and
child rearing. The wife's acceptance of this role is secured
104. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 22-
23; Missouri Gender Bias Report, supra note 43, at 531.
105. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 22-
23.
106. Winner writes:
Husbands usually control the money supply at the end of the
marriage. If a woman's husband chooses to conceal assets, the
discovery process can be dragged out for years, her lawyer
charging fees every step of the way, in the effort to collect and
assess financial information from her husband and his
lawyers.... For many women, the process of discovery is much
like cutting off an arm to save a finger. Commissioning experts
to track down assets is a major expense. And the financial
information the lawyer obtains from the husband and his
attorneys doesn't necessarily help women in the courtroom,
because the information often isn't reliable. Peijury is a major
problem in divorce court.
WINNER, supra note 87, at 40-41; see also Florida Gender Bias Report,
supra note 43, at 810.
107. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 21.
108. Statistics from 1995 indicate that women spend more than
three times as many hours caring for children and substantially more
time at household tasks than do men. See Laura Shapiro, The Myth of
Quality Time, NEWSWEEK, May 12, 1997, at 62, 68. As noted by Fuchs:
In the early years of the sex-role revolution there was a hope
that differences in homemaking and childcare responsibilities
would disappear, but this is not occurring on a large scale.
There are some households in which the father does as much as
or more than the mother, but they are the exception, not the
rule. Moreover, almost one child in four is raised in a household
without a father or stepfather. Children are still predominately
women's concern.
FUCHS, supra note 78, at 72. Fuchs concludes that women's
disproportionate responsibility for child care provides the most powerful
1178 [Vol. 47
1999] WOMEN CONTRACTING AT DIVORCE
through her socialization as a caregiver and through the
validation that she receives from her husband and children,
and from society for behaving in conformity with unspoken
expectations of self-sacrifice.' °9 The importance the wife
places on her caregiving role encourages her to place
greater value on having custody of the children than does
her husband."0  A loss of custody would not only
unacceptably alter her relationship with the children, it
would deeply violate her sense of self."' A divorcing mother,
then, may be inclined to accept an unfair financial
agreement if her husband threatens a custody dispute."2
explanation of the difference in men and women's earnings. See id. at
60-62. Although the gap between men and women's wages closed by an
unprecedented seven percent between 1980 and 1986, Fuchs explains
that the improvement was due largely to the increased percentage of
women workers who were born after 1946 and had fewer children. See
id. at 65-66; see also MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED
MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTiETH CENTURY
TRAGEDIES 161-65 (1995); WINNER, supra note 87, at 47.
109. See generally CHESLER, supra note 45.
110. In her study of the California divorce courts, Weitzman found
that 96% of the divorced women, compared to 57% of divorced men,
reported that they wanted custody of their children. Only 38% of the
divorced men, however, spoke of custody with their lawyers and only
13% requested custody in their divorce petition. Weitzman concludes
that most divorcing fathers are not seriously interested in having
custody of their children, while most divorcing mothers are. See
WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 243-44. Others found a similar
discrepancy between what type of custody fathers said they wanted and
what custody they actually requested. In seeking to explain this
discrepancy, the researchers speculated that fathers may not have
wanted custody as passionately as mothers, that fathers may have
conformed to the social expectation that women "should" have custody,
that fathers may have perceived their wishes as unrealistic because
they were less experienced parents than their wives, or that fathers
ultimately may have perceived their desire for custody as inconsistent
with the demands of their work. See Mnookin et al., supra note 42, at
72.
111. See CHESLER, supra note 45, at 334-38; Missouri Gender Bias
Report, supra note 43, at 536; Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and
Crime, 79 IOWA L. REV. 95, 96-98 (1993). Moreover, divorced mothers
without custody face social stigmatization. Since most people believe
that the law favors mother custody and that all good mothers want
custody, what kind of mother could she possibly be if she lost or
voluntarily relinquished custody? See CHESLER, supra note 45, at 176-
82.
112. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 25
(noting that in divorce mediation women bargain away their economic
rights in order to retain custody of the children); see also WINNER, supra
1179
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The wife's meager financial resources make her fear of
losing custody even more salient, for she knows that she
cannot, and that he can, hire attorneys and experts."
B. Psychological Factors and Socialized Tendencies
Many psychological factors or socialized tendencies
cause wives significant problems in divorce negotiations."'
Particularly important are intangible resource disparities
between men and women, more particularly, disparities
between husbands and wives. Lawyers negotiate many
divorce settlements for their clients, arguably insulating
women from the consequences of the following
characteristics. However, as explained earlier, many wives
lack the financial resources necessary to hire lawyers."'
note 87, at 50-51; Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 43, at 819-20;
Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and
the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POLY REV. 168 (1984).
113. Experienced lawyers recognize that the wife's limited financial
resources compromise her interests on all divorce issues. See Missouri
Gender Bias Report, supra note 43, at 530. Winner tells Cyndi's
particularly disturbing story:
Cyndi, a working mother from New York said the court papers
were filled with falsehoods about her ability as a mother, which
Cyndi had to defend herself against. She knew that in reality
her husband did not want custody, because he had expressed
little desire to care for the children. The father's real goal was to
get out of paying child support. If he obtained custody, Cyndi, as
the noncustodial parent, would be legally responsible for paying
child support. Cyndi's husband and his lawyer convinced the
judge through false statements that she was not as good a
mother as he was a father. The judge believed him and Cyndi
lost custody. But not too long afterward, and unknown to the
court, her ex-husband sent the kids to live with her. Cyndi is
still paying her husband child support, even though she is now
the de facto custodial parent. She told me she would rather keep
her kids, even if it means paying child support too, because they
mean more to her than anything. She fears having to go back to
court to reopen the custody dispute, but adds that the current
situation is also hard for her. If she does something to displease
her ex-husband she knows that he can wrench the children
away at any time, as their lawful custodial parent.
WINNER, supra note 87, at 63-64. In its most extreme form, the wife's
training/socialization as caregiver has led some women to relinquish
custody in order to protect their children from a custody battle.
114. See Bryan, supra note 76, at 457-81.
115. See supra notes 79-113 and accompanying text.
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These wives must negotiate directly with their husbands.
Moreover, as discussed later, many lawyers represent wives
poorly, allow or encourage their clients to negotiate directly
with their husbands, and/or serve merely as clerks who
shepherd through the courts an agreement reached
privately by the husband and wife."6 Consequently, even
when lawyers represent wives, the following characteristics
frequently have a direct effect on negotiated outcomes.
When a wife's lawyer does negotiate competently on her
behalf, the wife's characteristics can make it difficult for the
lawyer to secure the wife's permission to act as an advocate.
Finally, today many divorce agreements are reached in
mediation where the wife and husband negotiate directly
with one another."7 In mediation, these characteristics bear
immediately upon the negotiated outcome."8
1. Naive trust. Many wives naively trust their
husbands,"' their lawyers, and the legal system during the
divorce process."o The wife's naive trust of her husband
may encourage her to assume that she does not need her
own lawyer to protect her interests and that her husband
will treat her fairly at divorce. 2' Some wives agree to
representation by attorneys that their husbands or their
husband's lawyers have chosen.'22 Others perceive discovery
116. See infra pp. 181-86 and accompanying notes.
117. See Bryan, supra note 76, at 447.
118. Mediators claim they can balance the power between husbands
and wives during mediation and thus, prevent lop-sided agreements.
Upon closer examination, however, this claim proves false. See Bryan,
supra note 76, for an explanation of why mediators do not and cannot
compensate for the power imbalances between husbands and wives.
Moreover, even when lawyers represent wives in mediation, power
imbalances between spouses can still severely disadvantage wives. See
Bryan, supra note 88, at 193. The Massachusetts' Gender Bias Report
reveals that mediation disadvantages women on financial as well as
child issues. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43,
at 23-27.
119. The wife's financial dependency upon her husband helps explain
her naive trust of him. Because of the dependent person's psychological
need to perceive her benefactor as benevolent, dependency tends to
breed naive trust.
120. See ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 9.
121. See In re Marriage of Broday, 628 N.E.2d 790, 795 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993).
122. See In re Marriage of Beck, 404 N.E.2d 790, 795 (Ill. App. Ct.
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as unnecessary because they trust their husbands to define
accurately, to value fairly, and even to divide appropriately,
the marital assets." Marital scripts exacerbate the
tendency of wives to defer to husbands on financial issues.
While many couples today exhibit egalitarian attitudes
about marriage, the traditional division of labor within the
family seems quite intractable.1" Certainly more wives than
ever now participate in the workforce and share the burden
of providing for the family.'25 Yet husbands exercise greater
control over marital decisiomaking than wives,
particularly on important financial decisions.' When a
husband has exercised authority over financial issues, the
wife may accept his definition and valuation of the marital
property rather than require verification by an expert,
particularly if she lacks the resources to hire that expert. 27
The wife's naive trust in the justice of the legal
system2 8 and in the integrity of her lawyer discourages her
1980); Beattie v. Beattie, 368 N.E.2d 178, 179-80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
123. See infra pp. 191-203 and accompanying text.
124. See DOwD, supra note 21, at 33; FINEMAN, supra note 108, at
164; Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for
Parental Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1415-16, 1435, 1451-53 &
n.125 (1991); see also supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
Pateman traces the historical evolution of women's domestic service
within the family and concludes that being a woman (wife) means
providing services for and at the command of a man (husband). See
PATEMAN, supra note 2, at 116-28.
125. See Czapanskiy, supra note 124, at 1415 & n.1, 1451-53 &
n.124.
126. See, e.g., BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 83, at 53-59, 62-
65.
127. See, e.g., In re Broday, 628 N.E.2d 790, 795 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
128. Sarat and Felstiner note that divorce clients "come to the
divorce lawyer's office believing in the efficacy of rights in the legal
system, only to encounter a process that not only is 'inconsistent,' but
cannot be counted on to protect fundamental rights or deal in a
principled way with the important matters that come before it." AUSTIN
SARAT & WILLIAM L. F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR
CLIENTS: POWER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 93 (1995). These
authors relate an exchange between a female divorce client, Jane, and
her attorney, Peter:
Jane: I just really cannot quite believe this. Part of me is still
incredulous. It's nothing else than property rights. I don't even
have the rights of a landlord, to go to a home that I own 50
percent of, to make sure it's not being destroyed. I don't
understand that. I always thought that, in some way or
another, if one's human rights were not protected, one's
property rights were.
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from exercising the vigilance needed to protect her
interests.129 Moreover, when a wife finally realizes that her
husband is indifferent to her needs, that the judge truly is
biased, or that her lawyer has unjustly or incompetently
compromised her case, she becomes frightened and
disheartened. The brutality of the transition from the
mindset of the family to that of law and the market can
stun and confuse her,30 leaving her ill-equipped to fend for
herself during divorce negotiations. 3'
2. Care orientation. Much has been written about
women's ethic of care, their distinctive orientation towards
moral issues.' 2 The literature suggests that women tend to
Peter: No.
Id.
129. As Winner notes:
Women... are more likely [than men] to regard the system
idealistically, believing perhaps too literally in the image of the
blindfolded lady holding up the scales of justice. It is little
wonder that so many women made poorer by their divorces use
the same words to describe this misplaced trust in the system,
saying, 'I was so naive-I was a babe in the woods'.
WINNER, supra note 87, at 12.
130. Regan explains the dichotomy between the family and the
market as follows:
In this dichotomy, the family represents the sphere of life
characterized by relationships of mutuality and care, in which
individuals are willing to forego their own advantage for the
sake of others with whom they share largely ineluctable bonds.
The interdependence of family members' lives creates the
prospect that individuals within a family may sometimes be
subject to obligations that cannot wholly be described as
voluntarily chosen. By contrast, the market ostensibly is the
realm of the sovereign individual, animated by self-interest,
who surrenders her freedom only to the degree that she has
consented to do so. Individuals in the market thus relate as
strangers, whose ties to one another are deliberately forged as
well as broken, and whose obligations to each other are best
characterized as contractual.
Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations and
Property Rhetoric, 82 GEO. L.J. 2303, 2306 (1994).
131. See KIRP ET AL., supra note 5, at 179 (noting the difference
between family and marketplace norms). Cases offer numerous
examples of the wife's failure to comprehend the law and the
significance of legal proceedings. Moreover, some wives seem so
stunned by their attorneys' claims that the offers before them are the
best the law provides that they acquiesce without question or contest.
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Brandt, 489 N.E.2d 902 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
132. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL
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care more for others than for themselves " whereas men
exhibit more individualistic tendencies. 1 1 In the family,
where women are socially conditioned to perform as
caretakers,..5 this tendency becomes more pronounced. " '
Although caring for others and tending to relationships
has great value, this orientation may create problems for
wives during divorce negotiations. The preference for
private ordering in divorce cases assumes that two self-
interested individuals conduct negotiations. 3 Moreover, as
noted earlier, wives may be particularly vulnerable to their
husbands' threats to seek custody of the children."' Their
care orientation enhances that vulnerability. Wives' care
orientation also encourages them to focus on the emotional
issues in divorce, sometimes to the exclusion of financial
THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (spawning debate about the
existence and the origin of women's care orientation).
133. Gilligan explains:
In analyzing women's thinking about what constitutes care and
what connection means, I noted women's difficulty in including
themselves among the people for whom they considered it moral
to care. The inclusion of self is genuinely problematic not only
for women but also for society in general. Self-inclusion on the
part of women challenges the conventional understanding of
feminine goodness by severing the link between care and self-
sacrifice; in addition, the inclusion of women challenges the
interpretive categories of the Western tradition, calling into
question descriptions of human nature and holding up to
scrutiny the meaning of "relationship," "love," "morality," and
"self."
Carol Gilligan, Prologue: Adolescent Development Reconsidered, in
MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN VII, XXX-XXXI (Carol Gilligan et al. eds.,
1988); see also GILLIGAN, supra note 132; Trina Grillo, The Mediation
Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1601
(1991). The tendency of wives to discount the importance of their own
needs may be particularly acute in violent marriages. See ANGELA
BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 78-79 (1987); Karla Fischer et
al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic
Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. REV. 2117, 2162 (1993).
134. See GILLIGAN, supra note 132.
135. See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, Beyond No-Fault: New Directions in
Divorce Reform, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 6, 30 (Stephen
D. Sugarman & Henna Hill Kay eds., 1990).
136. Williams argues that the market requires the husband to
perform as an ideal worker with few family responsibilities. In order for
husbands to meet this market requirement, wives assume the domestic
responsibilities. See Williams, supra note 26, at 2235-41.
137. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 367-68.
138. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
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issues."3 9 Husbands, on the other hand tend to treat the
divorce more as a business transaction.34
3. Status. Income, education, occupational rank, and
sex determine an individual's status. 4' Status significantly
influences negotiation dynamics because people grant
authority to high status persons,' as well as defer to the
opinions of, and succumb, knowingly or unconsciously, to
the influence of high status persons. During divorce
negotiations husbands tend to have higher status than
their wives, 44 encouraging others, including attorneys and
wives, to defer to them. Moreover, women's lower status
relative to men makes women more easy to influence than
men and promotes their greater tendency to conform 45-
troublesome traits in negotiations.
139. See Bryan, supra note 76, at 488-90 & n.203.
140. See WINNER, supra note 87, at 23, 57. Winner explains:
"Being nice" to her husband during the divorce was the main
concern of Rae Logan, Director of the State Bond Commission in
Louisiana. Logan concedes: "I was so concerned about being
nice. He got the Fiat, the savings account, and the girlfriend. I
got the bills, the furniture, and the children. It was my fault. I
was so concerned with maintaining his image. I was concerned
with not being seen as the stereotypical 'hysterical' divorcee."
Many women, to their own disadvantage, are simply not
culturally geared to think about money at the time of divorce.
Id. at 12; see also Isolina Ricci, Mediator's Notebook: Reflections on
Promoting Equal Empowerment and Entitlements for Women, J.
DIVORCE, Spring-Summer 1985, at 49.
141. See Bryan, supra note 76, at 458-63.
142. See Alice H. Eagly, Gender and Social Influence: A Social
Psychological Analysis, 38 AM. PSYCHOL. 971 (1983); see also JOHN
SCANZONI, SEXUAL BARGAINING: POWER POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN
MARRIAGE 82-83 (2d ed. 1982).
143. See generally Joseph Berger & Morris Zelditch, Jr., Artifacts
and Challenges: A Comment on Lee and Ofshe, 46 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 59
(1983); Eagly, supra note 142; Gerald W. McDonald, Family Power: The
Assessment of a Decade of Theory and Research, 1970-1979, 42 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 841 (1980); Charlan Jeanne Nemeth, Reflections on
the Dialogue Between Status and Style: Influence Processes of Social
Control and Social Change, 46 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 70 (1983); Aysan
Tuzlak & James C. Moore, Jr., Status, Demeanor and Influence: An
Empirical Reassessment, 47 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 178 (1984).
144. See Bryan, supra note 76, at 458-63, for an explanation of status
disparities between men and women, particularly between husbands
and wives.
145. See id. at 462.
1185
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
4. Self-Esteem. People with high self-esteem negotiate
better outcomes than do people with low self-esteem." High
self-esteem also leaves one less vulnerable to the influence
of others.47 In contrast, low self-esteem can inhibit
bargaining ability and encourage people to accept
unfavorable settlements.48
For a variety of reasons women have low self-esteem,"
and women have lower self-esteem than do men.5° Divorce
exacerbates the disparity in self-esteem between men and
women because the loss of marital status depresses the
wife's self-esteem more than it does the husband's. 5'
Divorcing wives with low self-esteem may be vulnerable to
146. See John F. Stolte, Self-Efficacy: Sources and Consequences in
Negotiation Networks, 119 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 69 (1983); see also JOHN
ScANZONI & MAXIMILIANE SZINOVAcz, FAMILY DECISION-MAKING: A
DEVELOPMENTAL SEX ROLE MODEL 31 (1980).
147. See, e.g., Steven J. Sherman, Internal-External Control and Its
Relationships to Attitude Change Under Different Social Influence
Techniques, 26 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 23 (1972); David Vern
Stimpson, The Influence of Commitment and Self-Esteem on
Susceptibility to Persuasion, 80 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 189 (1970).
148. "[D]iminished feelings of self-worth may inhibit the ability to
bargain constructively and effectively, or worse, produce an abject
acceptance of almost any terms dictated by the other." KENNETH
KRESSEL, THE PROCESS OF DIVORCE: How PROFESSIONALS AND COUPLES
NEGOTIATE SETTLEMENTS 83 (1985). Kressel speaks of the low self-
esteem of the spouse whose husband or wife seeks the divorce. See id.
No reason exists, however, to suspect that low self-esteem attributable
to this cause has greater effect on negotiating ability than low self-
esteem attributable to other causes.
149. See Bryan, supra note 76, at 472-74 for an explanation of
women's low self-esteem.
150. See, e.g., Jon W. Hoelter, Factorial Invariance and Self-Esteem:
Reassessing Race and Sex Differences, 61 SOC. FORCES 834 (1983);
Sharron Koffman & Hilary M. Lips, Sex Differences in Self-Esteem and
Performance Expectancies in Married Couples, 8 SOC. BEHAV. &
PERSONALITY 57 (1980). But see Marlene Mackie, The Domestication of
Self: Gender Comparisons of Self-Imagery and Self-Esteem, 46 SOC.
PSYCHOL. Q. 343 (1983) (finding no self-esteem differences between
husbands and wives).
151. See, e.g., William A. Barry, Marriage Research and Conflict: An
Integrative Review, 73 PSYCHOL. BULL. 41 (1970); Anne Statham Macke
et al., Housewives' Self-Esteem and their Husbands' Success: The Myth
of Vicarious Involvement, 41 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 51 (1979) (finding
that housewives' self-esteem is related to perceived marital success);
Marlene Mackie, supra note 141, at 346. As one author notes "becoming
a man's wife is still the major means through which most women can
find a recognized social identity." See PATEMAN, supra note 2, at 132.
Loss of that valued identity can lead to lowered self-esteem.
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their husbands' or their attorneys' attempts to influence
them, and may be more inclined than their husbands to
accept poor offers.'52
5. Depression. Generally women suffer far more from
depression than do men.5 ' Married couples exhibit an even
greater difference in depression between men and women."
At divorce, the wife's acquisition of unfamiliar roles
(primary bread-winner/single parent), her loss of the valued
role of wife, and her predictable financial problems enhance
the likelihood of her depression."' Depression has a
devastating impact on a person's ability to negotiate
effectively," and truly depressed persons predictably fare
poorly in negotiations " ' .
6. Expectations. People who negotiate with higher
expectations tend to obtain more than people with lower
expectations.'58 Women expect less than men for their
contributions.'59 Consequently, in divorce negotiations many
wives expect and obtain a smaller share of the marital
152. See Bryan, supra note 76, at 472 & n.125.
153. Rosenfield notes that the differences between depression in men
and women are "found across cultures, over time, in different age
groups, in rural as well as urban areas, and in treated as well as
untreated populations. Researchers estimate that women have as much
as twice the rate of distress and depression as men." Sarah Rosenfield,
The Effects of Women's Employment: Personal Control and Sex
Differences in Mental Health, 30 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 77, 77
(1989). For an explanation of why women are more prone to depression
than men, see Bryan, supra note 76, at 467-68.
154. See Rosenfield, supra note 153, at 77.
155. See Bryan, supra note 76, at 469-70.
156. See id. at 466-71.
157. See id.; see also Bryan, supra note 88, at 177-88, 199-200
(providing an example of how depression affects negotiation
competence).
158. See DONALD G. GIFFORD, LEGAL NEGOTIATIONS: THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS 99 (1989) (citations omitted); DEAN G. PRUITT,
NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR 26 (1981) (citing John G. Holmes et al., The
Effects of Prenegotiation Expectations on the Distributive Bargaining
Process, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 582-99 (1971)); Donald L.
Harnett et al., Personality, Bargaining Style and Payoff in Bilateral
Monopoly Bargaining Among European Managers, 36 SOCIOMETRY 325,
342 (1973).
159. See Bryan, supra note 76, at 475-77 for an explanation of why
women expect less than men.
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assets than do their husbands.60
7. Conflict Resolution Styles. Bargaining over scarce
marital resources is inherently competitive 6' and normally
induces competitive negotiation tactics. 162 A party reluctant
to assertively counter such tactics is disadvantaged. Several
factors discourage women from using assertive conflict
resolution styles in divorce negotiations.
In the early 1970's, Matina Homer found that women
were inhibited in achievement-oriented behavior." Women
saw their feminine sex role identity as inconsistent with
displays of competence, independence, competition,
intellectual acumen, and leadership. 65 They also feared that
engaging in such displays risked social rejection, loss of
femininity, and personal or social destruction. 6 6 Many had
high ability and cared about achievement. 167 Nevertheless,
even when they knew their success necessitated competitive
behavior they hesitated to behave in a competitive
fashion.' 8 Their greatest hesitation occurred when they
160. See infra pp. 191-210 and accompanying notes for an example.
161. Conflict theorists acknowledge the competitive nature of
bargaining over scarce resources. See, e.g., KENNETH E. BOULDING,
CONFLICT AND DEFENSE: A GENERAL THEORY 4-5 (1962); MORTON
DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT 20-25 (1973).
162. See Morton Deutsch, Conflict and Its Resolution, 7 Natl Tech.
Info. Service Technical Rep. No. 1, (Oct. 1, 1965); Barbara J. Lonsdorf,
Coercion: A Factor Affecting Women's Inferior Financial Outcome in
Divorce, 3 AM. J. FAM. L. 281, 288 (1989). See, e.g., June Starr &
Barbara Yngvesson, Scarcity and Disputing: Zeroing-In on Compromise
Decisions, 2 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 553 (1975).
163. See WINNER, supra note 87, at 12, 23, 57 (1996); Bryan, supra
note 76, at 477-81; see also Carol M. Rose, Women and Property:
Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REV. 421 (1992) (finding that
women's greater "taste for cooperation" than men's disadvantages
women in negotiations). Moreover, Rose persuasively argues that the
simple perception of others that women have a greater "taste for
cooperation" than men can disadvantage women in negotiations. Id.
164. See Matina S. Homer, Toward an Understanding of
Achievement-Related Conflicts in Women, 28 J. SOC. ISSUES 157, 173
(1972).
165. See id. at 171.
166. See id. at 162.
167. See Bryan, supra note 76, at 427 & n.125.
168. See Homer, supra note 164, at 171. The negative consequences
anticipated by these women seem quite reasonable when one considers
that women's popularity is adversely affected by aggressive, assertive
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competed with men169 or when important males,
particularly husbands or intimates, or parents disapproved
of their achievement-oriented behavior."
Although Homer conducted this research nearly thirty
years ago and women's worlds undoubtedly have changed
since then, more recent research suggests the continuing
viability of Homer's findings. Susan Pollock and Carol
Gilligan found that a greater percentage of women than
men associate violence with competitive success.' 7' Other
research confirms that men, as well as women, feel
threatened when women dominate in an achievement
situation.72 Taken together these findings suggest that
women tend to avoid competition and to perform beneath
their abilities in competitive situations, particularly when
they compete with males to whom they closely relate.
behavior. See Edward K. Sadalla et al., Dominance and Heterosexual
Attraction, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 730, 731-34 (1987).
Additionally, women's recent advances have precipitated a powerful
backlash. See generally SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED
WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN (1991).
169. See Homer, supra note 164, at 173.
170. See id. at 168-69. Homer's original research has received
criticism on methodological grounds and has proven difficult to
replicate. See, e.g., Adeline Levine & Janice Crumrine, Women and the
Fear of Success: A Problem in Replication, 80 AM. J. SOC. 964, 969-71
(1975) (finding no sex differences in fear of success imagery); Belle Rose
Ragins & Eric Sundstrom, Gender and Power in Organizations: A
Longitudinal Perspective, 105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 51, 71 (1989). More
recent research, however, lends support to Homer's original
conclusions. See infra pp. 136-37 and notes 171-73.
171. See Susan Pollak & Carol Gilligan, Images of Violence in
Thematic Apperception Test Stories, 42 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 159, 163 (1982). This research, like Homer's, has been
criticized. See Cynthia J. Benton et al., Is Hostility Linked with
Affiliation Among Males and With Achievement Among Females? A
Critique of Pollak and Gilligan, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1167 (1983). See generally Bernard Weiner et al., Compounding the
Errors: A Reply to Pollak and Gilligan, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1176 (1983) (criticizing Pollak and GiHligan's study). A more
recent study that replicates Pollak and Gilligan's findings, however,
suggests that the unwelcome message brought by Pollak and Gilligan's
work, rather than faulty methodology, explains the controversy. See
Vicki S. Helgeson & Don J. Sharpsteen, Perceptions of Danger in
Achievement and Affiliation Situations: An Extension of the Pollak and
Gilligan Versus Benton et al. Debate, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 727 (1987) (citing Susan Pollak & Carol Gilligan, Killing the
Messenger, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 374 (1985)).
172. See Helgeson & Sharpsteen, supra note 171, at 732.
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Research indicates that women, in fact, tend to employ
weak, indirect tactics, whereas men tend to use strong,
direct tactics.'73
Women are also more reluctant than men to behave
competitively in situations in which competition meets with
disapproval. A wife's assertive demands in divorce
negotiations often meet with her husband's, and sometimes




When couples resolve marital conflicts, wives tend to
accommodate, compromise, and facilitate more than their
husbands.76 Moreover, a study of distressed married
couples suggests that wives have more difficulty asserting
themselves in conversations with their husbands than they
do in conversations with other men.' 77 Spouses inevitably
bring their marital conflict resolution styles to the divorce
negotiation table,78 compromising the wife's ability to
protect her interests. 79
173. See generally Gloria Cowan et al., The Effects of Target, Age and
Gender on Use of Power Strategies, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1391 (1984); Toni Falbo & Letitia Anne Peplau, Power Strategies in
Intimate Relationships, 38 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 618 (1980);
Judith A. Howard et al., Sex, Power and Influence Tactics in Intimate
Relationships, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 102 (1986).
174. See Sheryle Whitcher Alagna, Sex Role Identity, Peer
Evaluation of Competition, and the Responses of Women and Men in a
Competitive Situation, 43 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 546, 553
(1982); see also KRESSEL, supra note 148, at 52-53; Ricci, supra note
140, at 53.
175. As Isolina Ricci notes:
When [the wife] does develop a utilitarian parenting or financial
plan, the husband might call her "cold," "calculating" or"selfish." Without interventions, these attributional labels may
be taken to heart rather than identified as a part of the
husband's bargaining tactics, and the wife may pull back and
revise her plan to gain his approval.
Ricci, supra note 140, at 53.
176. See Leonard H. Chusmir & Joan Mills, Gender Differences in
Conflict Resolution Styles of Managers: At Work and At Home, 20 SEX
ROLES 149, 151 (1989).
177. See Anne K. McCarrick et al., Gender Differences in Competition
and Dominance During Married Couples Group Therapy, 44 Soc.
PSYCHOL. Q. 164 (1981).
178. See Bryan, supra note 76, at 453 n.37.
179. During the investigation of gender bias in the Massachusetts
courts, Barbara Hauser, a director of the Family Service Clinic at
Middlesex Probate Court, testified:
At times it appears that the court and its personnel have a
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The foregoing illustrates the practical, psychological,
and social factors that inhibit a wife's ability to negotiate a
fair divorce settlement. Formal divorce laws exacerbate her
problems.
II. INDETERMINATE MASCULINE LAW
The law fails to compensate adequately for the wife's
disadvantage in divorce negotiations. Quite the reverse. As
the wife exits the marriage in which her caregiving and
sacrifices were endorsed and encouraged, she finds her life
recast in a masculine ideology of law and the market-an
ideology that comprehends the world through lenses of
autonomy, self-interest, formal equality, and
individualism.80 The sacrifices that she made in the
marketplace in order to fulfill her caregiving obligations,'
her continued financial dependency, her socialized
tendencies, and her prior investment in the family are
acknowledged only grudgingly in a world framed by these
limited appreciation about the inequality in ability of parties to
bargain effectively at the time of marital separation. Women in
these times often feel less adequate than men in areas of
articulating their needs and wishes, forcefulness in negotiating,
and economic stability. Furthermore, women often have a wish
to resolve conflict through communication and mediation rather
than taking a more adversarial posture, and it is thus
important that these differences be recognized rather than
overlooked in any form of divorce proceedings.
MASsACHUsETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 25.
180. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1713-16 (1976) (discussing the
ideology of individualism); see also Martha A. Fineman, Masking
Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181,
2182 (1995) (finding that society mythologizes autonomy and
independence). Feminists have claimed that legal concepts based upon
the experiences and interests of certain groups of men fail to reflect or
consider the life experiences of women and other nondominant groups.
See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Self-Defense and Relations of Domination:
Moral and Legal Perspectives on Battered Women Who Kill: Hostile
Domestic Environments: Commentary on Jane Maslow Cohen's Regimes
of Private Tyranny, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 809 (1996); Frances Olsen, The
Sex of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 453 (David Kairys ed., 1990).
Pateman also argues that the concept of individualism itself
contemplates men, not women. See PATEMAN, supra note 2, at 184-85.
181. See KIRP ET AL., supra note 5, at 18.
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concepts.'82 A closer examination of the substantive law and
its application clarify these points.
A. The Custody Standard
Society encourages married women to define
themselves primarily as mothers and wives, and they do.'83
Moreover, mothers provide far more child caretaking than
fathers."M For most divorcing mothers, then, a loss of
custody becomes an unacceptable loss of self.
The best interests of the child standard governs custody
decisions.'85 A typical statute lists ten or twelve factors
relevant to determining what custody and/or visitation
arrangement best serves a child's interest.'88 At first blush,
182. Martha Fineman argues that egalitarian ideology has helped to
neuter motherhood by devaluing and making invisible the caretaking
function that mothers typically perform. See FINEMAN, supra note 108,
at 68; see also Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV.
1, 60-65, 71-73 (1989) (arguing that a homemaker spouse's decision to
decrease her earning capacity to accommodate her spouse's lifestyle
preferences should not be compensated with alimony when that
decision yields a reduction in aggregate marital income except when her
services include primary responsibility for child care); Ann Laquer
Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71
N.C.L. REV. 721, 721-22, 728-30 (1993).
183. See PATEMAN, supra note 2, at 141.
184. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 61;
Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 43, at 821.
185. See, e.g., David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules
for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 477, 568 (1984);
Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of the Child:
Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of
Minnesota's Four Year Experiment with the Primary Caretaker
Preference, 75 MINN. L. REV. 427, 432 (1990); Czapanskiy, supra note
124, at 1442; Susan Beth Jacobs, The Hidden Gender Bias Behind "The
Best Interest of the Child" Standard in Custody Decisions, 13 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 845, 849 & nn.32-34 (1997).
186. Michigan's custody statute, for example, states:
As used in this act, "best interests of the child" means the sum
total of the following factors to be considered, evaluated, and
determined by the court: (a) The love, affection, and other
emotional ties existing between the parties involved and the
child. (b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to
give the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the
education and raising of the child in his or her religion or creed,
if any. (c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to
provide the child with food, clothing, medical care or other
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this may seem a friendly standard for a parent who has
invested substantial time in childcare. During the past
decade, however, fathers' groups have adeptly employed the
rhetoric of formal equality to press for legislation
expressing preferences for joint custody l 7 a presumption
that divorced children benefit from substantial and
continuing contact with both parents,'88 and friendly parent
provisions"' that favor the parent most likely to promote
remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of this
state in place of medical care, and other material needs. (d) The
length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory
environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity. (e)
The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed
custodial home or homes. (f) The moral fitness of the parties
involved. (g) The mental and physical health of the parties
involved. (h) The home, school, and community record of the
child. (i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court
considers the child to be of sufficient age to express preference.
(j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate
and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship
between the child and the other parent or the child and the
parents. (k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the
violence was directed against or witnessed by the child. (1) Any
other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a
particular child custody dispute.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23 (West 1993).
187. See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional
Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101
HARV. L. REV. 727, 758-59 (1988); Joanne Schulman & Valerie Pitt,
Second Thoughts on Joint Custody: Analysis of Legislation and Its
Implications for Women and Children, 12 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 538
(1982) (discussing joint custody).
188. See Czapanskiy, supra note 124, at 1442. The political and
social importance of the struggle for control over children extends
beyond any single mother/father dispute over custody. To the extent
that custodial parents have a better opportunity than non-custodial
parents to implant values in the hearts and minds of their children, the
ten million single-mothers raising children pose a distinct threat to the
hegemony of patriarchy. See Fineman, supra note 180, at 2211 n.74
(citing that ten million women are single mothers living with children
under 21 years old). One can understand then their attempts to reinsert
fathers into the families of custodial mothers. See Bryan, supra note 76,
at 495-96, n.237; see also DOWD, supra note 21; Nancy E. Dowd,
Stigmatizing Single Parents, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19 (1995).
Additionally, conservatives attempt to reinsert fathers into the families
of custodial mothers. See FINEMAN, supra note 108, at 118-19; Fineman,
supra note 180, at 2206-07.
189. The friendly parent provisions can create other perverse
situations. One gender bias study revealed that the wife, advised by
counsel to be "friendly" to the children's father, allowed her husband
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the non-custodial parent's relationship with the children.
These changes place fathers on equal legal footing with the
primary caretaker 9 mother.9 ' A mother who has invested
frequent contact with the children. At the final divorce hearing the
court granted the husband primary residential custody of the children,
reasoning that the mother did not really want the children because she
allowed the father to see them so often. See Florida Gender Bias Report,
supra note 43, at 819-23; Schulnan & Pitt, supra note 187, at 554-56,
572-77 (discussing friendly parent provisions).
190. In Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981), Justice
Neely of the West Virginia Supreme Court recognized that the best
interests standard's indeterminacy provoked custody litigation,
hindered settlement, and provided no guidance to courts. See id. at 361-
63. He also noted that the insecurity the standard created in caretaking
mothers allowed fathers to leverage better financial results by
threatening to contest custody. See id. at 360-62. To minimize this
dysfunctionality, Justice Neely turned to the primary caretaker
standard. He defined the primary caretaker as one who:
has taken primary responsibility for, inter alia, the performance
of the following caring and nurturing duties of a parent: (1)
preparing and planning of meals; (2) bathing, grooming and
dressing; (3) purchasing, cleaning, and care of clothes; (4)
medical care, including nursing and trips to physicians; (5)
arranging for social interaction among peers after school, i.e.[,]
transporting to friends' houses or, for example, to girl or boy
scout meetings; (6) arranging alternative care, i.e.[,]
babysitting, day-care, etc.; (7) putting child to bed at night,
attending to child in the middle of the night, waking child in the
morning; (8) disciplining, i.e.[,] teaching general manners and
toilet training; (9) educating, i.e.[,] religious, cultural, social,
etc.; and, (10) teaching elementary skills, i.e., reading, writing
and arithmetic.
Id. at 363. Many feminists have endorsed the primary caretaker
standard because of its gender neutrality and the value it imparts to
caregiving. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Double Binds Facing Mothers in
Abusive Families: Social Support Systems, Custody Outcomes, and
Liability for Acts of Others, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 13, 28-29
(1995); Fineman, supra note 187, at 768-74; Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Are
Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody
Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 235, 237, 241-43 (1982). Their
voices, however, have fallen on the deaf ears of male legislators and
judges who undoubtedly recognize that the primary caretaker standard
likely would deprive fathers of the leverage they currently enjoy under
the best interests standard, preferences for joint custody, and friendly
parent provisions.
191. See Fineman, supra note 187, at 739; Polikoff, supra note 190,
at 240. Fineman argues that the egalitarian ideology that has helped to
neuter motherhood also stigmatizes untraditional forms of motherhood.
She explains:
[An important component of the neutering process has been the
designation of untraditional forms of motherhood as
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substantially more of herself in the children than the father
may fear that her commitment will go unrecognized and
unrewarded when a court applies these standards.92 Many
fathers threaten a custody dispute using the mother's fear
to gain settlement advantages."' His threat combined with
her fear weakens considerably her negotiation position on
child-related and financial issues.
The indeterminacy of the best interests standard,
coupled with the gender bias of judges9 and mental health
professionals, 95 exacerbate her concern. A mother might
ignore her husband's custody threats if she could rely upon
unbiased custody decisionmakers.
As many writers have observed, however, the
indeterminacy of the best interests standard creates wide
discretion for trial court judges'96 and permits judges to
discriminate against women in custody decisions. " ' For
'pathological' or deviant. This stigmatizing process makes
mothering outside of the context of a two-parent, traditional
family susceptible to extensive legal regulation and supervision.
Mother and child alone are incomplete and insufficient-the
cause and perpetuators of social decay and decline.
FINEMAN, supra note 108, at 68.
192. See WINNER, supra note 87, at 48-49; Martha R. Mahoney, Legal
Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 43-44 (1991).
193. See Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 43, at 819-20.
194. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 62-
73; Jacobs, supra note185; Polikoff, supra note 190, at 237-41.
195. See infra notes 211 & 212 and accompanying text.
196. See David N. Bolocofsky, Use and Abuse of Mental Health
Experts in Child Custody Determinations, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 197, 203
(1989) (explaining that in a survey of lawyers, judges, and mental
health professionals, over 70% thought the best interests of the child
standard was unclear); Chambers, supra note 185; see also Katherine
Hunt Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving
Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523,
1533 (1994); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 955
(1979); Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial
Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226
(1975). See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF
EQUALITY, THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991)
(advocating the abandonment of abstract equality standards in custody
decisions in favor of valuing the nurturing of children).
197. See CHESLER, supra note 45, at 210-34; MASSACHUSETTS
GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 62-66, 69-73; GENDER BIAS
TASK FORCE REPORT OF SOUTH DAKOTA 4 (1994) (finding that those
surveyed perceived gender bias against women as most prevalent in
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instance, many complain that courts typically devalue the
nurturing that mothers provide,' and favor the superior
economic resources of the father.' On the other hand, if a
mother and a father both work, courts view her
employment as in conflict with the children's best
interests.00 Courts find mothers with ambitious careers
even more suspect.20 ' In contrast, judges believe the father's
employment benefits the children.02 Courts hold mothers to
higher standards of parenting than fathers.0 3 If a mother
temporarily relinquishes custody to the father for any
reason, courts find her an improper custodian. 
4
Uninvolved or long-absent fathers, on the other hand, are
encouraged to reestablish their relationships with their
children.Y05 Additionally, the illicit sexual relations of
mothers compromise their custody claims far more severely
than do the illicit sexual relations of fathers. 28 When
four areas: rape, custody, sentencing, and child support); WINNER,
supra note 87, at 46-49; Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 43, at
819-23; Christopher P. Gilkerson, Theoretics of Practice: The Integration
of Progressive Thought and Action: Poverty Law Narratives: The
Critical Practice and Theory of Receiving and Translating Client
Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 861, 880-81 (1992); Linda R. Keenan, Note,
Domestic Violence and Custody Litigation: The Need for Statutory
Reform, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 407, 412 (1985).
198. See Polikoff, supra note 190, at 237-38.
199. See CHESLER, supra note 45, at 83-84; WINNER, supra note 87,
at 47-48; Gilkerson, supra note 197, at 880-81; Jacobs, supra note 185,
at 858-63, 880-83; Polikoff, supra note 190, at 237-39.
200. See DOWD, supra note 21, at 6-8; MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS
REPORT, supra note 43, at 63; WINNER, supra note 87, at 46-47; Jacobs,
supra note 185, at 863-68; Polikoff, supra note 190, at 237-39. Our
society expects mothers to devote themselves to rearing children.
Because an employed mother does not devote her entire self to rearing
the children, her motherhood is suspect. On the other hand, our society
does not expect fathers to devote themselves to rearing children. His
employment, then, does not make his fatherhood suspect. See
Gilkerson, supra note 197, at 880-81. See generally CHESLER, supra note
45, at 49-63. Prejudice against working mothers persists despite studies
indicating that children benefit from their mother's work and greater
economic independence. See DOWD, supra note 21, at 33.
201. See Jacobs, supra note 185, at 868-71.
202. See Polikoff, supra note 190, at 237-39.
203. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 63-
64; Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 43, at 822; Jacobs, supra
note 194, at 857; Schafran, supra note 92, at 192.
204. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 64.
205. See id. at 64-65.
206. See id. at 65; Jacobs, supra note 194, at 872-74, 892-93;
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mothers allege that a father has physically or sexually
abused a child, judges frequently disbelieve them"' and use
friendly parent provisions to deprive them of custody."' 8 In
Schafran, supra note 92, at 192.
207. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 69-
70; Becker, supra note 190, at 24-25. See generally Sharon R.
Lowenstein, Child Sexual Abuse in Custody and Visitation Litigation:
Representation for the Benefit of Victims, 60 UMKC L. REV. 227 (1991).
Contrary to judicial beliefs, research reveals that allegations of child
sexual abuse arise infrequently in custody disputes and that allegations
in the divorce context prove unfounded no more frequently than in
other contexts. See Becker, supra note 190, at 25; Jessica Pearson, Ten
Myths About Family Law, 27 FAM. L.Q. 279, 293-95 (1993). Pearson
notes that, "while these allegations may be increasing, they are hardly
rampant." Pearson, supra, at 294. More specifically, Pearson found that
sexual abuse allegations surfaced in only two percent of the 9000
divorce proceedings that occurred during a six-month period. See id. at
294; see also Meredith Sherman Fahn, Allegations of Child Sexual
Abuse in Custody Disputes: Getting to the Truth of the Matter, 25 FAM.
L.Q. 193, 194, 202 (1991) (rejecting the idea that allegations of child
sexual abuse made during custody disputes automatically deserve
suspicion). Pearson's results hardly seem surprising in light of other
studies. For instance, Bross notes that "[tihe frequency of child sexual
abuse is disconcerting.... In a 1985 poll, researchers interviewed 2626
[sic] adults from the fifty states. Among this representative sample of
Americans eighteen years old or over, twenty-two percent of the women
and fifteen percent of the men reported being sexually abused as
children." Donald C. Bross, Terminating the Parent-Child Legal
Relationship as a Response to Child Sexual Abuse, 26 LOY. U. CI. L.J.
287, 289 (1995) (citing Lois Timinick, The Times Poll: 22% in Survey
Were Child Abuse Victims, L.A. TDIES, Aug. 25, 1985, at Al).
208. See Becker, supra note 190, at 26-27. In a Maryland case the
judge denied the mother custody of two pre-teen daughters because he
felt that the father's sexual abuse of the girls was not as damaging as
the mother's decision to report him. According to the judge, her
reporting "showed [that] her hatred for the father took precedence over
the children's need to hold a high image of their father.' " Czapanskiy,
supra note 86, at 256 (citing GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS: REPORT OF
THE MARYLAND SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE
COURTS 30 (1989)). Czapanskiy describes another case in which the
mother accused the father of sexual abuse of their daughter. The trial
court found that the mother was overreacting, that the father posed no
danger to the child, and that overnight visitation was appropriate
provided one of four persons close to the father was present. In entering
this order, the trial court ignored evidence that the father admitted to
sexually abusing the wife's older daughter by a previous marriage,
overwhelming evidence that the father inflicted excessive punishment
on the older daughter, that he denied he needed treatment for this
conduct, and that the father had physically and sexually abused the
mother. See id. at 268-69 (discussing Hanke v. Hanke, 615 A.2d 1205
(Md. App. 1992)). About the time that the trial court entered its order
1197
1198 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
such a gender hostile context, no mother can reasonably
anticipate fair judicial treatment. The father's threat, or
anticipated threat, of a custody dispute remains salient
throughout negotiations." 9
In contested custody cases, courts usually seek
guidance from mental health professionals.210  These
professionals, however, have a long history of
discrimination against women generally, ' and against
mothers in particular.212 Some of them also perform
for unsupervised visitation, the mother moved with the child to
Kentucky. No visitation with the father took place. However, the trial
court transferred custody from the mother to the father, likely to punish
the mother for moving and for noncompliance with the visitation order.
See id. at 268 n.65. Fortunately, the appellate court found the trial
court had erred. See id.; see also Anna Quindlen, Legal System Turning
a Blind Eye to Sexual Abuse of Our Children, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12, 1994,
§ 1, at 15 (discussing similar cases throughout the United States).
209. See Jacobs, supra note 194, at 882; Neely, supra note 112 at
168.
210. See PETER G. JAFFE ET AL., CHILDREN OF BATTERED WOMEN 108
(1990); Fineman, supra note 187, at 740-44, 764-65; MYRA SUN &
ELIZABETH THOMAS, CUSTODY LITIGATION ON BEHALF OF BATTERED
WOMEN (1987) (finding that in custody disputes judges followed the
recommendations of mental health professionals 90% of the time).
211. See HEWLETT, supra note 82, at 246-47; CATHERINE A.
MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 152-53, 283
n.42 (1989). In the past, the male dominated psychological profession
has marginalized women's concerns, portrayed women as inferior
hysterical human beings, and urged women to happily assume their
proper subordinate position to men. Sanity in women often meant little
more than proper accommodation to male dominance. See generally
PHYLLIS CHESLER, WOMEN AND MADNESS (1972).
212. Mental health professionals have blamed mothers for children's
developmental problems. See Becker, supra note 190, at 13; Fineman,
supra note 187, at 767 n.161; Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the
Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L.
REV. 1665, 1682 (1990); Roberts, supra note 111, at 110-11 & n.81.
Moreover, currently the mental health professions have deftly seized
significant control in child custody decisiomnaking. See Fineman, supra
note 187. In addition, men have organized politically and have
successfully pushed for joint custody. See Dan Menzie, Note, Fathers
are Parents Too: Pros and Cons of the New Missouri Domestic Relations
Statute, 57 UMKC L. REV. 963 (1989). As men become organized, the
ability of the mental health profession to retain its decisional control on
child issues depends upon placation of these elite males who now
actively seek increased parental rights. The psychological profession's
current bias in favor of joint custody suggests its continued
accommodation to pre-existing hierarchy rather than its concern for
children's best interests. See generally Fineman, supra note 187.
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incompetently.21 Moreover mental health professionals
strongly favor shared parenting14 and the participation of
both parents in the post-divorce lives of their children.15
This bias presumes that men and women make equal
parental contributions, exaggerates the importance of
fathers, and undervalues the mother's primary caretaking
role."6  Their involvement in custody decisionmaking
frequently compromises, rather than respects, a mother's
interest in custody.
Courts also employ guardians ad litem to assist in
custody decisionmaking.' Many of these guardians perform
incompetently.218 Moreover, no reason exists to assume that
213. Courts typically defer to court ordered custody evaluations
despite their inadequacies. Daniel Shuman notes that throughout the
judicial system judges are holding expert witnesses more accountable-
except in the areas of child custody and visitation. See Daniel W.
Shuman, What Should We Permit Mental Health Professionals to Say
About "The Best Interests of the Child"?: An Essay on Common Sense,
Daubert, and the Rules of Evidence, 31 FAM. L.Q. 551 (1997). For
instance, courts accept syndrome testimony despite the lack of scientific
support for the existence of the syndrome. See id. at 564-65. Moreover,
Marc and Melissa Ackerman's survey of psychologists who perform
custody evaluations revealed that one-third of these experts used two
tests, the MCMI-II and the MCMI-III, on divorcing parents, ignoring
that the tests were designed for a clinical rather than a normal
population. See Marc J. Ackerman & Melissa C. Ackerman, Child
Custody Evaluation Practices: A 1996 Survey of Psychologists, 30 FAM.
L.Q. 565, 573 (1996). Interestingly, one survey indicated that family law
attorneys thought mental health experts were of little help in child
custody decisions. They presented expert testimony largely to discredit
their opponent's expert. See Robert D. Felner et al., Child Custody
Resolution: A Study of Social Science Involvement and Impact, 18 PROF.
PSYCHOL.: REs. & PRAC. 468 (1987).
214. See Fineman, supra note 187, at 734-35.
215. See id. at 750-51 & nn.102-04.
216. See id. at 734-35.
217. See Roy T. Stuckey, Guardians Ad Litem as Surrogate Parents:
Implications for Role Definition and Confidentiality, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1785, 1785 (1996).
218. See Robert F. Kelly & Sarah H. Ramsey, Monitoring Attorney
Performance and Evaluating Program Outcomes: A Case Study of
Attorneys for Absued and Neglected Children, 40 RuTGERS L. REv. 1217,
1238-40 (1988) (finding that attorneys routinely represent children
incompetently); Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. & Sharon S. England, "I Know
the Child is My Client, But Who Am I?", 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1917,
1924-32, 1933-43 (1996) (explaining that many children do not receive
competent legal advocacy and that confusion over the proper role of
those appointed to represent children compounds incompetence); see
also Emily Buss, "You're My What?" The Problem of Children's
1199
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
court appointed guardians ad litem are less prone to gender
bias against women and mothers than are other
professionals. Mothers cannot rely upon competent
unbiased decisionmakers in a custody dispute.
Moreover, the wide open best interests standard
provides an advantage for the wealthier spouse, usually the
husband,219 who can hire a better lawyer and employ
experts with better credentials who are more persuasive.
2
y
Fathers' relative economic advantage also allows them to
survive protracted litigation without hardship, in contrast
to the financial desperation experienced by mothers and
their children.22' Unsurprisingly, many studies now confirm
that when a father contests custody, he more likely than
not will win.
Misperceptions of Their Lawyers' Roles, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699,
1699-1706 (1996); Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empower-
ment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling
the Child Client, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1655 (1996) (discussing
empowerment as the key element in defining a lawyer's relationships to
a child client); Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the
Role of Counsel for Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1399, 1399 (1996);
Peter Margulies, The Lawyer as Caregiver: Child Client's Competence in
Context, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1473 (1996); Jean Koh Peters, The Roles
and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children
in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1505 (1996);
Stuckey, supra note 217, at 1785-93.
219. See supra notes 79-113 and accompanying text.
220. See WINNER, supra note 87, at 61; see also Garska v. McCoy, 278
S.E.2d 357, 362 (W. Va. 1981); Becker, supra note 190, at 28; Mildred
Daley Pagelow, Justice for Victims of Spouse Abuse in Divorce and
Child Custody Cases, 8 VIOLENCE AND ViCTIMS 69, 78 (1993).
221. See supra notes 79-113 and accompanying text.
222. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 59,
62-63 (noting that Massachusetts fathers who seek custody obtain
either primary or joint physical custody more than 70% of the time);
WISCONSIN GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 100, at 197 (noting that
judges reported they "about equally" awarded custody to men and
women in contested custody cases); Florida Gender Bias Report, supra
note 43, at 821-22 & n.101; Polikoff, supra note 190, at 236-37; see also
CHESLER, supra note 45, at 78-80 tbl.4 (finding that in 70% of disputed
custody cases fathers won custody); id. at 65-66 (noting that many
studies, including her own, indicate that fathers who contest custody
are more likely than their wives to win); WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at
233-34 tbl.22; Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social
Science Data in Legal Policymaking: Custody Determinations at
Divorce, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 107, 120 & n.37; Lenore J. Weitzman & Ruth
B. Dixon, Child Custody Awards: Legal Standards and Empirical
Patterns for Child Custody, Support and Visitation After Divorce, 12
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A deserving mother's realistic fear of losing custody
then, might induce her to agree to a custody or visitation
arrangement that compromises both her and the children's
interests.2" Moreover, her fear of provoking a custody
contest may hinder her ability to demand fairness in
financial negotiations, particularly if she lacks the
economic resources to hire an attorney or to build a good
custody case.225 Perversely, the worse the father's parenting
during the marriage, the more the mother may desire
custody in order to protect the children, and the more
vulnerable she may become to financial manipulation.
B. Spousal Maintenance Law
On their face, maintenance statutes show sensitivity to
the financial dependency and care-giving contributions of
long-term homemakers and custodial mothers of young
children." 6 In their application, however, maintenance
statutes fail to fulfill their facial promise.2 7
Whereas approximately sixty percent of divorcing
couples have children, and mothers receive custody
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 502-04 (1979) (finding that in 63% of disputed
custody cases in Los Angeles in 1977 fathers won custody). But see
Mnookin et al., supra note 42, at 53 (finding that when mothers' and
fathers' requests for custody conflicted, mothers' requests were granted
approximately twice as often as fathers' requests). Yet, when both
parents requested sole custody, mothers received what they requested
in only 46.2% of the cases. See id. at 54 tbl.2.6.
223. See WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 393-94.
224. Commentators and researchers report that women frequently
compromise financial requests in order to retain custody of the children.
See, e.g., Becker, supra note 190, at 28-29; Fineman, supra note 187, at
761; Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 43, at 819-20; Heather
Ruth Wishik, Economics of Divorce: An Exploratory Study, 20 FAM. L.Q.
79, 101 (1986) (finding that a significant number of interviewed women
admitted bargaining away property or support rights in return for child
custody).
225. See WINNER, supra note 87, at 50-51; Florida Gender Bias
Report, supra note 43, at 819; Neely, supra note 112.
226. See WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 149; Estin, supra note 182, at
727-29 (noting that maintenance statutes in more than 20 states
acknowledge that a parent's custodial obligations may influence his or
her need for maintenance).
227. See WISCONSIN GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 100, at 229-39;
Estin, supra note 182, at 728-30 & n.20.
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approximately ninety percent of the time,228 only ten to
seventeen percent of divorcing wives receive any spousal
maintenance. 9 Moreover, less than half of the wives
married for more than fifteen years receive any
maintenance" and custodial mothers with dependent
228. In a study of 908 divorcing families in California, only 20% of
the divorce petitions indicated a conflict between the mother's and the
father's custody request. See Mnookin et al., supra note 42, at 51. In the
693 uncontested cases, the mother received sole custody 90% of the
time. See id. at 52. In the contested cases, mothers' requests were
granted twice as often as fathers' requests. More specifically, in the 190
contested cases, mothers received what they asked for in 115 cases,
fathers received what they requested in 50 cases, and a compromise
was reached in 25 cases. See id. at 53. Many other sources confirm that
mothers receive custody more often than fathers. See, e.g.,
MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 61 (noting that
Massachusetts mothers have primary physical custody in the great
majority of cases). However, when mothers and fathers dispute custody,
findings from other studies differ significantly from Mnookin's. For
instance, in Massachusetts, when fathers and mothers dispute custody,
the father receives either primary or joint physical custody more than
70% of the time. See id. at 59.
229. See, e.g., MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43,
at 30 (noting that nationwide only 12.4% of people divorced between
1980 and 1985 obtained an alimony award) (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. Dep't of Commerce (1989)); WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at
167, 362 (noting that in 1977 only 17% of wives in two California
counties received maintenance); Terry J. Arendell, Women and the
Economics of Divorce in the Contemporary United States, 13 SIGNS 121,
133 (1987); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
SERIES P-23, No. 167, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY. 1987 (1990)
(showing that in a 1988 Census survey, 17% of the divorced women
reported that their divorce decree entitled them to spousal
maintenance); Garrison, supra note 14, at 697 (finding that wives in
three different New York counties received maintenance in only 4%,
15%, and 18% of divorce cases respectively); Garrison, supra note 14, at
634 n.44 (citing studies in which 30%, 18%, 10.9%, and 7% of wives
were awarded alimony at divorce); Claire L'Heureux-Dube, Economic
Consequences of Divorce: A View From Canada, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 451,
485 (1994) (showing that in Canada during 1990 only 16% of women
requested spousal maintenance upon divorce and only 19% of custodial
mothers requested spousal maintenance); Deborah L. Rhode & Martha
Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the Reforms: Feminist
Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS
191, 202 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990) (noting
that approximately one-sixth of divorced women receive alimony and
that two-thirds of the awards are for a short duration). Moreover,
Weitzman found that more than one-half of the older housewives in her
study received no maintenance. See WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 183.
230. See WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 187; Garrison, supra note 14,
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children receive maintenance only twenty-five percent of
the time. 3' Even when wives do obtain maintenance, the
awards are small 2 and for a short duration.23
at 669-700 (explaining that only 34% of wives married for 20 or more
years received spousal maintenance and more than one-half of them
were awarded maintenance for a limited time); Garrison, supra note 14,
at 669-03 (1991) (finding that in 1984 unemployed wives married for 20
or more years received permanent maintenance in only 32% of
contested divorce cases). Weitzman also found that older long-term
homemakers are expected to live on much smaller incomes than their
ex-husbands. In 1977, in California, wives married 18 years or more
with predivorce family incomes of $20,000 to $30,000 per year had, on
the average, a median income of $6,300 per year after the divorce,
versus their husbands median income of $20,000 per year after divorce.
See WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 190. Moreover, these women are more
likely to have dependent children with whom they must share their
income. See id. at 191. An estimate from The Displaced Homemakers
Network suggests that 57% of displaced homemakers earn income at or
near the poverty line. See Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced
Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts
and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CI. L. REV. 67, 79 & n.50
(1993) (citing NATIONAL DISPLACED HOMEMAKERS NETWORK, THE MORE
THINGS CHANGE... A STATUS REPORT ON DISPLACED HOMEMAKERS AND
SINGLE PARENTS IN THE 1980S 20-21 (1990))
231. See, e.g., ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT MNOOKIN, DIVIDING
THE CHILD 123-24 (1992) (finding that alimony was awarded in 30% of
cases in which the divorcing couple had at least one child under the age
of 16); MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 30
(finding that in Massachusetts families with minor children, wives
receive alimony in only 10% to 20% of the cases). But see WEITZMAN,
supra note 14, at 185 (demonstrating that in two California counties in
1977 only 22% of mothers with custody of minor children received
maintenance and only 13% of mothers with pre-school children received
maintenance); Garrison, supra note 14, at 704-06 (stating that in New
York in 1984 only 25% of divorced mothers with custody were awarded
spousal maintenance). The Massachusetts Gender Bias Task Force
discovered that implementation of child support guidelines negatively
affected the frequency of maintenance awards. Evidently, judicial
officers conflate child and family support and believe maintenance
unnecessary. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43,
at 30.
232. See WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 171 (revealing that in 1977 the
median maintenance award was $210 per month); see also U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-23, No. 152,
CURRENT POPULATION REP. (1989) (finding that the mean alimony
award received by women was $3,730 per year); Garrison, supra note
14, at 711-12 & n.270 (noting that census data and other time-series
studies uniformly report declining alimony awards).
233. See Schafran, supra note 92, at 188. Weitzman's study revealed
that in 1977 one-third of the alimony awards were open-ended or
permanent, while two-thirds were for a limited duration. The median
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Sometimes the husband does not make enough money
to pay maintenance, especially if he also is ordered to pay
child support. 4 Studies, however, suggest that in many
cases the inadequacy of maintenance awards is not related
to the payor spouse's inability to pay."' In her 1978
research on California divorce cases, Weitzman found that
an ex-husband's standard of living generally increased
about forty-two percent after divorce, while the ex-wife's
standard of living generally declined about seventy-three
percent. 6 These results and many others like them 7 are
duration of a transitional award was 25 months. See WEITZMAN, supra
note 14, at 164-65; see also Garrison, supra note 14, at 634 n.45, 697-98
(citing numerous studies, including her own, that indicate a dramatic
decline in permanent alimony awards). Weitzman comments that these
meager awards thrust wives into the job market without affording them
the time and financial resources to gain the education, career
counseling, and training that they need to improve their job prospects.
See WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 167. Not only do just a few wives
receive meager and short-term maintenance awards, but approximately
one-half of those awards are never fully paid. See Rhode & Minow,
supra note 229, at 202. These statistics stand in stark contrast to
survey results indicating that 81% of women assume they will be able to
obtain spousal maintenance if they need it. See Lynn A. Baker & Robert
E. Emery, When Every Relationship is Above Average: Perceptions and
Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
439, 443 (1993).
234. Weitzman found that husbands earning less than $20,000 per
year are rarely ordered to pay maintenance. See WEITZMAN, supra note
14, at 179. The Massachusetts Gender Bias Task Force found that
judges assume, without factual verification, that husbands paying child
support cannot afford maintenance. Massachusetts attorneys maintain,
however, that courts cannot assess accurately what a husband can
afford without proper discovery and factual findings. See
MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 30.
235. See Garrison, supra note 14, at 707-09 (finding that the
husband's income did not correlate with maintenance awards to low-
earning wives or wives married for 20 years or more).
236. See WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 338-39 fig.3. Weitzman
elaborates:
Where the discrepancy [in the standard of living] is smallest-
namely, in lower-income families-the husband and every
member of his postdivorce family each have about twice as
much money as his former wife and every member of her
postdivorce family (i.e., typically, his children). Where the
discrepancy is the greatest-in higher-income families-it is
enormous: among families with predivorce incomes of $40,000
or more a year, the wife is expected to live at 42 percent of her
former per capita standard of living, while her husband is
allowed 142 percent of his former per capita level.... In
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difficult to square with the belief that most ex-husbands
cannot afford spousal maintenance. 8
addition, each person in the husband's new household-a new
wife, or cohabitor, or possibly a child-has three times as much
disposable income as those living with his former wife.
Inasmuch as the other members of his former wife's household
are almost always his own children, the discrepancy between
the two standards of living is especially striking.
Id. at 191. Some argue that Weitzman's research suffers from "skewed
statistical analyses" and researcher bias. Jed H. Abraham, "The Divorce
Revolution" Revisited: A Counter-Revolutionary Critique, 9 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 251, 296 (1989). See generally Williams, supra note 26, at 2227 n.1
(citing commentators who criticize and defend Weitzman's findings).
However, even those who criticize Weitzman's work generally agree
that women's economic position after divorce is substantially worse
than that of men. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial
Interests on Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 130, 149-
52 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990).
237. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 28;
Garrison, supra note 14, at 633 n.42 (citing numerous studies indicating
that women's standard of living dropped precipitously at divorce, while
men's standard of living increased); Garrison, supra note 14, at 720-21
tbl.55 (The average post-divorce per capita income of wives and children
was approximately 68% of their pre-divorce per capita income, whereas
the per capita income of husbands increased by 182% after divorce.);
McLindon, supra note 14, at 386-88 tbl.26 (noting that in New Haven,
Connecticut, the per capita income of divorced women in the early
1980s was 69% of pre-divorce per capita median income, while the
average per capita income of divorced men was 190% of pre-divorce per
capita median income); Williams, supra note 26, at 2227 n.1; Wishik,
supra note 224, at 97-98 tbl.5 (finding that the per capita income of
women in Vermont dropped 33% after divorce, whereas the per capita
income of Vermont men increased 120% after divorce). In Garrison's
1984 study of three New York counties, she found that in contested
divorce cases, the wives who were married for 20 or more years and
received permanent maintenance had an average income of $5,757 after
divorce, whereas their husbands' average post-divorce income was
$52,679. Wives in this group who received durationally-limited
maintenance had an average income of $7,458 after divorce, whereas
their husbands' average post-divorce income was $77,358. See Garrison,
supra note 14, at 708 n.261.
238. In her 1977 study, Weitzman found that 83% of divorced men in
California earned less than $20,000 per year, and only 15% of these
men were ordered to pay alimony. In contrast, 62% of divorced men
earning above $30,000 were ordered to pay alimony. Judges did not
order men making less than $20,000 to pay alimony, Weitzman
believes, because judges did not think it was possible for these men to
pay it. See WEITZAMAN, supra note 14, at 181-82. Twila Perry argues
that current efforts to develop a new theory of alimony do not address
the interests of poor women because alimony generally is not available
to them. See Twila Perry, Alimony: Race, Privilege and Dependency in
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What explains the difficulty wives have in negotiating
for maintenance? The rhetoric of formal equality that
pervades divorce law weakens a wife's claim for
maintenance. Formal equality is a double-edged sword for
women who are not yet equal. m9 Thinking of women as no
different from men suggests that they are able to care for
themselves just as men do;' ° specifically, they can compete
successfully in the job market." 1 This concept of equality
the Search for Theory, 82 GEo. L.J. 2481, 2484 (1994).
239. Most frequently, Herma Hill Kay is cited for expressing the
concern that alimony might encourage women to remain dependent
upon men. See Williams, supra note 26, at 2285 (referring to Herma
Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce
and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 80 (1987)). As Williams
acknowledges, more recently Kay has moved away from this argument.
See id. at 2285 (referring to Herma Hill Kay, Beyond No-Fault: New
Directions in Divorce Reform, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS
6, 32-34 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990)). Others,
however, now reflect Kay's concern. See id. at 2285 n.299 (citations
omitted). See generally FINEMAN, supra note 196 (noting throughout
that the use of "rule" or formal equality rhetoric in divorce reform has
compromised the position of many women on economic and custody
issues). Fineman argues:
It has proven difficult for feminist legal theorists to offer
remedies for unequal circumstances within an equality
paradigm that emphasizes sameness of treatment and is
suspicious of accommodating differences. Our institutions,
particularly the family, are gendered. And, women are
disadvantaged not only by the fact of gender differences but also
by rules that ignore the different cultural and social mandates
and restrictions built on gender differences.
FINEMAN, supra note 108, at 12; see also ARENDELL, supra note 14, at
152-54; Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL.
L. REV. 1279 (1987).
240. The public's attitude towards spousal maintenance seems to
reflect some of this thinking. In her 1978 survey, Weitzman found that
the public favored spousal maintenance in only four instances: (1) as
support for the older homemaker; (2) as support until the ex-spouse
became self-sufficient; (3) as support for mothers of young children; and
(4) as a share of partnership assets the recipient spouse helped acquire.
By the 1980s, most of the American public indicated that they favored
spousal maintenance awards only for a short duration and only on the
basis of need. See WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 150-52. Estin argues
that the self-reliance norm has overtaken concern for caregiving in
maintenance awards. Estin, supra note 182, at 721-22, 728-30.
241. See Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 43, at 814-16.
Williams explains that the current ideal in family law is the self-
reliance of all adults. See Williams, supra note 26, at 2232. Estin argues
that many courts refuse to award caregivers maintenance in order to
encourage self-reliance. See Estin, supra note 182, at 722-23, 725-26,
1206 [Vol. 47
1999] WOMEN CONTRACTING AT DIVORCE
ignores that women generally receive less pay than men for
the same or equally valuable work, 2 that women have
more difficulty than men in securing suitable
employment,m that spousal maintenance may be necessary
for women to begin to achieve actual equality with men,
728-38.
242. See ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 60; KIRP ET AL., supra note 5,
at 171; Arendell, supra note 229, at 129-30.
243. See ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 53-61. Qualified women also
have more difficulty than qualified men in achieving deserved
promotion. See WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 350. Securing employment
of any kind is particularly difficult for the divorced older long-term
homemaker. See id. at 209-12.
244. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 31
(noting that education and training for future employment may
necessitate maintenance). Some feminists resist the idea of spousal
maintenance, arguing that these awards perpetuate women's
dependence upon men and help sustain patriarchy. See generally
FINEMAN, supra note 196, at 21-22 (noting that in the face of growing
opposition, many feminist legal scholars continue to argue that true
equality for women requires legal rules that ignore gender as a
distinguishing characteristic); KIRP ET AL., supra note 5, at 178-82;
WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 359. But see BETTY FRIEDAN, IT CHANGED
MY LIFE 325-26 (1976) (defending women's need of and right to spousal
maintenance). Feminists who oppose maintenance overlook the reality
of most women. Some dependence upon an ex-spouse seems better than
poverty or severe economic deprivation. Support may be essential to the
woman's physical and psychological health. Research indicates that age,
education, and financial resources assist divorced parties in recovering
from the stress of divorce. See Celvia Stovall Dixon & Kathryn D.
Rettig, An Examination of Income Adequacy for Single Women Two
Years After Divorce, 22 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 55, 60 (1994)
(citations omitted); see also ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 68-70 (noting
that work generally provides divorced mothers with income, increased
self-esteem, contact with other adults, and personal growth). In one
study, educational attainment and income accounted for 66% of the
well-being of single-parent mothers. See Mary E. Duffy, Mental Well-
Being and Primary Prevention practices in Women Heads of One-Parent
Families, 13 J. DIVORCE 45 (1989). Moreover women can use spousal
maintenance to achieve greater financial independence by seeking
education, job training, or business opportunities. Divorced women
instead often remain trapped in menial jobs and/or poverty. See
ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 53-61; WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 208-
09. Finally, the desperate financial positions of divorced women
frequently lead them to remarry, sometimes very unwisely. See
CHAPTER 5, supra note 66, at 392-93. Because of inadequate post-
divorce support, these women become "more" rather than "less"
dependent upon men. While spousal maintenance perpetuates some
dependence, it can also facilitate women's financial independence and
alleviate post-divorce poverty. In arguing that women's caregiving
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that society continues to demand that women fulfill the
bulk of our collective responsibility for caregiving,"5 and
that the responsibilities of motherhood constrain women's
marketplace participation," especially after divorce. 7
responsibilities and their limited workforce opportunities help justify
spousal maintenance for wives who are mothers, I adopt what Martha
Fineman terms "acceptance" feminism. Fineman explains,
[Acceptance arguments... encompass both biological and
cultural sexual differences and seek to ensure 'symmetry' in the
ultimate positions of women and men by taking account of those
differences. In this way, acceptance arguments are similar to
the earlier attempts to fashion different types of equality to gain
equality of results.
FINEMAN, supra note 108, at 42 (citations omitted); see also Littleton,
supra note 239. Certainly in the rare cases in which the father is the
caregiving parent with compromised workforce participation, he should
be eligible for spousal maintenance.
245. See ZiLAR R. EISENSTEIN, FEMINISM AND SEXUAL EQUALITY 146
(1984); FINEMAN, supra note 108, at 162-63; OKIN, supra note 19, at 5;
Fineman, supra note 180, at 2199-2200. For instance, a 1988 study
indicated that employed women spent twice as much time as their
husbands on household tasks and child care, and that fathers in 1988
participated in child care only slightly more than they did in 1967. See
Janice Drakich, In Search of the Better Parent: The Social Construction
of Ideologies of Fatherhood, 3 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 69, 85-87 (1989)
(reviewing the 1988 study). In today's capitalist society, the
construction of worker presupposes that he is a man who has a woman,
a housewife, to take care of his daily needs. See PATEMAN, supra note 2,
at 131. The housewife does not conform to this ideal worker image. See
id. at 135. Her workplace disadvantage relative to her husband remains
largely unacknowledged in family law.
246. See Czapanskiy, supra note 124, at 1453-55; FINEMAN, supra
note 108, at 25-27 & nn. 23 & 24; Fineman, supra note 180, at 2199-
2200. As Fineman notes, "a primary focus now is on women as economic
actors, a role that requires a degree of independence that is difficult, if
not impossible, to reconcile with the demands of 'traditional'
motherhood." FINEMAN, supra note 108, at 68; see also ARENDELL, supra
note 14, at 61-63; KATHLEEN GERSON, HARD CHOICES: HOW WOMEN
DECIDE ABOUT WORK, CAREER, AND MOTHERHOOD (1985); KIRP ET AL,
supra note 5, at 18; Arendell, supra note 229, at 124-25, 128-29;
Elizabeth Smith Beninger & Jeanne Wielage Smith, Career
Opportunity Cost: A Factor in Spousal Support Determination, 16 FAM.
L.Q. 201, 207 (1982); Corcoran et al., supra note 19, at 234; Ellman,
supra note 182, at 4 n.2; Estin, supra note 182, at 746-47. Estin notes
that an implicit presumption of self-sufficiency surrounds younger
caregivers and precludes their eligibility for spousal maintenance. See
Estin, supra note 182, at 743-44.
247. See generally ARENDELL, supra note 14, at 61-63; FINEMAN,
supra note 196, at 5; WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 342, 355 (finding that
the presence of children in the divorced woman's household depresses
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Formal equality disregards the inevitable dependency of
children upon women and the dependency of women that
results from their caregiving burdens. 8
Belying women's worlds,"9 equality rhetoric supports
the perception that women do not need spousal
maintenance,"5 making it harder for women to obtain
maintenance at divorce."' Moreover, the law currently
expresses a preference for a "clean break" at divorce.252 At
her opportunities for economic betterment).
248. Fineman argues that the family rather than the state is
currently the repository of "inevitable dependencies"--those associated
with being a child, and those that often accompany age, illness, or
disability. Within families, the burden of providing the care needed by
those who are inevitably dependent is disproportionately allocated to
women. This disproportionate allocation in turn creates the "derivative
dependency" of women, who require some social structure to support
them in the performance of their care-giving tasks. See FINEMAN, supra
note 108, at 25-26, 161-63.
249. In criticizing the feminist strategy of formal equality, Fineman
argues that any theory that seeks to change women's lives and women's
relationship to our patriarchal culture must capture women's gendered
experiences-not deny them. See FINEMAN, supra note 196, at 4.
250. For a period, judges became so enthralled with this idea that
they nearly stopped awarding spousal maintenance altogether, even to
long-term homemakers with few skills to offer potential employers. See
WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 170-71; see also Arendell, supra note 229,
at 25; Marsha Garrison, The Economics of Divorce: Changing Rules,
Changing Results, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 75, 93
(Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990).
251. See Florida Gender, Bias Report, supra note 43, at 814-16.
Attitudes toward maintenance also are undoubtedly shaped by
devaluation of women's work within the family. Maintenance can be
partially justified by the desirability of providing optimal child care-
taking services. These services can be more difficult for mothers to offer
at optimal levels if mothers must work full-time outside the home.
Maintenance as a vehicle for enhancing mothers' abilities to care for
their children seems justified. If these care-taking services are
devalued, however, maintenance seems less justified. Many
commentators argue that "work associated with child rearing within
the private sphere of the family has been systematically devalued." See
GERSON, supra note 246, at 211-12; see, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 108;
Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance
of Economics, 1995 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 993-95.
252. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, Property Distribution Physics: The
Talisman of Time and Middle Class Law, 31 FAM. L.Q. 93, 107 & n.76
(1997); Williams, supra note 26, at 2232-33; Thornton, supra note 17, at
595 (explaining how high divorce rates and the loosening of attitudes
about marriage have encouraged people to think differently about
marital obligations generally.) As "to death do us part" has become an
unrealistic expectation, so too has the expectation of a life-long
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most, the wife is entitled to short-term rehabilitative
maintenance;253 judges disfavor permanent maintenance
because the wife's continued dependence on her husband
interferes with the clean break between spouses.254 Wives,
or their attorneys, cannot successfully negotiate for
maintenance that judges will not award."'
The failure of society generally, and of attorneys and
judges in particular, to attribute economic value to
household labor further hampers a wife's ability to secure a
maintenance award.2"6 Because the economic importance of
obligation. Even when a spouse receives a maintenance award, the
payor spouse frequently does not comply. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER
BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 31 (noting 1981 nationwide statistics
that indicate that only 43% of women awarded maintenance received
full payment and that 33% of women awarded maintenance received no
payment at all) (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE).
253. See WINNER, supra note 87, at 35-36; Florida Gender Bias
Report, supra note 43, at 814.
254. See KIRP ET AL., supra note 5, at 181-82; Florida Gender Bias
Report, supra note 43, at 814-16; Jana B. Singer, Husbands, Wives, and
Human Capital: Why the Shoe Won't Fit, 31 FAM. L.Q. 119, 120 (1997).
Regan argues that the perception of men and women as either spouses
or as strangers is an artificial and dysfunctional dichotomy. See Regan,
supra note 130, at 2306-07, 2313-14.
255. Massachusetts attorneys complain that inconsistency in judicial
maintenance awards hampers considerably their ability to predict a
judge's response to a maintenance request. See MASSACHUSETTS
GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 33.
256. Feminists have long objected to the husband's ability to exploit
his wife's labors. See PATEMAN, supra note 2, at 133. And many legal
commentators have noted the current failure of family law to attribute
economic value to household labor. See, e.g., MASSACHUSETTS GENDER
BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 32-33; Estin, supra note 251, at 993-95;
Regan, supra note 130, at 2309; Williams, supra note 26, at 2252-53. A
substantial body of academic literature attempts to correct this injustice
by according value to household labor and reconceptualizing marriage
in order to justify awarding to the wife a portion of her husband's post-
divorce income. See, e.g., Margaret Brinig & June R. Carbone, The
Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce, 62 TUL. L. REV. 855 (1988);
June Carbone, Economics, Feminism, and the Reinvention of Alimony: A
Reply to Ira Ellman, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1463 (1990); June R. Carbone &
Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic
Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953 (1991); Ellman, supra
note 182; Estin, supra note 182; Mary E. O'Connell, Alimony After No-
Fault: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 23 NEW ENG. L. REV. 437
(1988); Regan, supra note 130, at 2316-17; Jane Rutherford, Duty in
Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 539
(1990); Carl E. Schneider, Rethinking Alimony, Marital Decisions and
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the wife's contribution to the family remains
unacknowledged, her claim of entitlement to a portion of
her husband's post-divorce income carries little force.257
Moreover, many fail to realize that marriage may seriously
compromise a wife's ability to participate in the labor
market. Wives tend to subordinate their careers to those of
their husbands and to assume the bulk of homemaking and
childcare responsibilities. 258 Even fewer realize that the
wife loses income for each year she stays out of the work
force, 259 that her market work during marriage has little to
Moral Discourse, 1991 BYU L. REV. 197; Singer, supra note 254; Jana
Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the
Economic Justification for Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2423 (1994); Starnes,
supra note 230; Williams, supra note 26, at 2252-53.
257. See Williams, supra note 26, at 2241 n.62. A Massachusetts
attorney represented a wife with two children under six years of age.
One of the children had a chronic illness. The wife worked part-time
and earned less than $100 per week. Her husband made $55,000 per
year. The attorney told the Massachusetts Gender Bias Task Force that
the judge stated "it was unconscionable for her to be taking a job like
this. It was about time women learned that they had to work. His
daughters were going to work." The judge awarded the wife $200 a
week for six months. He reduced the award to $100 per week after six
months so that, "she could learn a lesson." MASSACHUSETTS GENDER
BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 33.
258. See Williams, supra note 26, at 2245-47 & n.91. Williams
describes how wives tend to sacrifice their own market participation in
order to facilitate the ideal worker status of their husbands. Id. at 2236-
67. Williams also explains that even in two career families, couples
commonly engage in a game of "chicken" over who will provide
housekeeping and child care services. Due to her socialization that
accords high priority to homemaking and child care, the wife typically
loses this game and performs most of these functions. See id. at 2240-
41.
259. Williams notes that wives who interrupt their careers lose an
average of 1.5% of income for each year they do not participate in
market labor, with college-educated wives losing as much as 4.3%. See
Williams, supra note 26, at 2257 n.148 (citing Jacob Mincer & Solomon
Polachek, Family Investments in Human Capital: Earnings of Women,
in ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 397 (Theodore W. Schultz eds., 1974)); see
also Beninger & Smith, supra note 246, at 207; Jacob Mincer &
Solomon Polachek, Family Investment in Human Capital: Earnings of
Women, 82 J. POL. ECON. 576, 583 (1974). Estin reports a more recent
study that found a typical wage gap of 33% the first year women
returned to work, with a portion of the gap made up over time. See
Estin, supra note 182, at 746 n.87 (discussing a study by Laurence
Levin and Joyce Jacobsen) (citing Laura Myers, Women Who Interrupt




no effect on her financial well-being after divorce, 60 and
unless she remarries, she will suffer long-term economic
costs attributable to divorce.26' Judges typically
underestimate a wife's financial vulnerability and need for
spousal maintenance.262
Today spousal maintenance law is premised on the
dependent spouse's need and the husband's ability to pay.263
Dependency, however, remains an unattractive concept in a
society steeped in norms of autonomy and self-sufficiency.
Furthermore, need has never provided a strong justification
for wealth transfer in this society.265 Rather, those who
perform market labor deserve to earn and keep their hard-
earned wages.266 In this ideological context, a maintenance
claim based on need has no compelling justification.
Like custody statutes, spousal support statutes
typically list many factors a court should consider in
determining how much, if any, maintenance to award.267
260. See Pamela J. Smock, The Economic Costs of Marital Disruption
for Young Women Over the Past Two Decades, 30 DEMOGRAPHY 353, 367
(1993).
261. See id. at 366-67; see also Williams, supra note 26, at 2256-57
(noting that a mother's decreased earning capacity due to child care
responsibilities extends beyond the children's majority).
262. See MVASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 63;
Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 43, at 814-16.
263. The Colorado maintenance statute, for instance, authorizes a
court to award maintenance if the spouse seeking the award:
(a)Lacks sufficient property, including marital property
apportioned to him, to provide for his reasonable needs; and (b)
Is unable to support himself through appropriate employment
or is the custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances
make it appropriate that the custodian not be required to seek
employment outside the home.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-114 (1998); see also In re Marriage of
Olar, 747 P.2d 676, 677-78, 680-82 (Colo. 1987) (en banc). Not all state
maintenance statutes specifically condition an award of maintenance on
need. Yet today most courts disfavor maintenance, even when need
seems apparent. See infra note 272 and accompanying text.
264. See Fineman, supra note 180, at 2182.
265. See Regan, supra note 130, at 2350-56; William Simon, Rights
and Redistribution in the Welfare State, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1431 (1986).
266. See WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 163, 183; Regan, supra note
130, at 2350-52.
267. Illinois law, for instance, provides that a court:
[May grant maintenance only if it finds that the spouse seeking
maintenance lacks sufficient property, including marital
property apportioned to her, to provide for her reasonable
needs; is unable to support herself through appropriate
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Statutes do not prioritize or weight these factors.2 In a
context that favors formal equality and a clean break, and
ignores the financial contributions and financial
vulnerability of wives,269 the indeterminacy of these statutes
invites discrimination against women in support awards.
As Weitzman notes, judges typically view the husband's
income as rightfully his,27 despite statutory language
encouraging consideration of the wife's contributions as
homemaker.27' Current law focuses on the wife's need,
resulting in decisions in which wives who earn $12,000 to
$20,000 a year are found to have no "need" for alimony,
irrespective of their husbands' ability to pay.272 Other judges
believe maintenance is not appropriate because they believe
the wife will remarry. In the words of one judge:
Alimony was never intended to assure a perpetual state of secured
employment; or is otherwise without sufficient income.
Maintenance is to be awarded in such amounts and for such
periods of time as the court deems just, after consideration of
various factors, including the following: the time necessary to
acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party
seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment; the
standard of living established during the marriage; the age and
the physical and emotional condition of both parties; and the
ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet
his or her needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking
maintenance.
In re Marriage of Harding, 545 N.E.2d 459, 469 (IM. App. Ct. 1989)
(citations omitted); see also In re Marriage of Frederick, 578 N.E.2d
612, 620 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (finding that the court should also
consider the tax consequences to each party of a maintenance
award).
268. See supra note 267.
269. Many attorneys believe that many judges have an unrealistic
view of the dependent spouse's ability to become self-sufficient. See
Missouri Gender Bias Report, supra note 43, at 546-50.
270. WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 163, 183; see also Singer, supra
note 254, at 124; Williams, supra note 26, at 2234, 2250-52.
271. See Estin, supra note 182, at 748 & n.93, 749-54, Starnes, supra
note 230, at 95-96; Williams, supra note 26, at 2234, 2252.
272. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 30-
32; Williams, supra note 26, at 2252 n.120 (citing Luedke v. Luedke,
487 N.E.2d 133 (Ind. 1985); Rohling v. Robling, 379 N.W.2d 519 (Minn.
1986)).
273. One attorney in Missouri reported that two different judges
refused to order spousal maintenance for his client because she was
young and attractive and the judges believed she would remarry. See
Missouri Gender Bias Report, supra note 43, at 542.
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indolence. It should not be suffered to convert a host of physically
and mentally competent young women into an army of alimony
drones, who neither toil nor spin, and become a drain on society
and a menace to themselves.
27 4
We begin to understand why wives have difficulty
obtaining maintenance during negotiation. The realities of
divorce law practice contribute additional obstacles. If the
wife cannot or does not hire an attorney, she may be
unaware of her right to spousal support. Even if she knows
the law, as noted earlier, many circumstances suggest her
weakness in negotiations with her more powerful
husband.75 If the wife does hire a lawyer, her counsel likely
will urge settlement.2 7 6 Husbands typically resist spousal
maintenance,277 making settlement difficult if maintenance
is demanded. Judicial reluctance to award maintenance
compounds the problem. The lawyer cannot credibly
threaten trial on the issue when everyone knows the judge
likely will not award maintenance, or will not award
enough to make the struggle worthwhile.278 Moreover, some
lawyers believe that property is more valuable than
maintenance.279 These circumstances create disincentives
for lawyers to demand maintenance and suggest that
lawyers are likely to encourage their clients to abandon or
274. See Samuel H. Hofstadter & Shirley R. Levittan, Alimony-A
Reformulation, 7 J. FAM. L. 51, 55 (1967).
275. In her 1984 study of divorce cases in three New York counties,
Garrison found that not one spousal maintenance award was entered
when neither party was represented by counsel. When wives did have
lawyers, they were awarded maintenance in 30% of the cases. See
Garrison, supra note 14, at 710.
276. See infra note 381 and accompanying text.
277. See WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 160-61.
278. Anticipation of what the court will do is a bargaining chip in
negotiation. See Galanter, supra note 8, at 168-69. As one lawyer
stated to his male divorce client:
We ought not to be offering too much. Precedent seems to be
more generous than judges are in paying spousal support. As
much as you are concerned right now about what she might be
getting, the judges are really not generous at all. This is a
somewhat conservative county and there's a backlash for a
woman to go out and do whatever a man can. So why not? Why
can't she go and take care of herself? You take care of yourself.
SARAT & FELTSTINER, supra note 128, at 125; see also Melli et al., supra
note 15, at 1143-44.
279. See WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 162.
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compromise requests for support.280  In the end the
substance and the application of maintenance statutes do
little to level the uneven playing field of divorce.
C. Property Distribution
The "clean break" rationale favors the use of property
distribution rather than maintenance to achieve financial
equity between spouses.281  A maintenance award
perpetuates a relationship between ex-spouses; property
distribution does not.212 Marital property in most states is
subject to equitable distribution.28  Again we encounter
statutory indeterminacy" and biased judicial discretion285
280. See id. (finding that attorneys for wives most commonly
counseled their clients to forget about maintenance and to get on with
building their new lives). The Massachusetts Gender Bias Task Force
discovered that attorneys sought alimony in only 29% of their divorce
cases. See MASsACHUsETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 30;
see also In re Marriage of Flynn, 597 N.E.2d 709, 712-13 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992) (finding that a 67 year old wife with poor health agreed to waive
her maintenance rights largely because she believed it was the best she
could do under the circumstances). But see Garrison, supra note 14, at
710 (noting that her data suggest that legal representation may account
for the success of some wives in obtaining spousal maintenance).
281. See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 14, at 623, 629; Regan, supra note
130, at 2313-15 & n.39. See generally In re Flynn, 597 N.E.2d at 173.
See Regan, supra note 130, for a thoughtful discussion of the limitations
property rhetoric can impose on law's ability to establish financial
equity between divorcing spouses.
282. See Regan, supra note 130, at 2306, 2319. This rationale is used
to disfavor maintenance even when spouses undoubtedly will remain
related because they share children. Moreover, the implicit
contradiction between conceptualizing ex-spouses as strangers for
purposes of financial issues and simultaneously demanding that ex-
spouses remain cooperative parents generally lacks acknowledgement
in the law. Scott suggests that the "clean break" rationale also may
discourage some parents from continuing to support their children after
divorce. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About
Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 36 (1990).
283. Community property states now commonly permit deviation
from the prior requirement of equal division of property, making them
similar to equitable distribution states. See Linda D. Elrod & Robert G.
Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: Of Welfare Reform, Child
Support, and Relocation, 30 FAM. L.Q. 765, 808, tbl. 5 (1990).
284. Illinois law, for instance, directs courts to consider:
[Elach spouse's contribution to or dissipation of the marital
property; the value of the property set apart to each spouse; the
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that results in wives frequently receiving fewer marital
assets than husbands." Even if marital assets were equally
divided as they still are in some community property
states, 7 equality might once again mask inequity."
First, if the wife's financial prospects are inferior to
those of her husband's, she may need more than half of the
marital property. 9 Under current definitions of marital
property, 90 most divorcing couples have little property to
duration of the marriage; the relative economic circumstances of
the parties; the age, health, station, occupation, amount and
sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate,
liabilities, and needs of each of the parties; the custodial
provisions for any children; whether the apportionment is in
lieu of or in addition to maintenance; the opportunity of each
spouse for future acquisition of capital assets and income; and
the tax consequences of the property division upon the
respective economic circumstances of the parties.
In re Marriage of Harding, 545 N.E.2d 459, 465 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
285. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 33-
36; Williams, supra note 26, at 2273-75.
286. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 33-
36; Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 43, at 816-18; Isabel
Marcus, Locked In and Locked Out: Reflections on the History of Divorce
Law Reform in New York State, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 375, 462-67 & n.342
(1988-89) (finding that appellate cases reveal that wives receive fewer
marital assets than do husbands and that settlements reflect this
pattern); Schafran, supra note 92, at 188. Williams argues that the
unspoken "he who earns it owns it" rule governs property distribution
in equitable distribution states. See Williams, supra note 26, at 2251.
Ellman notes that some equitable distribution states employ a
presumption in favor of the equal division of marital property, but that
in practice wives still receive less than one-half of the marital assets.
See IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAw: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 234
(2d ed. 1991); see also WINNER, supra note 87, at 41-42. Some
researchers, however, have detected a trend toward equal distribution
of marital assets in equitable distribution states. See Garrison, supra
note 14, at 673. But see WE1TZMAN, supra note 14, at 106-07 (citing
studies by researchers who have not detected this trend). Courts
constantly remind that equitable distribution does not require an equal
distribution. See, e.g., In re Harding, 545 N.E.2d at 465.
287. See Garrison, supra note 14, at 636 & n.55 (noting that
California, Louisiana, and New Mexico mandate equal property
division).
288. See Suzanne Reynolds, The Relationship of Property Division
and Alimony: The Division of Property to Address Need, 56 FORDHAM L.
REV. 827, 854-57, 861-64 (1988) (observing that courts rarely distribute
property to address financial need, despite statutory authorization to do
so).
289. See Schafran, supra note 92, at 189-90.
290. Nearly every state defines as marital all property acquired by
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distribute.29' Unless a couple is wealthy, the marital
property of a couple married for many years generally
consists of equity in a marital home.292 Moreover, today's
more expansive definition of marital property stops short of
embracing a spouse's enhanced earning capacity2 93 or the
either spouse during the marriage, with the exceptions of property
obtained by gift or through inheritance. During the past several decades
most jurisdictions have expanded their definition of marital property to
encompass property titled solely in one spouse's name, pension and
retirement plans, business and celebrity goodwill, and in a few
jurisdictions, increased value of separate assets. Under extreme
circumstances, a few states allow judges to award the separate property
of one spouse to the other spouse upon divorce.
291. See Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 43, at 818;
Garrison, supra note 14, at 662, 667 (finding that the median net worth
of marital property in a 1984 sample of contested divorce cases was
$23,591 and that much of that property consisted of non-liquid assets
like furniture and cars); Rhode & Minow, supra note 229, at 202 (noting
that more than 50% of divorcing couples have no significant marital
assets); Starnes, supra note 230, at 84-87 (noting that marital assets
rarely are sufficient to ease the financial problems of divorced women).
As Singer explains:
Feminist analysis and human capital theory have also combined
to demonstrate that traditional definitions of marital property
fail to account for a substantial portion of the assets
accumulated during marriages. Thus, relying on equitable
distribution principles is unlikely to achieve an equitable
sharing of costs and benefits in a substantial number of
divorces.
Singer, supra note 254, at 122.
292. See WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 66, 78-79. Weitzman explains
that the most valuable, or only, marital property of middle-income
couples (who make up approximately one-half of the divorcing
population) is usually the marital home. Lower income couples in short
marriages typically do not own homes, whereas wealthy couples have
other assets in addition to the marital home. See id. at 66. Specifically
Weitzman found that the family home was the major asset for 46% of
the divorcing couples and that the median equity in the family home
was approximately $33,000 in 1978 dollars, or $53,100 in 1984 dollars.
See id. at 61-62. Moreover, less than one-quarter of the divorcing
couples had a pension, and only one in nine had a business or other real
estate. See id. at 80; see also MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS REPORT,
supra note 43, at 33-34 (finding that the marital estate often consists of
a marital home and few other assets); WINNER, supra note 87, at 38-39;
Garrison, supra note 14, at 665 (finding in her 1984 study of New York
divorce cases that the marital home was by far the most valuable asset
in most contested cases).
293. See Arendell, supra note 229, at 131-32; Deborah A. Batts,
Remedy Refocus: In Search of Equity in "Enhanced Spouse/Other
Spouse" Divorces, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751, 751-53, 757 (1988); Regan,
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spouse's post-divorce income,2" arguably the most
significant 5 or only types of marital wealth. 9 Excluding a
spouse's post-divorce income whether or not enhanced from
marital property, skews the distribution at divorce and
invites impoverishment of the more dependent spouse,
particularly when maintenance is disfavored and
infrequent. Consequently, under current distribution
supra note 130, at 2361-62. But see Batts, supra, at 771-77 (noting that
Wisconsin and New York, in particular, have dealt more
comprehensively and sensitively with the issue). Courts explain that
enhanced earning capacity is not property because it lacks the
traditional attributes of property. See Regan, supra note 130, at 2362. It
cannot, for instance, be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed or pledged.
See Batts, supra at 759. Enhanced earning capacity also lacks the
attribute of joint ownership because it is "personal" to the holder and it
has no current exchange value because it is a mere expectancy of future
income. See id. Courts also justify their refusal to treat enhanced
earning capacity as marital property because of valuation difficulties.
See id. at 777-78. Moreover, because property awards are not
modifiable, some courts express concern about possible injustice if the
court's projection of future earnings proves inaccurate. See Regan,
supra note 130, at 2363-64; Batts, supra note 272, at 779-81. For
discussion of the inadequacy of these explanations, see Batts, supra
note 272, at 760-64.
294. See Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 43, at 818.
295. See Garrison, supra note 14, at 663-64 (noting that the low
value of marital property found in her study contrasted dramatically
with the high value of family income).
296. See Batts, supra note 293, at 752.
297. See WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at 110-11, 388 (noting that
failure to include "career assets" in the marital estate skews the
property distribution in favor of the primary working spouse and
assures an inequitable division of marital property). Some jurisdictions
claim to correct for this injustice by taking enhanced earning capacity
into account when distributing the marital property and awarding
spousal maintenance. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75
(Colo. 1975). Reimbursement maintenance, for instance, returns to one
spouse the financial contributions he or she made to the education of
the other spouse. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527 (N.J.
1982). This crude attempt at equity, however, does not capture the
value that financial contribution was designed to have for both spouses.
Arguably, the spouse who supported the other through years of
graduate or professional education anticipated that they both would
benefit from his or her enhanced earning capacity. Had the supporting
spouse known that the highly educated spouse would leave upon
graduation, he or she would not have agreed to provide support. He or
she might have chosen to pursue his or her own advanced degree.
Rehabilitative alimony also provides an inadequate remedy because the
spouse who supported the enhanced spouse likely is self-sufficient and
not "in need" of maintenance. See Batts, supra note 293, at 768-69.
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laws, a wife may at most be entitled to half the value of
limited assets; formal equality again masking inequity.
III. THE SPECIAL CASE OF THE ABUSED WIFE
Many wives suffer physical and/or emotional abuse
from their husbands, 29" and a high percentage of divorcing
wives have most likely been abused.2" Abused wives face
nearly insurmountable problems negotiating fair divorce
Moreover, the recipient spouse's remarriage terminates rehabilitative
alimony.
298. See Mahoney, supra note 192, at 10-11. Some estimate spousal
abuse occurs in at least one-fourth to one-third of marriages. See
MuRRAY A. STRAUSS ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE
AMERICAN FAMILY 32 (1980); Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding
Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered
Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1210 (1993); Murray A.
Straus & Richard J. Gelles, How Violent are American Families?
Estimates from the National Family Violence Resurvey and Other
Studies, in PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN FAMILIES: RISK FACTORS
AND ADAPTATIONS TO VIOLENCE IN 8, 145 FAMIES 110 (Murray A.
Straus & Richard J. Gelles eds. 1990). Others estimate spousal abuse
occurs in one-half to two-thirds of all marriages. See Florida Gender
Bias Report, supra note 43, at 848 & n.225; Laurie Woods, Litigation on
Behalf of Battered Women, 7 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 39, 41 (1981).
Repeated severe violence occurs in one of 14 marriages. See JAFFE ET
AL., supra note 210, at 19. Some criticize Straus and Gelles' findings for
underestimating the incidence of marital violence. See Fischer et al.,
supra note 133, at 2124-25 & n.44, 2137 & n.97.
299. See Fischer et al., supra note 133, at 2142; Linda K. Girdner,
Custody Mediation in the United States: Empowerment or Social
Control?, 3 CANADIAN J. WOMEN & L. 134, 138 n.19 (1989) (noting
studies in which 50% to 75% of the women gave physical violence as a
reason for marital separation); Joan S. Meier, Notes From the
Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal Perspectives on
Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295,
1304 & n.24 (1993) (finding that approximately two-thirds of divorced
or separated women report violence in their former relationships)
(citing Irene Frieze & Angela Browne, Violence in Marriage, in FAMILY
VIOLENCE 177-80 (Lloyd Oblin & Michael Tonry eds., 1989)); Joan
Zorza, Recognizing and Protecting the Privacy and Confidentiality
Needs of Battered Women, 29 FAM. L.Q. 273 (1995) (noting that
although divorced and separated women comprise only 10% of all
American women, they represent 75% of all battered women and report
being battered 14 times as often as women still living with partners)
(citing CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEMALE
VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME 5 (Jan. 1991)).
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settlements. This section first explores those problems and
then explains why a battered woman's rational fear of
losing custody of the children further compromises her
negotiation strength.
Although most husbands exercise the lion's share of
control over marital finances, abusive husbands typically
exercise extreme financial control.0 A battered wife
frequently lacks the funds she needs to hire an attorney
and adequately develop her case."1 Moreover, her abuser
likely has compromised her work performance and
participation, making her a difficult employee.02 After
separation, she may still have difficulty locating
employment and earning the funds she needs to hire a
lawyer.0 3 Finally, the battered wife may lack the financial
knowledge necessary to accurately assess her financial
needs and develop a realistic post-divorce financial plan.
The abuser's role as rule maker and enforcer 0 further
compromises a battered wife's ability to negotiate a fair
divorce settlement. Typically, abusive husbands establish
300. See LENORE E.WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 129-44 (1979);
Fischer et al., supra note 133, at 2121 & n.17; Roberta L. Valente,
Addressing Domestic Violence: The Role of the Family Law Practitioner,
29 FAM. L.Q. 187, 189 (1995).
301. Many battered women cannot afford legal representation. See
Czapanskiy, supra note 86, at 250 & n.11.
302. As Zorza notes:
Working is effectively foreclosed to many battered women
because abusers often sabotage their efforts to get to their jobs
or continue to abuse them while they are at work. Seventy-four
percent of battered women who work report that they are
harassed on the job by their abusers. Abusive men cause over
half of working battered women to be late for work at least sixty
days a year, and over half to miss at least thirty-six full days of
work annually. Twenty percent of all employed battered women
lose their jobs because their abusers so harass them on the
telephone or in person at work.
Zorza, supra note 299, at 277 (footnotes omitted); see also Keenan,
supra note 197, at 426; Valente, supra note 300, at 189.
303. A study of protective order petitions filed in a Pennsylvania
county during 1990 revealed that 45% of the petitioners were
unemployed and that their personal income averaged only $535 per
month. See Edward W. Gondolf et al., Court Response to Petitions for
Civil Protection Orders, 9 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 503, 508 (1994).
Moreover, the judges hearing the protective order petitions minimally
granted the financial relief the petitioners requested. See id. at 510-12;
see also Czapanskiy, supra note 86, at 253 & n.16.
304. See Fischer et al., supra note 133, at 2126-29.
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stringent rules that govern their wife's and their children's
behavior."0 5 These rules demand that the wife focus
exclusively and continually on fulfilling the batterer's
needs, however he defines them. Abused wives frequently
internalize these rules."0 6 Moreover, to avoid the violence
that results if they challenge or break these rules, 307 many
battered women routinely comply with the batterer's
articulated or anticipated demands."0 At divorce, a woman
who believes that she has survived by fulfilling the
batterer's needs and complying with his rules may have
extreme difficulty identifying and asserting her own
interests during negotiations."9  She may also fear
additional violence if she fails to comply with his divorce
demands. 1 o
The risk of violence escalates when the abused wife
attempts to break the abuser's control by leaving him.31' She
may sense this heightened danger3 and hesitate to make
305. See id.
306. See id. at 2129-30; Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 43,
at 851; Pagelow, supra note 220, at 74.
307. See Fischer et al., supra note 133, at 2131-37.
308. See Dutton, supra note 298, at 1227.
309. See Becker, supra note 190, at 18; Pagelow, supra note 220, at
74.
310. See Dutton, supra note 298, at 1232; Pagelow, supra note 220,
at 74.
311. See Catharine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal
Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case
Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 801, 815-16 (1993); Mahoney, supra note 192,
at 5-7, 65-68 (naming this phenomenon "separation assault"). The
abuser may direct the violence at his wife, her children, and/or her
family. As Pagelow notes:
When a battering victim takes the first steps toward freedom,
the abuse frequently escalates to deadly intensity. An abused
woman may be most at risk of femicide when she leaves or
when it becomes clear to her spouse that she will be leaving for
good. The most common type of retaliation is against the woman
herself, stalked and killed by "obsessive" mates; other times it
results in murder-suicide. Murder-suicide most frequently
occurs between husband and wife, and is almost always
perpetrated by the male who first kills his wife, girlfriend, or
estranged partner. Batterers also murder or attempt to murder
their own children for revenge when victims try to get away,
and occasionally they also carry out their threats against their
wives' families.
Pagelow, supra note 220, at 72 (citations omitted); see also Fischer
et al., supra note 133, at 2138-39.
312. See Pagelow, supra note 222, at 71-72. Sometimes for years
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any request for property or maintenance that will ruffle his
feathers -trading, in her mind, her life for their assets.
Additionally, a batterer frequently isolates his victim from
family and friends,31 depriving her of the emotional support
she might need to confront him. Many abused wives are
also averse to risk, feel guilty about fracturing the family,
14
suffer low self-esteem 15  and depression,"1 have low
expectations,317 feel terror, 8 ' have difficulty concentrating,
19
and are frequently passive. 20 Each of these characteristics
severely compromises a person's ability to negotiate
effectively.
3 21
If a battered woman can afford an attorney, the
foregoing makes her a difficult client to represent.
rior to their wives' departure, abusive husbands threaten their victims
tat any attempt to leave will be met with violence toward them, their
children, or their families. See id. at 72; see also Dutton, supra note 298,
at 1232.
313. See JAFFE ET AL, supra note 210, at 23, 26; SUSAN SCHECHTER,
WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE
BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 219-44 (1982); Fischer et al., supra note
133, at 2132; Pagelow, supra note 220, at 70 (describing a systematic
pattern of withdrawal from relations with family and friends).
314. See Becker, supra note 190, at 18 (noting that battered women
frequently learn from religious training or from their families of origin
that they are responsible for the quality of the marriage and for keeping
the family together).
315. See JAFFE ET AL., supra note 210, at 23; MASSACHUSETTS
GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 83; WALKER, supra note 300, at
32; Dutton, supra note 298, at 1218-19, 1221; Valente, supra note 300,
at 191.
316. See Dutton, supra note 298, at 1216, 1221.
317. See id. at 1218-19.
318. See id. at 1221.
319. See id.
320. See generally LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN
SYNDROME (1984); WALKER, supra note 300; Pamela Choice & Leanne
K. Lamke, A Conceptual Approach to Understanding Abused Women's
Stay/Leave Decisions, 18 J. FAM. ISSUES 290 (1997); Desmond Ellis,
Marital Conflict Mediation and Post-Separation Wife Abuse, 8 LAW &
INEQ. J. 317, 331 (1990); Sherry L. Hamby & Bernadette Gray-Little,
Responses to Partner Violence: Moving Away from Deficit Models, 11 J.
FAM. PSYCHOL. 339, 340 (1997); Keenan, supra note 197, at 418. Many
battered women, however, also rebel and resist the batterer's pervasive
control. See Fischer et al., supra note 133, at 2133-37. Moreover, many
scholars and researchers persuasively argue that passivity is only one
of many symptoms that battered women may exhibit. See, e.g., Hamby
& Gray-Little, supra, at 340-41, 347-49; Mahoney, supra note 192.
321. See Bryan, supra note 76, at 457-81.
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Moreover, her attorney may inadequately represent her
interests."' Many abused wives resist identifying
themselves as abused." An uneducated lawyer may not
discover the abuse.3" If a wife does reveal abuse, many
lawyers will disbelieve her or minimize the importance of
the violence. 25 Even lawyers who believe their clients
frequently fail to bring the abuse to the court's attention.326
If a judge does not know a wife has experienced abuse, she
or he may misapprehend the wife's and the children's
financial and safety needs. The judge may also
misunderstand the wife's mental condition, testimony, or
behavior, compromising the wife's case.
If the battered wife and her abusing husband settle
their divorce dispute through mediation, the likelihood of
an unfair custody and/or financial agreement increases.
Although mediators claim that they can balance power,
perhaps by meeting separately with each spouse, the
extreme power disparities between an abused wife and her
violent husband defy balancing.27 Many mediators who
322. See The Family Violence Project of the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Family Violence in Child Custody
Statutes: An Analysis of State Codes and Legal Practice, 29 FAM. L.Q.
197, 212-14 (1995) [hereinafter Family Violence in Child Custody
Statutes] (noting the inadequate legal representation frequently
provided to domestic violence victims); Valente, supra note 300, at 187,
190;
323. See Fischer et al., supra note 133, at 2139-41; Mahoney, supra
note 192, at 8 n.29; Minow, supra note 212, at 1686; Pagelow, supra
note 220, at 70, 76; Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and
Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on
Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 530 (1992); Valente, supra note
300, at 187.
324. See Family Violence in Child Custody Statutes, supra note 322,
at 212 (noting that lawyers fail to identify domestic violence victims);
Klein & Orloff, supra note 311, at 814 (acknowledging that few lawyers
attempt to determine whether their clients have suffered domestic
violence).
325. See Czapanskiy, supra note 86, at 257.
326. See id.; Family Violence in Child Custody Statutes, supra note
322, at 213-14.
327. Many commentators reveal the problems battered wives
confront in divorce mediation. See MASSACHUSETTS GENDER BIAS
REPORT, supra note 43, at 94; Bryan, supra note 88, at 203-05; Fischer
et al., supra note 133; Andree G. Gagnon, Ending Mandatory Mediation
for Battered Women, 15 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 272 (1992); Barbara J.
Hart, Gentle Jeopardy: The Further Endangerment of Battered Women
and Children in Custody Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 317 (1990);
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Keenan, supra note 197, at 437-38; Daniel G. Saunders, Child Custody
Decisions in Families Experiencing Woman Abuse, 39 Soc. WORK 51, 55
(1994). Gerencser provides one example:
A recent family mediation began with the father shouting, "Do
you know what I'd do if my son ever came home with an
earring? I'd cut off his ear." He was responding to the mother's
request that he stop berating their son. This outburst was no
surprise. In a pre-mediation screening questionnaire, the
mother said the father had abused her. Although she wanted to
try mediation, she was unsure whether she could participate on
an equal basis with the father. As the mediation progressed, the
mother willingly acquiesced to the father's visitation demands
in his presence. However, she said privately that she did not
want him near her or their children, and that she had agreed to
his demands only because she was afraid of him. The mediation
ended in an impasse, with no reported mention of the father's
abusive history or the mother's fear of further abuse based on
her conduct at the mediation.
Alison E. Gerencser, Family Mediation: Screening for Domestic Abuse,
23 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 43, 43 (1995). Gerencser does believe that some
battered spouses can successfully mediate, but she also recommends
that states provide sophisticated procedures for screening for domestic
violence and exemptions from mediation for battered women. See id. at
55-60. Consider also one battered woman's experience in mediation:
In court-ordered mediation we were told to cooperate and
communicate in regards to the children. He took this one step
further and used this to continue to harass me... On the way
home from our last mediation session of which we were told to
ride to and from together-cooperation as they say-he got
extremely agitated over something that I said in mediation. I
had made the mistake of feeling safe enough to say how I really
felt. [I thought] this would help the mediator to see what a mess
I was really living in. I did not know about power and control at
that time .... I dropped him off at his mother's house and he
threw the papers the mediator gave us-these were contracts-
and cussed me out later that evening around midnight. He
broke into our apartment and started going through my things.
He said he was looking for evidence that I was having an affair.
This was his reason for our marriage to be ending, nothing
about the abuse. When I realized there was something wrong in
my apartment, I got up to investigate. He then struggled with
me, slapping me and kicking me. He threw me to the floor and
screamed at me that he was going to have me one last time. I
was raped at knife point that night while my children were in
the next room. Mediation is extremely dangerous when
domestic violence is evident. If people who are ending
relationships had equal power and could communicate, they
would not need mediation. In cases where there is domestic
violence, this never occurs. Mediation is set up with the idea
that reasonable rational people will be participating in it.
WISCONSIN GENDER BIAS REPORT, supra note 100, at 210.
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claim knowledge about and sensitivity to domestic violence
suffer from the same misperceptions of battered women as
judges, lawyers, and mental health professionals."8
Mothers frequently leave their batterers in order to
protect their children.29 Their abusive husbands, however,
commonly threaten to take the children if their wives leave
them.3 ° At divorce, a battered mother most likely
anticipates and fears a custody dispute. Many batterers do
pursue child custody as a way to perpetuate control over
their victims.3 ' A battered mother's fear of provoking or
losing a custody dispute can cause her to accept a custody
or visitation arrangement that offers her and the children
insufficient protection.332 Her fear may also make her
unwilling to push for fairness on financial issues.33 3 The
many factors that compromise her case for custody lend
credence to her fear.3 '
328. The Colorado Women's Bar Association recently invited me to
participate on a panel addressing mediation in divorce cases involving
domestic violence. One of the panelists was a woman lawyer-mediator
who advocated mediation for dissolving violent marriages and who
claimed great sensitivity to domestic violence issues. In a spontaneous
burst of candor, however, she stated that "violence was a two-way
street," clearly implying to all present that the responsibility for the
violence lay equally at the feet of the violent husband and the abused
wife. The audience emitted a gasp of disbelief. Fortunately, this woman
exposed what I frequently find; mediators talk a good game, but they
lack the knowledge and the ability to address domestic violence issues
in divorce mediation.
329. See, e.g., Saunders, supra note 327, at 54.
330. See JAFFE ET AL., supra note 210, at 107; Becker, supra note
190, at 28; Keenan, supra note 197, at 422-23.
331. See Czapanskiy, supra note 86, at 257; Fischer et al., supra note
133, at 2159-60; Mahoney, supra note 192, at 43-44; Meier, supra note
299, at 1308 n.40; Pagelow, supra note 222, at 74; Schneider, supra note
323, at 555.
332. See Saunders, supra note 327, at 56 (noting that a battered
mother's fear of looking bad in a sole custody trial may encourage her to
agree to a dangerous joint custody arrangement).
333. See Fischer et al., supra note 133, at 2160; Keenan, supra note
197, at 413, 423-24; Mahoney, supra note 192, at 43-48; Pagelow, supra
note 222, at 74. The battered wife also may return to the batterer in
order to avoid the risk of losing custody.
334. See Mahoney, supra note 192, at 44 n.199 (discussing studies
confirming high percentages of custody awards to fathers who battered
their wives); see also CHESLER, supra note 45, at 79 tbl.6 (finding that
59% of the fathers in her study who won custody in litigation had
abused their wives and that 50% of the fathers who obtained custody
through private negotiations had abused their wives).
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Judicial and lawyer ignorance and attitudes about
domestic violence pose the first problem.35 The law of many
states now provides that evidence of domestic violence is
relevant to a custody determination."'6 Many judges and
lawyers, however, routinely ignore these provisions.
3 7
Frequently, judges do not believe the wife's allegations of
domestic violence38 and many times she lacks the requisite
proof to change the court's mind. 9 Because of the veil of
secrecy that typically surrounds a violent family the wife
frequently cannot offer corroborating witnesses. 0 Medical
records may also fail to confirm the violence because
batterers and their wives commonly provide alternative
explanations for her injuries,3 41 and the medical profession
remains insensitive to domestic violence issues.3 42 Many
335. See Family Violence in Child Custody Statutes, supra note 322,
at 212-14, 216-18; Klein & Orloff, supra note 311, at 811-14.
336. See Naomi R. Calm, Civil Images of Battered Women: The
Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L.
REv. 1041, 1058-59 (1991); Family Violence in Child Custody Statutes,
supra note 300, at 199-01, 208-10; Leslie D. Johnson, Caught in the
Crossfire: Examining Legislative and Judicial Response to the Forgotten
Victims of Domestic Violence, 22 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 271, 276-77 (1998);
Lynne R. Kurtz, Comment Protecting New York's Children: An
Argument for the Creation of a Rebuttable Presumption Against
Awarding a Spouse Abuser Custody of a Child, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1345,
1348 (1997) (noting that the custody statutes of 44 states and the
District of Columbia have provisions relating to domestic violence);
Meier, supra note 299, at 1304, 1309; Pagelow, supra note 222, at 76.
Eleven states have presumptions against awarding custody of a child to
a batterer. See Kurtz, supra, at 1350. Many of these presumptions,
however, provide trial courts with wide discretion, diminishing their
effectiveness. See id. at 1367 & nn.151-55, 1368-72.
337. See Czapanskiy, supra note 86, at 249, 255-58; Klein & Orloff,
supra note 311, at 958 (concluding that gender bias studies suggest that
one-half of the sitting judiciary resists considering domestic violence in
custody litigation).
338. See Becker, supra note 190, at 17; Czapanskiy, supra note 86, at
249, 252, 254-56 & n.19; Mahoney, supra note 192, at 11-12 (noting that
denial of wife abuse permeates the legal system); Meier, supra note 299,
at 1308, 1310; Pagelow, supra note 222, at 73.
339. See Pagelow, supra note 222, at 72.
340. See id. at 70; see also Fischer et al., supra note 133, at 2139.
341. See Pagelow, supra note 222, at 70.
342. Reviewing current research, Coleman and Stith describe the
results as follows:
[T]he medical response to abuse has been slow and sporadic."
Researchers examining this phenomenon have documented a
continuing pattern of nonassessment, nondetection, and
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battered women never call the police,' so police records
cannot confirm the abuse.' Even if police records do exist,
the batterer and his victim typically minimize the
violence. 45 In response to women's allegations of domestic
violence, judges commonly issue mutual restraining orders,
implying that the husband's violence is equivalent to the
wife's. Consequently, evidence of the existence, frequency,
and severity of the abuse becomes a liar's contest between
the abusive husband and his wife17---a contest she
frequently loses.
Judges, who do believe that violence occurred, generally
minimize its importance and its relevance to child
nonintervention. Research has demonstrated that health
professionals chronically failed to question the source of a
woman's injury, ignored indications that domestic violence was
occurring, were unable to recognize a possible relationship
between abuse and many recurrent, nontraumatic physical and
psychological problems, and finally, labeled and denigrated the
woman if abuse was revealed. In turn, battered women have
found the health care community to be insensitive and not
particularly helpful.
Jean U. Coleman & Sandra M. Stith, Nursing Students' Attitudes
Toward Victims of Domestic Violence as Predicted by Selected
Individual and Relationship Values, 12 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 113, 114
(1997) (citations omitted). Consistent with research on other
populations, these researchers found that sex role egalitarianism and a
high level of perceived person control over life events correlated
positively with nursing students' sympathy for battered women. See id.
at 129-30.
343. The police are called in on only approximately two percent of
woman beatings. See Pagelow, supra note 222, at 72. Additionally,
battered wives are less likely than other battered women to call the
police. See id.; see also Dutton, supra note 298, at 1229.
344. In some states the police officers' failure to arrest compounds
the problem. See Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 43, at 855-57.
The Gender Bias Study Commission in Florida provided examples:
In Alachua County, for example, women have been told "to give
him some [sex] and he won't need to beat you." In DeSoto
County, some batterers have been advised simply to "take five."
In Pinellas County, officers reportedly have spent most of their
response time trying to convince the victim not to press charges.
From Okeechobee County, the Commission heard that the police
may even arrest the victim rather than the perpetrator.
Id. at 855 (footnotes omitted).
345. See Pagelow, supra note 222, at 71-72; Valente, supra note 300,
at 191.
346. See Pagelow, supra note 222, at 73.
347. See id. at 72.
348. See Becker, supra note 190, at 17; Czapanskiy, supra note 86, at
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custody.3 49 This belief that the father's violence is irrelevant
in custody cases persists in the face of compelling evidence
that children who witness the abuse35° exhibit many
behavioral and psychological problems,35' and that spouse
249, 252, 254-56 & n.19; Mahoney, supra note 192, at 11-12; Meier,
supra note 299, at 1308, 1310; Pagelow, supra note 222, at 73; Lynn
Hecht Schafran, There's No Accounting for Judges, 58 ALB. L. REV.
1063, 1063-67 (1995). The report of the Florida Gender Bias
Commission provides extreme examples of judicial attitudes toward
battered women:
Upon learning that a husband had poured lighter fluid on his
wife and set her afire, one Palm Beach County judge, in open
court, sang, "You light up my wife" to the tune of the song, "You
Light Up my Life." When the judge in a recent first-degree
murder case learned that the defendant had tried to kill his
wife, the judge asked, in open court, "Is that a crime here in
Dade County?"
Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 43, at 863 (footnotes omitted).
349. See Becker, supra note 190, at 17, 23; Cahn, supra note 336, at
1073; Czapanskiy, supra note 86, at 257 & n.30; Meier, supra note 299,
at 1308; Schafran, supra note 92, at 192; Schneider, supra note 323, at
555; see also Katz v. Katz, 467 N.Y.S.2d 223 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
Minow relates one case in which the judge commented on the wife's
allegations of spouse abuse, "He may have abused her, but that doesn't
necessarily make him a bad father." Minow, supra note 212, at 1673.
Cases in which judges award custody of children to fathers who have
murdered the children's mothers provide an extreme example of this
judicial attitude. See Keenan, supra note 197, at 414-17.
350. Jaffe explains that children may "witness" the abuse of their
mothers in a variety of ways; they may observe the violence directly by
watching their father threaten or hit their mother, they may overhear
the violence from another part of the house, or they may observe the
results of the violence without hearing or seeing any aggressive act. See
JAFFE ET AL., supra note 210, at 17. Studies indicate that at least 3.3
million children per year are exposed to parental violence, and that
children are present in 41% to 80% of incidents of wife assault. See id.
at 20.
351. SEE JAFFE ET AL., supra note 210, at 26 (explaining that the
particular harms suffered by a child who witnesses the abuse of its
mother depends upon the child's age, sex, stage of development, role
within the family, and other factors). An infant's need for attachment,
for example, may go unfulfilled because of the mother's stress from
being abused. See id. Infants who witness abuse also have health
problems, including low weight, poor eating patterns, sleeping
difficulties, and lack of responsiveness to adults. See id. at 35, 40.
Toddlers frequently have mood-related disorders, such as anxiousness,
crying, and sadness. See id. at 35. They may show signs of terror, such
as yelling, irritable behavior, hiding, shaking, and stuttering, and many
regress to earlier developmental stages. See id. at 40. Latency-age
children model their father's behavior and learn violence as an
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abusers frequently physically and sexually abuse their
children.352 More perversely, judges who do believe that
appropriate way to resolve conflict. See id. at 26. When they come to
shelters, boys frequently act out, becoming disobedient, defiant, and
destructive. See id. at 35. Latency age girls may learn that victimization
is inevitable. See id. at 26. Young girls who come to shelters appear
withdrawn, clingy, and dependent. See id. at 35. Practicing at school
what they have learned at home may undermine children's social
adjustment and academic performance. See id. at 26. Many witnessing
children live with the shame of the hidden violence in their homes, and
their experience undermines their sense of self-esteem and confidence
in the future. See id. Their father's domination isolates them from peers
and extracurricular activities, hindering their social development. See
id. at 26, 27, 49. Children frequently blame themselves for the violence,
a tremendous burden for a child to carry. See id. at 27. Children remain
confused, anxious, and fearful while they await the next violent
outburst. See id. at 27. As a result, they may spend most of their time at
school distracted and inattentive to academic tasks. See id. at 27, 50.
Their stress also compromises their physical and psychological health.
See id. at 34-35. Many complain of headaches, tight stomachs, and bite
their fingernails or pull their hair, while some become suicidal. See id.
at 49. Having witnessed violence against their mothers for years,
adolescent children may begin to participate or accept violence in their
own relationships. See id. at 27. Some adolescents escape the violence
by running away from home. See id. Some adolescents act out their
anger and frustration by committing violent crimes, including assaults
on their mothers or siblings. See id. at 30, 33. Others, particularly girls,
attempt to shoulder the responsibility of keeping the family peace and
protecting their siblings and mothers. See id. at 30-31. Thus, witnessing
the abuse of their mothers profoundly affects many children; see also
Calm, supra note 336, at 1055-59; Sandra A. Graham-Bermann &
Alytia A. Levendosky, Traumatic Stress Symptoms in Children of
Battered Women, 13 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 111 (1998); Michael
Hershorn & Alan Rosenbaum, Children of Marital Violence: A Closer
Look at the Unintended Victims, 55 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 260
(1985); George W. Holden & Kathy L. Ritchie, Linking Extreme Marital
Discord, Child Rearing, and Child Behavior Problems: Evidence from
Battered Women, 62 CHILD DEV. 311 (1991); Johnson, supra note 336, at
274-75; Peter Lehmann, The Development of Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD) in a Sample of Child Witnesses to Mother Assault, 12
J. FAM. VIOLENCE 241 (1997); Pagelow, supra note 222, at 77; Saunders,
supra note 327, at 52-53; Alan J. Tomkins et al., The Plight of Children
Who Witness Woman Battering: Psychological Knowledge and Policy
Implications, 18 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 137 (1994).
352. Approximately one-half of the men who batter their female
partners also abuse their children. See Saunders, supra note 327, at 51-
52; see also Lee H. Bowker et al., On the Relationship Between Wife
Beating and Child Abuse, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE
158, 165-66 (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd eds. 1988); Cahn, supra note
336, at 1055-58; Meier, supra note 299, at 1308; Roberts, supra note
111, at 111-12 & nn.84-86; Schneider, supra note 323, at 551 n.128, 554.
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spouse abuse harms children sometimes blame the mother
for her failure to remove and protect the children,35 or they
perceive her failure to leave and avoid the violence to
herself as a pathology354 that makes her an unsuitable child
custodian. 55 Conversely, if she does attempt to protect
herself and the children by fleeing with them to a shelter,
the judge may find her living arrangements inferior to
those of her husband and award the husband custody.356 If
she tries to protect the children by calling the father's abuse
of them to the attention of the court, the judge frequently
The long-term effects of physical and sexual abuse of children include
depression, susceptibility to suicide, anxiety disorders, eating disorders,
sexual dysfunction, dissociative disorders, personality disorders,
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), substance abuse, and adult
psychiatric disorders including psychosis. See John Read, Child Abuse
and Psychosis: A Literature Review and Implications for Professional
Practice, 28 PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOL. 448 (1997); Saunders, supra note
327, at 51-52 (stating that approximately half the men who batter their
female partners also abuse their children).
353. See Meier, supra note 299, at 1309; Schneider, supra note 323,
at 551-53 & n.135. Perhaps judicial attitudes should not surprise, since
mother blaming pervades our society. See, e.g., NANCY CHODOROW, THE
REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY
OF GENDER (1978); DOWD, supra note 21, at xiv-xv, 3-15; P. Caplan & I.
Hall-McCorquodale, Mother Blaming in Major Clinical Journals, 55
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 345 (1985); Bernardine Dohrn, Bad Mothers,
Good Mothers, and the State: Children on the Margins, 2 U. CHI. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1 (1995); M. Laurie Leitch, The Politics of
Compromise: A Feminist Perspective on Mediation, 14/15 MEDIATION Q.
163, 167 (1986-87). Martha Fineman argues that single mothers
especially are stigmatized and scorned as deviant. See Fineman, supra
note 180, at 2182, 2190-93, 2206-08.
354. See Mahoney, supra note 192, at 37-39; Meier, supra note 299,
at 1302-03; Schneider, supra note 323, at 556. In contrast, most experts
understand that a woman's decision to remain in an abusive
relationship results from her rational assessment of a variety of factors
as well as the psychological correlates of abuse. See generally Choice &
Lamke, supra note 320; Hamby & Gray-Little, supra note 320; A. J. Z.
Henderson et al., He Loves Me; He Loves Me Not: Attachment and
Separation Resolution of Abused Women, 12 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 169, 170
(1997).
355. See Czapanskiy, supra note 86, at 257; Meier, supra note 299, at
1306.
356. See Mahoney, supra note 192, at 44. One judge claimed that a
battered woman's extensive contacts with a protective shelter showed
that "self-interest and excessive liberalism" characterized her
environment. Saunders, supra note 327, at 56 (citing L. Fredericks,
Minnesota Supreme Court Creates Primary Caretaker Presumption in
Child Custody Disputes, 7 WOMEN'S ADVOC. 1, 2 (1986)).
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believes she has fabricated the abuse to gain an advantage
in divorce negotiations.85 Her allegations can also indicate
her "unfriendliness" toward the father or her unfitness as a
parent, ultimately resulting in her loss of custody to the
abuser. 8"
Battered women's reactions to abuse can severely
compromise their credibility before the court and call into
question their ability to parent. Some abused women
exhibit symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD),359 including: (1) hyperarousal, a consistent alert for
danger that may cause excessive irritability and explosive
aggression, (2) intrusion, a reexperience of the original
violence through flashback and nightmare, and (3)
constriction, a dissociation, trance, or numbness that
protects against experiencing a terrifying memory.5 0 A
battered wife suffering from PTSD, or from various aspects
of PTSD, may repress memories of violent events, relate her
story in convoluted fragments, exhibit ina]propriate affect
while testifying about abusive incidents, minimize the
magnitude and impact of the abuse,"' overreact to a
batterer's seemingly insignificant behavior or remark, and
testify inconsistently with other evidence such as medical
records. 6 ' Unless a judge has unusual sensitivity to the
effects of domestic violence, she or he may perceive a
battered wife with PTSD as incredible and unable to
parent.
Although a battered mother's symptoms may not
warrant a diagnosis of PTSD, her reactions to the abuse
may still cause her to lose custody. Today courts
357. See Becker, supra note 190, at 17.
358. See id. at 24-26; see also Family Violence in Child Custody
Statutes, supra note 322, at 201-02 (arguing the inappropriateness of
friendly parent provisions in domestic violence cases).
359. See Meier, supra note 299, at 1312-13; Concepcion Silva et al.,
Symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Abused Women in a
Primary Care Setting, 6 J. WOMEN's HEALTH 543 (1997). Symptoms of
PTSD typically result from exposure to extreme trauma, personally or
as a witness, or from learning of an unexpected threat to, injury to, or
death of someone close. See Silva et al., supra, at 543. Prolonged
exposure to a stressor, regardless of its nature, also can produce
symptoms of PTSD. See id. at 544.
360. See Meier, supra note 299, at 1312; Silva et al., supra note 359.
361. See Saunders, supra note 327, at 54.
362. See Hamby & Gray-Little, supra note 320, at 339.
363. See Meier, supra note 299, at 1313.
1231
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
increasingly rely upon evaluations by mental health
professionals in deciding custody cases.3' Yet, many mental
health professionals know little about domestic violence.3 5
Abused wives commonly perform poorly on psychological
tests, encouraging ignorant mental health professionals to
evaluate them negatively.366 The abuse she has experienced
may have induced her to abuse the children.6 7 Although the
battered mother's abuse of the children tends to cease after
separation from the batterer,3" inexperienced mental health
professionals may overlook this tendency. The batterer,
however is far more likely to abuse the children than his
spouse,3  and his abuse is commonly more frequent and
severe. 7 1 Yet batterers tend to perform better than their
victims on psychological tests37' and their skill at
manipulation may result in a favorable psychological
evaluation. 72 The abuser's violent treatment of his wife
364. See supra notes 210-13 and accompanying text; see also
Saunders, supra note 327, at 54.
365. See JAFFE ET AL., supra note 210, at 108. To support their
contention that evaluating mental health professionals may know little
about domestic violence, Jaffe et al. call attention to a 1986 book about
custody assessments that contained nothing about domestic violence
except the warning to exercise caution about women's exaggerated
reports of violence. See id. at 108 (citing R. PARRY ET AL., CUSTODY
DISPUTES: EVALUATION AND INTERVENTION (1986)); see also Saunders,
supra note 327, at 54 (noting that therapists fall prey to the same
misunderstandings of battered women's behavior as do judges).
366. Psychiatrists frequently diagnose battered women as paranoid
or conclude that battered women suffer from a variety of character
disorders. See Meier, supra note 299, at 1301; see also JAFFE ET AL.,
supra note 210, at 71 (noting that mental health professionals have
misdiagnosed battered women as schizophrenic or paranoid); Saunders,
supra note 327, at 54 (warning that battered women's poor performance
psychological tests can lead to misdiagnosis).
367. See Saunders, supra note 327, at 52.
368. See Pagelow, supra note 222, at 77.
369. Abusive husbands are three times more likely to abuse their
children than are their abused wives. See Howard A. Davidson, Child
Abuse and Domestic Violence: Legal Connections and Controversies, 29
FAM. L.Q. 357, 357 (1995); Pagelow, supra note 222, at 77.
370. See Saunders, supra note 327, at 52.
371. See Meier, supra note 299, at 1302 n.19 (citing Evan Stark,
Framing and Reframing Battered Women, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 287 (Eva Buzawa ed., 1993)); see also
Saunders, supra note 327, at 54 (advising that batterers frequently
appear to function well, while their partners give the inaccurate
appearance of pathology).
372. See JAFFE ET AL., supra note 210, at 107-08; Mahoney, supra
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ultimately enables him to present his beaten wife to the
court as unstable and unable to parent.37 Although expert
testimony can sometimes curtail judicial ignorance, the
abused wife may lack the financial resources to hire an
expert.
Although preferences for joint custody and friendly
parent provisions disadvantage all mothers, they severely
disadvantage abused mothers.374 If an abused mother
attempts to protect the children and herself by requesting
sole custody in a state favoring joint custody, the court, or
the evaluating mental health professionals,3" may perceive
her as an unfriendly parent. If she flees with the children,
she interferes with the batterer's access to them, becoming
an unfriendly parent. On the other hand, if she flees and
leaves the children behind she risks claims of
abandonment,76  instability,377  and insensitivity to her
children's needs. If she engages in any of these self-
protective behaviors she severely compromises her custody
case.
The foregoing discussion illustrates the extreme
disadvantage abused wives have in custody disputes and
justifies her fear of losing custody. This fear can interfere
note 192, at 47-48.
373. The Commission on Gender Bias for the State of Georgia
reported:
A frequent complaint to the Commission was the batterer's
tactic in divorce proceedings of "going on the offensive" and
attempting to demonstrate that the victim is unstable, is not
self-sufficient, or is unable to care for their children. Judges who
do not understand the syndrome often fulfill the batterer's
threat and the victim's worst nightmare by awarding custody to
the father, interpreting the victim's erratic behavior as neurotic.
Gender and Justice in the Courts: A Report to the Supreme Court of
Georgia by the Commission on Gender Bias in the Judicial System, 8
GA. ST. L. REV. 539, 589 (1992); see also Keenan, supra note 197, at 424.
374. See Keenan, supra note 197, at 424-25.
375. In custody disputes courts commonly rely upon custody
recommendations of social workers or psychologists. See Fineman,
supra note 187, at 740-44. Additionally, social workers are generally
suspicious of those who request sole custody. See id. at 766.
376. See Mahoney, supra note 192, at 46; Meier, supra note 299, at
1310; see also Ostrander v. Ostrander, 541 N.Y.S.2d 630 (N.Y. App. Div.
1989) (awarding custody to father when the battered mother left the
children with the father).
377. See Mahoney, supra note 192, at 46; Meier, supra note 299, at




significantly with her pursuit of a sensible
custody/visitation plan and/or a fair financial settlement.
IV. LAWYER REPRESENTATION AND JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT
Many wives do not seek or cannot find legal
representation. 7 ' Moreover, in the legal context just
described, a wife's lawyer seems more like Don Quixote
flailing at windmills than Teddy Roosevelt leading the
charge up San Juan Hill. It is said that attorneys negotiate
divorce agreements in the "shadow of the law,"379 implying
that formal law protects wives in settlement negotiations.'
As noted, however, law's indeterminacy, its individualistic
ideology, and its failure to comprehend women's worlds
make it difficult for even the most capable lawyers to obtain
equitable results for wives.
Studies suggest that divorce lawyers frequently
encourage their clients to settle with little or no reference to
legal principles. 8' Practical realities suggest more obstacles.
378. See supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
379. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 196; see also Melvin A.
Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement
and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637 (1976).
380. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 196, at 968-70.
381. See William L. F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of
Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client
Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1497 (1992); Austin Sarat &
William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in
the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1663, 1682-84 (1989). See
generally SARAT & FELSTINER, supra note 128; Austin Sarat & William
L.F. Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of Motive in
Lawyer/Client Interaction, 22 L & SOC'Y REv. 737 (1988); Austin Sarat
& William L. F. Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's
Office, 20 L. & SOC'Y REV. 93 (1986). In his study of divorced spouses
Jacob found that many clients do not frame their cases legalistically
and, with the exception of child support guidelines, do not believe the
law had much effect on their settlements. See Herbert Jacob, The
Elusive Shadow of the Law, 26 L. & SOC'y REV. 565, 576-78 (1992).
Their lawyers frequently failed to provide them with helpful legal
advice, rather, many clients negotiated their own agreements, using
their lawyers more as clerks than as legal professionals. See id at 579-
80, 584-85. These studies suggest a far more limited role for law in
divorce negotiations than that suggested by Mnookin and Kornhauser.
Moreover these studies are consistent with others that have shown that
lawyers in contexts other than divorce frequently settle with little
reference to law. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 10, at 2675.
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Lawyers themselves are steeped in the masculine ideologies
of law and the market.8 ' They may even exhibit overt
gender bias.3" Representation by counsel may contribute to,
rather than intercept, women's disadvantages." Apart from
their troublesome attitudes, many lawyers are
incompetent,8. or incompetently represent some clients.8 '
Some attorneys take divorce cases only when more
desirable cases are unavailable.87 Other lawyers, many of
382. Winner relates a subtle, yet typical, form of exclusion:
One woman recalled the divorce proceeding, and a crucial
deposition session in which her lawyer was supposed to
question her husband about the contents of the marital estate:
'My lawyer, my husband, and his attorney were joking together,
talking about the ball game before the deposition, leaving me
out of their talks completely and then interrupting me
whenever I tried to raise an important question during the
deposition.'
WINNER, supra note 87, at 91. For a particularly graphic example of
gender bias on the part of the wife's female lawyer, see Bryan, supra
note 88, at 177-88.
383. See CHESLER, supra note 45, at 198-208 (describing lawyers'
gender bias against women in custody disputes).
384. See Marcus, supra note 286, at 462-64, 467 n.342 (noting that
divorce settlements negotiated by lawyers reflect the same gendered
decisionmaking reflected in judicial decisions). In Terry Arendell's
study of sixty divorced mothers, only seven of the mothers failed to
complain vehemently about their lawyers. See ARENDELL, supra note
14, at 13. Of those seven, three of the mothers had proceeded pro se,
three had reached an agreement with their husbands before hiring
lawyers, and one had entered law school and obtained her divorce with
the help of one of her professors. See id. For a scathing indictment of
lawyers' representation of wives during divorce, see WINNER, supra note
87.
385. See WINNER, supra note 87, at 18.
386. Sarat and Felstiner tell the story of Kathy whom they label
"The Unsupported Wife." Kathy was represented by Wendy, a self-
styled feminist lawyer. Wendy insisted that Kathy required spousal
maintenance to survive financially. Wendy also realized that Kathy
never had been able to stand up to her husband Nick. Indeed, whenever
Kathy thought about confronting Nick, she cringed. Nevertheless,
Wendy sent Kathy to negotiate with Nick alone, and Kathy predictably
failed to secure Nick's agreement to pay spousal maintenance. See
SARAT & FELSTINER, supra note 128, at 63-83. In his study of divorced
spouses Jacob found that many clients received very little legal advice
from their attorneys and that many others used their attorneys only to
prepare and process the agreements the clients independently had
reached with their spouses. See Jacob, supra note 381, at 579-81.
387. Sarat and Felstiner explain that client emotionalism and
dissatisfaction, low professional prestige, lack of financial rewards, and
unpleasantness of tasks, discourage lawyers from enthusiastic
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them unimpressive solo practitioners, "specialize" in mass-
production, by-the-numbers divorces388 because a steady
stream of divorce clients pays the bills. Only within the past
two decades have high quality law firms specializing in
divorce become a common feature of the legal landscape."'
For the most part, these firms represent just a few wealthy
clients, many of them husbands.
As noted, many lawyers are reluctant to represent
wives because of their frequently accurate perception that
wives may be unable to pay attorney fees."' Inadequate
financial resources may also lead attorneys to forego needed
discovery3 92  and to invest inadequate time in case
preparation.393 Practice pressures may cause lawyers to
neglect their clients' cases. Lawyers may then negotiate
representation of divorce clients. See SARAT & FELSTINER, supra note
128, at 3-4; see also Bryan, supra note 88, at 177-88 (relating the story
of a divorce lawyer's incompetent representation of the wife).
388. See PDILLIPS, supra note 101, at 58.
389. A variation on this theme is the high status law firm creates a
family law division in response to client demand.
390. A wealthy lawyer friend who lives in a town of about 75,000
recently filed for divorce. Before choosing his lawyer, he interviewed
every law firm in his area known to specialize in divorce. During the
interviews he provided enough facts about his finances and the
marriage to assure that none of these firms could represent his wife
without a conflict of interest. He is not the only wealthy man I have
known to employ this tactic.
391. See supra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
392. In many cases where the wife attempts to vacate a prior divorce
judgment that incorporated a property settlement agreement, the lack
of discovery by the wife's lawyer is apparent. See In re Marriage of
Steadman, 670 N.E.2d 1146 (IM. App. Ct. 1996); In re Broday, 628
N.E.2d 790 (IM. App. Ct. 1993); In re Marriage of Foster, 451 N.E.2d 915
(Ill. App. Ct. 1983); see also Melli et al., supra note 15, at 1146-47. One
must assume either that all of these lawyers are incompetent, and/or
that their clients lacked the resources with which to pursue discovery.
393. See Bryan, supra note 88, at 177-88 (relating the story of a
lawyer's failure to conduct discovery, leading to an inequitable
settlement).
394. Attorney neglect of divorce cases seems rampant. See WINNER,
supra note 87, at 71-92. Several commentators note that many divorce
cases are settled in court hallways just minutes before the final
hearing. See generally Melli et al., supra note 15, at 1143. One might
think that this settlement behavior equally disadvantages husbands
and wives. On closer inspection this seems unlikely. Generally,
husbands have in their possession the income and property that the
wife wants transferred to her. Moreover, he is in a much stronger
position to resist that transfer than she is to force it. She needs what he
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with inadequate information 95 and may encourage their
women clients to accept poor agreements,3 96 sometimes in
the hallways just before trial. 97 Add to this calculus the fact
that attorneys, for practical, emotional, and financial
reasons, would often rather settle than try divorce cases,"'
and that the wife generally is less able than the husband to
resist an attorney's pressure to settle.99 Indeterminate law
helps the wife's lawyer persuade her to accept his advice.4"'
has and he, as yet, is under no compunction to give her what she needs.
These factors combine with her financial desperation, her attorney's
inferior preparation, indeterminate law, prevailing ideologies, and her
fear of the impending open conflict to disadvantage her more than her
husband.
395. See Melli et al., supra note 15, at 1146-47. Appellate opinions
addressing petitions to vacate or set-aside the property settlement
provisions in a final divorce decree provide numerous examples of the
wife's divorce attorney failing to conduct discovery. See In re Marriage
of Beck, 404 N.E.2d 972, 974 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Beattie v. Beattie, 368
N.E.2d 178, 179-80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977). In one study of 349 Wisconsin
divorce cases only 90 files contained Financial Disclosure Sheets from
both parties whereas 126 files contained little or no financial
information. See Melli et al., supra note 15, at 1146-47.
396. Winner notes that divorce lawyers frequently urge their women
clients to accept agreements the women do not want, explaining that
the agreements are "for [the client's] own good." WINNER, supra note 87,
at 69, 91; see also Melli et al., supra note 15, at 1158-59.
397. See Beattie, 368 N.E.2d at 179-80.
398. Sarat and Felstiner's study confirms how much divorce lawyers
prefer settlement. See SARAT & FELSTINER, supra note 128, at 108-21;
see also In re Marriage of Flynn, 597 N.E.2d 709, 173 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992).
399. In their study of divorce cases Erlanger et al. found that
settlement terms reflected the parties' stamina and vulnerability to the
pressures of prolonged negotiations. See Howard S. Erlanger et al.,
Participation and Flexibility in Informal Processes: Cautions from the
Divorce Context, 21 L. & SoC'Y REV. 585, 592 (1987). Financial
pressures sometimes persuaded clients to accept settlement proposals
their lawyers considered unfair. See id. Many seasoned family law
attorneys attempt to schedule temporary support hearings as early in
the divorce process as possible to avoid these pressures. Yet crowded
dockets, evasion tactics by opposing lawyers, and judicial reluctance to
award temporary support frequently foil their attempts.
400. See WINNER, supra note 87, at 91. Sarat and Felstiner studied
interactions between divorce lawyers and their clients. Their work
provides numerous examples of lawyers using evasive predictions of
what a court will do in order to manipulate clients into accepting
particular settlements. See SARAT & FELSTINER, supra note 128, at 124-
26. Moreover, lawyers frequently invoke vague "standards" or "rules of
thumb" in order to encourage their clients to accept particular
settlement provisions. See id. at 121-24; Melli et al., supra note 15, at
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Finally, if the wife's lawyer expects to collect attorney fees
from the husband, the lawyer may compromise the wife's
position in order to ingratiate herself with the husband.
401
Put simply, the legal culture of divorce frequently permits
and encourages the wife's attorney to compromise the wife's
interests during negotiations, and to encourage the wife to
accept a poor deal.4 Tellingly, one author notes that judges
seem more inclined to divide marital property equally than
litigants who settle their cases.403
Judicial oversight may, but usually does not, provide
relief from unfair settlement agreements. At the final
hearing most jurisdictions require the judge to review
settlement agreements for unfairness or
unconscionability. Currently, however, for a myriad of
reasons,415 judges review only cursorily the provisions of
divorce settlements.4 6 What review does occur seems
1143-44. "Law" for the client is whatever the lawyer says it is. The
client cannot challenge the lawyer's assertions of knowledge
particularly because determinate legal standards do not exist.
401. See WINNER, supra note 87, at 90-91.
402. Unsurprisingly many wives complain of having been coerced by
their attorneys into bad settlements or of having been abandoned by
their attorneys during divorce negotiations.
403. See Garrison, supra note 14, at 685-86.
404. See Sally Burnett Sharp, Semantics as Jurisprudence: The
Elevation of Form Over Substance in the Treatment of Separation
Agreements in North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. REV. 319, 322 & n.14 (1991).
405. For reasons such as judicial frustration with overcrowded
dockets, judicial deference to family privacy, and judicial distaste for
divorce cases, see Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 43, at 811-12,
830; Missouri Gender Bias Report, supra note 43, at 537-39 (noting
judicial dislike of family law cases), and a pervasive preference for
private settlement encourage judges to accept without serious question
unfair settlement provisions.
406. See, e.g., Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 196, at 951 & n.2,
955; Mnookin, supra note 1, at 365. Judges typically inquire only
whether the divorcing couple considers the agreement fair and/or
whether the agreement accurately reflects their understanding. In the
words of one trial judge:
If they know what they're doing, even if it is out of line, then it
is not my job to change their decision. I'll inquire to make sure
they know what they are doing. I have to let them know what
their options are. But I won't usually change it. I don't know if I
have ever changed an amount set by a couple.
Melli et al., supra note 15, at 1145. Melli et al. found only one instance
of judicial intervention in 349 cases they studied. The judge intervened
in that case because the state child support agency objected to the
settlement's terms regarding child support. See id. See also Sally
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directed more to whether the parties voluntarily agreed to
the settlement than to the settlement's substance.4" As one
lawyer explained to his divorce client:
An agreement is totally creative between the two of you. The two
of you can agree to anything you want to, as long as it's not illegal.
The judge is going to say fine, and it can be as lopsided as you
want to make it. The judge will say fine if you both think it's fair
and both of you agree to it. 0
Judicial oversight, consequently, fails to intercept and
rectify unfair divorce agreements.
V. PETITIONS TO VACATE OR SET-ASIDE UNFAIR
AGREEMENTS
Legal interpretive acts signal and occasion the imposition of
violence upon others: A judge articulates her understanding of a
text, and as a result, somebody loses his freedom, his property, his
children, even his life.
40 9
When a judge fails to intercept an unfair agreement at
the time of divorce, a wife may return to court later with a
petition to set aside or vacate the agreement.410 Many wives
lack the financial and emotional resources needed to
challenge unfair settlement agreements.411 Wives who do
Burnett Sharp, Modification of Agreement-Based Custody Decrees:
Unitary or Dual Standard?, 68 VA. L. REV. 1263, 1264 (1982)
(describing the reluctance of judges to alter custody custody and
visitation agreements). Coached by their lawyers, parties mechanically
testify that they consider the agreement fair and that the agreement
reflects their understanding.
407. See Melli et al., supra note 15, at 1146.
408. See SARAT & FELSTINER, supra note 128, at 121-22.
409. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601
(1986).
410. See infra notes 417-29 and accompanying text.
411. An attorney responding to the Florida Gender Bias Commission
painted this picture of the wife at the end of the divorce proceeding:
[I]t's just a simple reality. You run into situations in the
representations specifically of women who generally don't have
the purse strings and by the end of divorce they have run out of
money, they have run out of credit worthiness, they have run
out of every possible relative or friend [from whom] they could
borrow money in pursuing the litigation itself...
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move to have agreements set aside or vacated frequently
confront insensitive judges and a second layer of masculine
law. The contract doctrines of coercion, duress,
misrepresentation, and unconscionability, and the
particular spin that judges place on these doctrines in
family law frequently confirms rather than corrects unfair
results.
Because of the disadvantage of wives in settlement
negotiations, courts should listen sympathetically to
women's complaints of duress or coercion and should look
with suspicion upon agreements with seemingly unfair
provisions. Many courts, in fact, reason that freedom of
contract should be restricted in divorce cases for reasons of
public policy. The state, they say, should guard against
unconscionability in the substance of divorce agreements
412
and against fraud, duress, and undue influence in the
making413 of the agreements.
Despite this lofty rhetoric, courts seem highly reluctant41t
to set aside divorce settlement agreements. Some of the
reluctance415 can be explained by the failure of masculine
legal standards to capture the experience of women.418
Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 43, at 810-11.
412. See, e.g., McIntosh v. McIntosh, 328 S.E.2d 600, 602 (N.C. App.
1985) (citing cases where courts have thrown a "cloak of protection"
around agreements negotiated between husband and wife to ensure
their fairness).
413. See Sharp, supra note 404, at 327 n.42.
414. See id. at 329 n.50; see also Lou McPhail, Comment, Divorce-
Alimony, Allowances, and Disposition of Property-Abuse of
Discretion-The Unconscionable Stipulated Divorce Agreement and
Rule 60(b)(vi): What About the Children?, 72 N. DAK. L. REV. 1099,
1106-07 (1996) (commenting on Crawford v. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d 833
(N.D. 1994), where the North Dakota Supreme Court found a stipulated
divorce agreement unconscionable). Judicial frustration with
overcrowded dockets, judicial deference to family privacy, judicial
distaste for divorce cases, and a pervasive preference for private
settlement encourage judges to refuse to vacate unfair agreements.
415. Efficiency concerns, reflected in a policy favoring divorce
settlements and gender bias also make important contributions.
416. See PATEMAN, supra note 2 for a discussion of the patriarchal
nature of contract theory. Many scholars note that legal norms
frequently fail to anticipate the worlds of women and other
subordinated persons. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 211, at 238;
OKIN, supra note 19, at 7; Abrams, supra note 74, at 318-20 n.55;
Gilkerson, supra note 197, at 873-75; Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-
Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75
MINN. L. REV. 1599, 1642 (1991).
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The law of the State of Illinois provides an example of
how courts address petitions to vacate property
settlements. The State has a policy that favors settlement
of divorce disputes and the Illinois courts presume the
validity of divorce settlements. 1 An Illinois statute declares
that a court may not set aside or vacate a divorce
settlement unless it finds the agreement unconscionable.418
In making this determination, the court is to employ a
concept of unconscionability taken from Illinois commercial
law.4' Unconscionability requires an absence of meaningful
choice on the part of one party together with contract terms
unreasonably favorable to the other party.420  An
unconscionable agreement must be extremely one-sided or
oppressive, an agreement '"hich no man, not under
delusion, would make, on the one hand, and which no fair
and honest man would accept, on the other. ' 2l
417. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Gorman, 671 N.E.2d 819, 825 (IMl.
App. Ct. 1996); In re Marriage of Gidlund, 614 N.E.2d 315, 317 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1993); In re Marriage of Riedy, 474 N.E.2d 28, 30 (Ill. App. Ct.
1985); Bickson v. Bickson, 183 N.E.2d 16 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962).
418. This standard is set forth in the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act which provides:
The terms of the separation agreement, except those providing
for the support, custody and visitation of children, are binding
upon the court unless it finds, after considering the economic
circumstances of the parties and any other relevant evidence
produced by the parties, on their own motion or on request of
the court, that the separation agreement is unconscionable.
40 ILL. COmP. STAT. ANN. 502(b) (West 1992). Other states allow
spouses to challenge separation agreements incorporated into final
judgments by invoking civil procedure rules pertaining to relief from
final judgments. They then commonly employ contract principles in
determining whether the judgment should be vacated. See, e.g.,
McPhail, supra note 414, at 1105-06 (commenting on Galloway v.
Galloway, 281 N.W.2d 804 (N.D. 1979))
419. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Kloster, 469 N.E.2d 381, 385 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1984); In re Marriage of Foster, 451 N.E.2d 915, 918 (IIl. App.
Ct. 1983). Occasionally an appellate court will note that
unconscionability also protects against "overreaching, concealment of
assets, and sharp dealing not consistent with the obligations of marital
partners to deal fairly with each other." In re Marriage of Carlson, 428
N.E.2d 1005, 1010 (IlM. App. Ct. 1981) (citations omitted). In the vast
majority of cases, however, courts omit any reference to this obligation.
420. See, e.g., In re Gorman, 671 N.E.2d at 826; In re Marriage of
Broday, 628 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); In re Carlson, 428 N.E.2d
at 1010.
421. In re Marriage of Gurin, 571 N.E.2d 857, 864 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(quoting In re Carlson, 428 N.E.2d at 1010); See, e.g., In re Kloster, 469
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The courts use a two-part test to determine
unconscionability. They inquire into: (1) the conditions
under which the agreement was made, and (2) the economic
circumstances of the parties produced by the agreement.422
Claims of duress, coercion, and fraud42 4 are examined
under the first prong of the unconscionability test. These
claims must be established by clear and convincing
evidence. 5 The party challenging the agreement must
establish an absence of meaningful choice.426
Of course, this standard is difficult to satisfy. It reflects
a market mentality that presumes equality, autonomy, and
self-interest as governing norms. Wives' challenges to
unfair settlement agreements predictably fail.42
N.E.2d at 385; In re Foster, 451 N.E.2d at 919; In re Carlson, 428
N.E.2d at 1010.
422. In re Gorman, 671 N.E.2d at 826; In re Foster, 451 N.E.2d at
919.
423. Illinois courts define duress as:
[Tihe imposition, oppression, undue influence or the taking of
undue advantage of the stress of another whereby one is
deprived of the exercise of his free will. The person asserting
duress has the burden of proving, by clear and convincing
evidence, that he was bereft of the quality of mind essential to
the making of the contract.
In re Marriage of Hamm-Smith, 633 N.E.2d 225, 230 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)
(citations omitted).
424. Illinois courts define fraud as follows:
For a misrepresentation to constitute fraud, it must consist of a
material false statement which is known to be false by the party
making it, made to induce the other party to act in reliance on
the truth of the statement, and actually acted upon by that
other party.
In re Marriage of Held, 392 N.E.2d 169, 172-73 (11M. App. Ct. 1979)
(citation omitted).
425. See In re Marriage of Goldberg, 668 N.E.2d 1104, 1107 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1996) (explaining that a claim of fraud requires clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant intentionally misstated or concealed a
material fact that he had a duty to disclose and upon which the plaintiff
detrimentally relied); In re Broday, 628 N.E.2d 790; In re Gorman, 671
N.E.2d at 826 ("[The person asserting coercion bears the burden of
proving it by clear and convincing evidence."); In re Carlson, 428 N.E.2d
1005; Beattie v. Beattie, 368 N.E.2d 178, 182 (IlM. App. Ct. 1977)
(stating that party seeking to set aside a divorce settlement must prove
by "clear and convincing evidence that the agreement was entered as
the result of coercion, fraud or duress, or is contrary to public policy or
morals.").
426. See In re Carlson, 428 N.E.2d at 1010.
427. The wife frequently combines two or more claims such as
misrepresentation and duress under the first prong of the
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To illustrate how the application of Illinois'
unconscionability doctrine perverts the wife's experiences
and reinterprets them through a lens of masculine law, I
analyze one representative case in detail and follow with
shorter depictions of other cases. Of course only wives with
substantial financial and emotional resources can afford to
petition a trial court to set aside or vacate a property
settlement, and many questionable agreements doubtlessly
go unchallenged. Moreover, the appellate decisions I have
reviewed strongr suggest that trial courts generally deny
these petitions. Consequently, we know only of cases in
which wives possess sufficient financial and emotional
resources not only to petition the trial court but also to
appeal,429 suggesting that the situation is even worse than
the appellate cases reveal.
I turn now to a representative case." ° The following
facts come from the appellate opinion, from interviews with
the wife and her second attorney, and from the transcript of
the hearing on the wife's Motion to Vacate the settlement
agreement. They exemplify many of the concerns raised at
the beginning of this paper.
Doris married Virgil in 1956 in Walterloo, Illinois."
unconscionability standard. In addressing these claims courts
frequently fracture the factual context into many small pieces which
taken by themselves lose their compelling nature and distort the wife's
reality. In some cases, the wife fails even to allege a specific claim of
coercion, duress, or misrepresentation, merely reciting facts that she
believes indicate the conditions under which the agreement was
reached. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Brandt, 489 N.E.2d 902 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1986). The doctrinal niceties in fact seem to obscure the central
issue: why do women enter objectively unfair agreements?
428. If a trial court vacates an agreement, trial will likely follow.
Court concern over crowded dockets, judicial dislike of divorce cases,
and strongly worded statutes favoring divorce settlements provide
ample incentive for trial courts to deny petitions to vacate, many times
without allowing an evidentiary hearing. See In re Marriage of Hoppe,
580 N.E.2d 1186 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); In re Marriage of Burch, 563
N.E.2d 1049 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); In re Marriage of Beck, 404 N.E.2d 972
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Dendrinos v. Dendrinos, 374 N.E.2d 1016 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1978). Since most challenges likely are brought by dependent wives,
gender bias provides additional inducement.
429. The costs of appeal provide a substantial impediment for
economically dependent spouses. See Missouri Gender Bias Report,
supra note 43, at 539; Florida Gender Bias Report, supra note 43, at
810-11.
430. See In re Brandt, 489 N.E.2d 902.
431. See id.; Report of Proceedings (Dec. 19, 1983), (Doris Brandt) at
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Virgil had an eighth grade education; Doris had graduated
from high school."2 The couple had two children, both of
whom were adults by the time of divorce.43 Throughout the
marriage, Virgil was a self-employed farmer." During the
marriage, Doris completed several college accounting
courses.' ° At the time of divorce, she was employed as an
accountant for the Harrisonville Telephone Company at an
annual salary of $26,400.436
Doris and Virgil's marriage had been troubled for
years.431 Virgil dominated Doris, and according to Doris'
second attorney, Virgil emotionally abused her.4 8 At the
divorce hearing, Doris testified that during their marriage
Virgil had participated in mentally cruel conduct that kept
her nervous and upset.49 The judge granted the divorce on
grounds of "extreme and repeated mental cruelty."'
Doris worked during most of the marriage, routinely
turning her paycheck over to Virgil who invested all extra
funds in the family farm and other enterprises.44' Even the
inheritance Doris received from her parents was given to
Virgil to invest in the farm."2 Virgil made all of the
important financial decisions in the family, usually telling
Doris what he was going to do but not seeking her advice or
permission."3 In 1982, after twenty-six years of marriage,
2, In re Marriage of Brandt, 489 N.E.2d 902 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)
[hereinafter Doris Brandt Proceedings 1983].
432. See In re Brandt, 489 N.E.2d at 903.
433. See Doris Brandt Proceedings 1983 supra note 431, at 2. One
child was 24 and the other 19 at the time of the hearing. See id.
434. See id. at 2.
435. See In re Brandt, 489 N.E.2d at 903.
436. See id. at 44.
437. Evidently Doris had attempted to leave the marriage nine years
before the ultimate separation. See Doris Brandt Proceedings 1983
supra note 431, at 53.
438. See Telephone Interview with Doris' second attorney (Mar. 7,
1997).
439. See Doris Brandt Proceedings 1983 supra note 431, at, 2-3.
440. Id. at 3. Too much, however, should not be made of Doris'
testimony or the judge's findings. Doris gave no specific instances of
Virgil's mental cruelty, the trial court accepted her limited testimony as
sufficient to establish grounds for divorce, and Illinois did not allow no-
fault divorce in 1983 when the divorce hearing took place.
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Doris told Virgil she wanted a divorce.' She was forty-six
and Virgil was forty-nine years old."5
Virgil proposed that they see the same local attorney."
Doris replied that she should have her own attorney, but
Virgil persuaded her that using one attorney would keep
legal fees to a minimum."' The attorney to whom Virgil
took Doris had represented Virgil in several commercial
transactions.' Moreover, after the divorce Virgil and the
attorney maintained a business relationship, buying and
selling land together."9
Virgil and Doris met the attorney at his office on a
Saturday morning.45 ° During their conference, Virgil and
Doris agreed that Virgil should retain the property
necessary to continue farming and that Doris should receive
a cash settlement.45' Virgil and Doris disagreed, however,
about how much money Doris should receive.452 Virgil
valued the marital estate at $315,000.45
444. See id.
445. See Doris Brandt Proceedings 1983 supra note 431, at 2.
446. See Telephone Interview with Doris Brandt (Mar. 10, 1997).
447. See id.
448. See Telephone Interview with Doris' new attorney (Mar. 7,
1997).
449. See id.
- 450. See Report of Proceedings (Apr. 10, 1984), (Virgil Brandt) at 5,
In re Marriage of Brandt, 489 N.E.2d 902 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)
[hereinafter Virgil Brandt 1984].
451. See id. at 12.
452. See Report of Proceedings (1984), (Doris Brandt) at 30, In re
Marriage of Brandt, 489 N.E.2d 902 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) [hereinafter
Doris Brandt Proceedings 1984].
453. See Proceedings Virgil Brandt 1984 supra note 450, at 15. Doris
describes the process of reaching the $315,000 value as follows:
Q. Could you tell the Court what happened in Mr. Crowder's
office that day?
A. Virgil and I were on one side of the table, and Mr. Crowder
on the other.... The two of them went through, and I was
listening, went through the acreage, real estate, the amounts,
the values, the approximate value of the cattle on hand, what
they figured was a fair value of the house, and the indebtedness
was taken from that figure, and we came up with something
like $305,000.00 or $315,000.00.
Q. When you say you are listening ---
A. Virgil was basically doing the valuing, and Mr. Crowder was
doing the writing, as I remember, and from time to time they
would make comments to me about it.
Q. Did you express any opinion as to value?
A. I am not a realtor, I had no idea. I assumed Mr. Crowder was
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The $315,000 value stands in stark contrast to the
values indicated on financial statements prepared by Virgil
and Doris during their marriage.454 One financial statement
prepared two years before the settlement negotiations
indicated a net worth of $764,045. 4" A second statement
prepared only six months before the settlement conference
indicated a net worth of $618,000.456 When these statements
were prepared the only knowledge Doris had of property
values was whatever Virgil told her, or what he told the
bank officer to put down on the statement.4 7 These
representing both of us, and if he thought I wasn't getting a fair
shake, he would open his mouth or say differently.
Doris Brandt Proceedings 1984 supra note 452, at 30.
454. See id.
455. See Virgil Brandt Proceedings 1984, supra note 450, at 11.
456. See id. at 6. Virgil also testified that this financial statement
omitted an $80,000 debt. See id. at 7. This reduced the value of the
marital property to $538,000.
457. See Doris Brandt Proceedings 1984 supra note 452, at 32. At
trial Doris explained how the couple arrived at the figures in the
financial statements:
Q. I am going to hand you a document marked as Petitioner's
Exhibit No. 3 and ask if you can identify that.
A. It is the Financial Statement we furnished Federal Land
Bank Association.
Q. That is signed by you?
A. Yes.
Q. And signed by Virgil?
A. Right.
Q. Who prepared that statement?
A. I would think Cletus Rau, the one that wrote these figures
down in front of both of us at the Federal Land Bank office in
Belleville.
Q. Who established the values?
A. Virgil and Mr. Rau.
Q. Did you participate in the establishment of those values of
the real estate?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Do you have any independent knowledge of the value of that
real estate?
A. Other than what I am told it is worth, no.
Q. Other than what you were told it is worth by whom?
A. Virgil. He was the basis for this.
Q. I hand you what is marked Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2 and ask
if you can identify that.
A. Yes, that is our Financial Statement presented to the First
National Bank of Waterloo.
Q. And have you signed that?
A. Yes, I did.
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statements were submitted to local banks, who in turn
granted Virgil and Doris the farming loans they
requested.58
In spite of the difference in the representations of net
worth on the financial statements and the representations
made by Virgil during settlement negotiations, no one
obtained an independent appraisal prior to settlement.59
Q. And is Virgil's signature on there also?
A. Yes.
Q. How were those values arrived at?
A. I believe each year we were asked to present a new one
revised each year. He would take one from a prior year and
pencil in figures, and changes if any, and I typed it and signed
it.
Q. Was there discussion between you as to arrival at the values?
A. Discussion? No. I knew pretty well what the indebtedness
was. I knew pretty well what we owed on these items. If there
were any changes as to equipment and that, he did the change.
I typed up a new one from his figures.
Id. at 31-33. At trial Virgil tried to make it seem as though Doris knew
as much as he did about the value of the farm property, machinery, and
crops. See Virgil Brandt Proceedings 1984, supra note 450, at 7-12. In
this author's opinion, his testimony is evasive and unconvincing.
458. See id. at 8, 11.
459. At trial Doris' expert appraiser valued the land owned jointly by
Virgil and Doris at $275,000 and the land owned by the farming
corporation at $664,000. See Report of Proceedings (Apr. 10, 1984),
(Kelly G. Martin) at 25-27, In re Marriage of Brandt, 489 N.E.2d 902
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986). Virgil (and Doris) owned a one-third interest in the
farming corporation, making the value of Virgil and Doris' portion
$225,000, according to Doris' expert. The farming corporation owed
Virgil and Doris approximately $39,000. See Virgil Brandt Proceedings
1984, supra note 450, at 13-14; Doris Brandt Proceedings 1984, supra
note 452, at 33; Virgil Brandt Proceedings 1984, supra note 450, at 17.
The parties stipulated that the farming equipment was worth between
$73,000 and $78,000. See Report of Proceedings (Apr. 10, 1984), (Floyd
Crowder) at 96, In re Marriage of Brandt, 489 N.E.2d 902 (Ill.App.Ct.
1986) [hereinafter Floyd Crowder Proceedings Apr. 1984]. The livestock
apparently was valued at approximately $10,000. See Doris Brandt
Proceedings 1984, supra note 452, at 36. Adding these figures together,
the marital estate approached $619,000-surprisingly close to the
amount on the most recent financial statement. If this estimate is
accurate Doris received 12% of the marital assets, while Virgil received
88%. Virgil's experts, however, testified that the real estate was worth
substantially less. See Floyd Crowder Proceedings Apr. 1984, supra, at
103-06, 130. Moreover, Virgil testified that the jointly owned property
was burdened with $178,000 of debt and that his portion of the farming
corporation was burdened with $187,000 of debt. Using Doris' expert's
evaluation of the property and Virgil's testimony about debt as
accurate, the net value of the marital estate would approximate
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Accustomed to Virgil's authority, Doris did not contest
Virgil's estimates.46 She did, however, object to Virgil's
failure to include in the marital assets a one-third interest
that the couple owned in a farming corporation,461 and
approximately $37,000 in promissory notes that the
farming corporation owed to Virgil.462  The farming
corporation gave these promissory notes to Virgil in return
for monies loaned to the corporation from Virgil and Doris'
joint checking account. 48' Doris claims that Virgil told her
that she had no right to the farming corporation or the
promissory notes.4 4 The attorney told Doris those assets
$254,000. At trial Virgil himself testified that during negotiations in
Mr. Crowder's office a net value of $247,000 rather than $305,000, was
placed on the marital property. See Virgil Brandt Proceedings 1984,
supra note 450, at 12-13. Even using this lower figure, Doris would
have received only 30% of the marital assets, while Virgil received 70%.
Virgil, however, is the only person who testified that the amount agreed
to during negotiations was only $247,000. Mr. Crowder himself,
testified that the notes that he kept during negotiation indicated the
parties had agreed that the value of the marital estate was $410,000.
See Report of Proceeding (Aug. 7, 1984), (Floyd Crowder) at 78, In re
Marriage of Brandt, 489 N.E.2d 902 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) [hereinafter
Floyd Crowder Proceedings Aug. 1984]. Mr. Crowder also indicated that
this figure was mistaken because it failed to reflect a $37,500 house
debt. Later Mr. Crowder indicates that the $315,000 value placed on
the marital estate during negotiations should have been reduced by an
outstanding debt, presumably the house debt referred to earlier. See id.
at 79. Using Mr. Crowder's figures, the value placed on the marital
estate during negotiations was somewhere between $372,500 and
$277,500. Doris also testified that a value of between $305,000 and
$315,000 was placed on the marital assets during negotiations. See
Doris Brandt Proceedings 1984, supra note 452, at 30.
460. Later, at trial, both Virgil's and Doris' experts testified that the
value of the marital estate exceeded $315,000.
461. Virgil and Doris owned approximately 217 acres, See Virgil
Brandt Proceedings 1984, supra note 450, at 3-4. And the farming
corporation owned approximately 767 acres. See id. at 3. The Brandts'
owned a one-third interest in the farming corporation.
462. Also excluded from the marital estate was Doris Brandt's
pension plan with the Harrisonville Telephone Company. See Doris
Brandt Proceedings 1984, supra note 452, at 35. The record contains no
indication of the value of Doris' pension plan, nor does it mention
whether Virgil had any pension plan.
463. See id. at 33.
464. See Telephone Interview with Doris Brandt (Mar. 10, 1997). At
trial Virgil denied telling Doris she had no rights in the corporation,
rather he claimed that he only told her that the corporation was
worthless. See Virgil Brandt Proceedings 1984, supra note 450, at 12,
18-19.
[Vol. 471248
1999] WOMEN CONTRACTING AT DIVORCE
were worthless anyway.465 No investigation was made into
Doris' rights in the farming corporation, nor was any
appraisal of its value obtained.466 Doris suggested that she
would like the settlement agreement to contain a paragraph
protecting her right to the promissory notes if they were
paid in the future.467 Throughout the conference, Doris
thought the lawyer was representing her and Virgil,4" and
she expected the lawyer to tell her if she was not getting
what she was entitled to have.469
During the conference Doris initially offered to accept
40% of the marital assets, or $126,000.470 Virgil resisted,
saying he was willing to pay her only $50,000.471 The lawyer
told them both that a court would likely make a fifty-fifty
distribution of the marital assets.472 Moreover, the lawyer
told Virgil that Doris was entitled to more than $50,000.
4 7
1
Virgil then offered Doris $60,000.474 Doris insisted that she
get $100,000. 475 Virgil countered with an offer of $75,000.476
Throughout the conference Doris was distraught and
465. See Telephone Interview with Doris Brandt (Mar. 10, 1997). The
attorney, Mr. Crowder, testified at trial that Virgil, not Mr. Crowder,
indicated that the farming corporation was worthless. See Floyd
Crowder Proceedings Aug. 1984, supra note 459, at 72.
466. This information was absent from the trial transcript.
467. At trial Virgil admitted that during the settlement conference
he and Doris discussed the money they had put into the farming
corporation and that Doris indicated she would like her share.
According to Virgil, he told Doris that if he ever got his money out of the
corporation, he'd be glad to give her share. That understanding, Virgil
admitted, was never put into the agreement. See Virgil Brandt
Proceedings Apr. 1984, supra note 450, at 17-18.
468. When asked during the hearing whether the lawyer was
representing him during the settlement conference, Virgil replied, "I
think he was representing both of us." See id. at 21.
469. See Telephone Interview with Doris Brandt (Mar. 10, 1997); see
also Doris Brandt Proceedings 1984, supra note 452, at 30.
470. See Doris Brandt Proceedings 1984, supra note 452, at 37.
471. See id. at 37.
472. See id. at 48. Why Doris asked for only 40% of the marital
assets rather than the 50% the lawyer indicated she was entitled to
remains unknown. One might speculate, however, that Doris felt guilty
because she had become involved with another man prior to the actual
separation. See id. at 45.
473. See id. at 48.
474. See id.
475. See id. at 47.
476. See id. at 48.
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depressed.477 As negotiations proceeded, it seemed to her
that all of her years of labor478 and all of her financial
contributions counted for little in the end.479 She felt
stunned and betrayed.48 ° She just "could not believe that
everything was so one-sided."8 By the time Virgil made his
final offer of $75,000, Doris felt resigned.482 She tried to get
him to agree to more, but he refused.483 Doris accepted the
$75,000 without interest,4' even though the $75,000 was to
477. See Telephone Interview with Doris' new attorney (Mar. 7,
1997).
478. In addition to her economic and caretaking contributions to the
marriage, Doris explained that she took one week of her two week
vacation each year to help plant the crops. She took the other week to
help harvest the crops. See Telephone Interview with Doris Brandt
(Mar. 10, 1997).
479. See id.
480. See id. Doris further explained that Virgil laid claim even to
small items that had personal significance only to her, like a set of
silver given to Doris by co-workers. At one point Virgil demanded that
he be given the truck and that the younger daughter, away at college,
be given the automobile, leaving Doris without a vehicle. The lawyer
told him that Doris had to have a car. See id.
481. See id. Doris' words echo those of a divorced woman in
Weitzman's study on the California divorce courts: "It's horrible when
you have to face how little you are worth-what a low value the society
places on all those years of your life.. . ." WEITZMAN, supra note 14, at
173. Another woman in the same study commented:
I figured it out. After ten years of marriage I got $200 a month
for five years. That comes out to $1,100 for each year of
marriage. That means I was his 60-hour-a-week servant for
$100 a month. Just about slave labor.., housekeeper, nurse,
chauffeur, mother. And prostitute-that's what I felt like... It's
an insult.
Id.
482. See Telephone Interview with Doris Brandt (Mar. 10, 1997).
483. When questioned at trial about why she finally accepted the
$75,000, Doris replied, "I felt we had been there all day. He is a very
insistent person, and I felt I wasn't going to get any further with him."
Doris Brandt Proceedings 1984, supra note 452, at 37.
484. Doris' lawyer questioned her about why she had not demanded
interest:
Q. Was there a discussion as to interest?
A. Yes, he wouldn't pay that, so I went along with the fact if he
wouldn't, he wouldn't.
Q. Did you receive any advice about the payment of interest or
what you were entitled to?
A. Mr. Crowder had brought it up in the conversation, yes, but
Virgil wouldn't buy it.
Q. Why did you accept these figures at no interest rate?
A. I felt that Mr. Crowder was representing me as well as Virgil.
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be paid out over a six-to-seven year period. 5
Doris and Virgil returned home."6 Over the weekend
Doris claimed that Virgil continued to pressure her.487 The
attorney- called and said the agreement was ready to be
signed.' On Monday evening, the parties returned to the
attorney's office and met with another attorney who had
prepared the settlement agreement.489 Doris remained
distraught; her sense of betrayal persisted and she was
depressed and numb.49° The new attorney explained that
she was to receive a cash settlement and that deeds to
property were to be executed and titles to automobiles
transferred.49' The lawyer told Virgil and Doris to look over
the agreement and that he would answer any questions; he
did not go through the agreement and explain the meaning
of each paragraph.492 Doris was never told, for instance, that
she was forever relinquishing her rights to spousal support
If he thought I deserved it, he would have forced the issue. And
like I said a few sentences ago, I didn't think I was going to get
any further. Virgil wouldn't and that was it.
Q. What led you to believe you wouldn't get any further with
Virgil?
A. He is a very headstrong man with his own mind. I had lived
with him enough years to know he doesn't change his mind.
Id. at 38.
485. See Floyd Crowder Proceedings 1984, supra note 459, at 88.
486. See Doris Brandt Proceedings 1984, supra note 452, at 38.
487. The following colloquy occurred between Doris and her attorney:
Q. Any pressure between the 25th and 27th?
A. Yes, there was.
Q. Could you explain that?
A. A lot of conversation, strong language, no physical abuse.
Q. How would you characterize the strong language? Explain
that.
A. Loud conversations and very --- He was very determined to
get his way. He was just quite a talker.
Q. Did you feel you had any choice?
A. No, I did not feel I had any choice.
Id. at 43.
488. See id.
489. See Virgil Brandt Proceedings 1984, supra note 450, at 20.
490. See Telephone Interview with Doris Brandt (Mar. 10, 1997).
491. See In re Marriage of Brandt, 489 N.E.2d 902, 906 (Ill. App. Ct.
1986).
492. See Virgil Brandt Proceedings 1984, supra note 450, at 20-21;
Doris Brandt Proceedings 1984, supra note 452, at 35; Report of
Proceedings (Aug. 7, 1984), (Arlie Traughber) at 60, In re Marriage of




and maintenance.493 This attorney testified at trial that he
provided no explanation of the document he had prepared
and that he represented neither party.494 Doris signed the
agreement.495 From beginning to end, the second conference
took no more than twenty minutes.496 When asked why
Doris signed the agreement, Doris' new attorney explained
that Doris had been distraught, that she had trusted the
lawyer, and that Virgil had always dominated Doris.497
Doris also reported that she trusted the lawyer.498 The
agreement did not contain the paragraph that Doris had
requested regarding the promissory notes.
Under the agreement, Doris received a 1979 Mercury
automobile, miscellaneous items of personal property, and
$75,000 to be paid in installments with no interest-
approximately twenty-four percent of the value of the
marital assets.499 Virgil received $240,000 in farm property
and equipment and various items of personal property-
approximately seventy-six percent of the marital estate."00
Virgil also received a one-third interest in the farming
corporation and $37,900 in promissory notes.5' Both Doris
and Virgil waived their respective rights to spousal
maintenance."' Doris' new lawyer insists, "Virgil made out
like a bandit."03
Afterwards, when Doris told a niece who worked for a
lawyer about the agreement, the niece protested that the
terms were unfair."' Doris sought the advice of a second
493. See Doris Brandt Proceedings 1984, supra note 452, at 35.
494. See Arlie Traughber Proceedings 1984, supra note 492, at 61.
495. See Doris Brandt Proceedings 1984, supra note 452, at 50.
496. See id.
497. See Telephone Interview with Doris' new attorney (Mar. 7,
1997).
498. See id.; Doris Brandt Proceedings 1984, supra note 452, at 30,
38.
499. At trial both parties introduced expert appraisals of the value of
the couple's jointly owned property and the farming corporation. Virgil
also introduced evidence of the debt on the jointly owned property and
the farming corporation. None of these appraisals reflect the net values
placed on the financial statements.
500. See In re Marriage of Brandt, 489 N.E.2d 902, 903-04 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1986).
501. See id.
502. See id. at 903.
503. See Telephone Interview with Doris' new attorney (Mar. 7,
1997).
504. See Telephone Interview with Doris Brandt on (Mar. 10, 1997).
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lawyer who agreed with the niece."' The new attorney
represented Doris at the trial when she asked the court to
set aside the agreement."6 The attorney that allegedly had
represented both parties during the negotiations
represented Virgil at the trial and on appeal.0 7 He justified
his representation of Virgil by claiming to have performed
as a mediator and not a lawyer during the negotiations. 8
Doris claimed she had never heard of mediation, nor did the
attorney ever explain that he was acting as a mediator.0 9
The trial court refused to set aside the agreement, and
Doris appealed.510
A sensitized reader can see how Doris was set up to
accept an objectively bad deal. First, although Doris worked
outside the home, Virgil controlled the family finances,
including Doris' paycheck.511 Virgil's authority carried over
to the divorce negotiations and predisposed Doris to accept
his valuation of the property and his claim that she had no
interest in the farming corporation and promissory notes, or
alternatively, that these assets lacked value.5"2 Second,
Doris began negotiations asking for forty percent of the
marital assets,5" illustrating that her initial expectations
were low compared to Virgil's. Third, still steeped in norms
of fairness, trust, and sharing, Doris was depressed and
stunned by her immersion in a world governed by self-
interest. The law, she was told, provided little recognition
for her twenty-six years of hard work and her financial
contributions to the marriage. She became an easy target
for Virgil's aggressive bargaining tactics. Fourth, Virgil had
505. See id.




509. See Telephone Interview with Doris Brandt (Mar. 10, 1997).
510. See In re Marriage of Brandt, 489 N.E.2d 902, 903 (1li. App. Ct.
1986).
511. See Telephone Interview with Doris Brandt (Mar. 10, 1997).
512. I was unable to determine from the conversations I had with
Doris and her second lawyer whether the promissory notes and the
interest in the farming corporation had value. Doris, however, was
predisposed to accept Virgil's assertions as to their value, irrespective of
their correctness. Moreover, Virgil clearly was wrong about Doris' lack
of interest in these properties since they both had been purchased with
marital funds during the marriage.
513. See Doris Brandt Proceedings 1984, supra note 452, at 37.
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emotionally abused Doris for years, enhancing her
depression, lowering her self-esteem, and leaving her prone
to his continued dominance during negotiations. Fifth, the
lawyer did very little to protect Doris' interests. He
accepted, without question, Virgil's evaluation of the
marital assets. He made no investigation of Doris' legal
rights to the farming corporation and promissory notes, and
he did not seek an independent evaluation of those assets.14
Rather, he actively encouraged Doris to forego any right to
them by claiming they lacked value. He ultimately failed to
include those assets in the settlement agreement. The
lawyer was plainly instrumental in securing Doris'
agreement to an unfair settlement. Moreover, the lawyer
then turned against Doris and represented Virgil at trial,
actually testifying against Doris and cross-examining her
during the proceeding.
Was the agreement unconscionable? The appellate
court did not believe so.5 ' First, the appellate court omitted
or reconstructed many of Doris' experiences. Rather than
recognize Virgil's dominance, the court implied that Doris
was at least Virgil's equal because she had taken some
college courses and she worked as an accountant.51 No
mention was made of Doris' financial contributions to the
marriage. The court also failed to note that the attorney
allegedly representing both Virgil and Doris had
represented Virgil in commercial transactions, represented
Virgil at trial, and also represented Virgil on appeal. The
court also de-emphasized the inequity of the property
distribution by noting that Doris received $75,000 in cash,
while declining to mention that Virgil received $240,000 or
seventy-six percent of the marital estate.517 Finally, the
court never acknowledged Doris' emotional state during the
negotiations. Rather, it spoke of offers and counter-offers,
depicting Doris as an assertive negotiator and implying
that she really did not need an attorney's advocacy.
On appeal, Doris claimed that Virgil's
misrepresentation of the value of the marital assets, her
lack of representation by independent counsel, and the
haste with which the agreement was contrived created
514. See Floyd Crowder Proceedings 1984, supra note 459, at 72.
515. See In re Brandt, 489 N.E.2d at 906.
516. See id. at 903.
517. See id.
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sufficiently questionable conditions to fulfill the first prong
of the unconscionability test.51  Regarding Virgil's
misrepresentation of the value of the marital assets, the
appellate court found that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by rejecting the testimony of the experts, and by
finding that the husband did not misrepresent the value of
the marital estate.519 Without so stating, the appellate court
seemed to impute negligence to Doris for her failure to
discover the actual value of the marital estate and to
investigate her rights in the farming corporation and
promissory notes-a theme found in several other cases."'
It did not consider the possibility that pre-existing marital
dynamics, including Doris' mental state, her lack of
independent knowledge, and her reliance upon the
attorney, substantially inhibited her ability to protect
herself. Moreover, the court implicitly condoned Virgil's
misstatements and hard bargaining tactics which, even if
suitable between competitors in the market place, ought to
have no place in negotiations between spouses.
Regarding Doris' lack of independent counsel, the court
found it enough that the attorney had informed her that a
court would most likely award her half of the marital
assets." The court seemed oblivious to both the self-serving
nature of the lawyer's testimony and its questionable
veracity. Even if the lawyer did inform Doris, Doris needed
more than information to protect herself. The court imputed
to her a fictitious equality with her husband, ignored her
inexperience, socialization, and emotional condition, and
condoned a lawyer's clearly improper behavior.
Regarding Doris' claim that the agreement was hastily
contrived and not a product of her free will, the court found
the twenty minutes that Doris had to review the agreement
sufficient. 22 Additionally, the court stated that Doris
"chose" to devote only twenty minutes to reviewing the
agreement, implicitly attributing haste and negligence to
her.5 23 The court concluded that the conditions under which
518. See id. at 904.
519. See id.
520. See supra note 103.
521. See In re Brandt, 489 N.E.2d at 905.
522. See id. at 905-06.
523. Joan Williams explains how choice rhetoric frequently is used in
family law to deny structuralpatterns of inequality between men and
women. Women are perceived as equal-they simply make different
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the agreement was entered did not support a finding that
Doris had satisfied the first prong of the unconscionability
standard.5
Turning to the second prong, the court noted that
unequal distribution does not itself establish
unconscionability.525 It observed that Doris' salary of
$26,400 and her $75,000 property distribution did not
"leave her destitute," and concluded that the agreement
was not one-sided enough to be unconscionable. 26
The circumstances of Doris' case are not unusual.
Commercial contract doctrine, particularly as applied by
gender-biased judges, does not capture women's experiences
during marriage and divorce negotiations. Courts typically
look disfavorably upon financially dependent wives for
"choosing" to forego legal representation.52 For instance,
Elaine Beattie had been married to Joseph Beattie for
twenty-four years when Joseph sought a divorce.2 8 Elaine
worked at K-Mart earning approximately $5,500 to $6,000
per year.529 Joseph worked as a self-employed farmer
earning approximately $10,000 per year.530 The couple had
four minor children. "' Prior to and during the divorce
Elaine was treated for mental problems.12 On June 2, 1975,
Elaine Beattie's husband took her to the office of his
attorney, Watts Johnson. 3 Johnson prepared a property
settlement agreement in which Elaine received no spousal
maintenance, approximately twenty-five percent ($25,000)
of the marital assets, custody of the four minor children,
and child support in a smaller amount than recommended
choices than men might make. See Williams, supra note 26, at 2241.
Women "choose," for instance, to marginalize their careers in order to
fulfill caregiving responsibilities, or women "choose" to remain
unemployed during marriage. See id. at 2241 & n.62. Williams argues
that this distorted version of equality distinctly disadvantages women
at divorce. See id. at 2241; see also O'Connell, supra note 256, at 500.
524. See In re Brandt, 489 N.E.2d at 906.
525. See id. at 906.
526. See id.
527. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Broday, 628 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. App. Ct.
1983).
528. See Beattie v. Beattie, 368 N.E.2d 178, 180 (IMI. App. Ct. 1977).
529. See id. at 184.
530. See id. at 180, 184.
531. See id. at 180.
532. See id. at 181.
533. See id. at 180.
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by the Bureau County Bar Association."4 After preparing
the agreement, Johnson called another attorney, Donald
Bird, to come to his office to represent Elaine.3 5 Elaine had
never met nor talked to Bird before he appeared at
Johnson's office. 36 When he arrived, Bird reviewed the
settlement agreement with Elaine and inquired whether
she was sufficiently composed to act as the plaintiff in the
divorce proceeding. 37 Bird spent no time alone with Elaine
until the following day, June 3, when he walked with her
from Johnson's office to the courthouse for the divorce
hearing.5 38 The judge granted the divorce on June 3
incorporating the parties' settlement in his final order.1
3 9
Elaine's extreme anxiety over the divorce led her to check
herself into the Methodist Hospital of Central Illinois,
where she was diagnosed with anxiety neurosis as a result
of the divorce.54 ° Upon regaining her composure on June 24,
Elaine requested the court to vacate the final judgment,
alleging among other things that she lacked the benefit of
private counsel during the divorce negotiations.541 The trial
court denied her petition, and Elaine appealed. 2 In
upholding the trial court, the appellate court noted that
during the divorce negotiations Elaine had not wanted an
independent attorney.13 The court apparently gathered this
information from the self-serving testimony of Johnson,
Joseph's attorney.5 The court concluded that Elaine had
made a knowing decision to forego independent
representation.545
Courts also minimize wives' complaints of anxiety,
depression, and mental distress, commonly noting that




537. See id. at 181.
538. See id.
539. See id. at 179.
540. See id. at 181.
541. See id. at 179.
542. See id.
543. See id. at 182.
544. See id.
545. See id.
546. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Flynn, 597 N.E.2d 709, 714, 173 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992). But see In re Marriage of Frey, 630 N.E.2d 466, 466-470
(Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (considering the wife's emotional distress in
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instance, she alleged that her emotional condition during
divorce negotiations impaired her capacity to contract.5
The severity of her condition led her to admit herself to a
local hospital immediately following the divorce, but the
appellate court credited the trial court's finding that Elaine,
although obviously upset during the divorce proceedings,
was no more upset and nervous than normal. 8 The trial
court also noted that Elaine's mental illness was not
particularly acute."9 Unsurprisingly, Elaine fared no better
with this argument than with her argument regarding
independent legal counsel.55°
Divorce attorneys typically coach their clients about
how to respond to the routine pattern of questions at the
final divorce hearing. Generally these questions include
whether the client believes the marriage is irretrievably
broken, whether the client understands the settlement
agreement, whether the client believes the settlement is
equitable, and whether the client agrees to the settlement's
terms. Of course, emotionally impaired people can give
rehearsed answers to the anticipated questions, but when
faced with claims of duress or coercion, courts point to this
coached testimony and impute actual understanding and
willing assent to wives.5 ' To return once more to Elaine
Beattie's case, she claimed that her mental condition
upholding a trial court's finding of unconscionability).
547. See Beattie, 368 N.E.2d at 182. In preparing this paper I read
more than 60 Illinois cases. In some of them, husbands challenged
settlements. Interestingly, in these cases no court ever mentioned that
husbands "normally" are emotionally upset at divorce.
548. See id. at 183.
549. See id.
550. Gender bias as well as contract doctrine probably contributed to
this decision. Negative stereotypes of women abound because women
are emotional creatures, and signs of emotionality during divorce are
merely to be expected.
551. See, e.g., Crawford v. Crawford, 350 N.E.2d 103 (Ill. App. Ct.
1976) (reversing the trial court's denial of wife's petition to vacate);
Byrne v. Byrne, 643 N.Y.S.2d 659 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (finding the
wife had "unequivocally agreed" to the terms of a stipulation that
concededly contained several concessions regarding the husband's
financial obligations). If an attorney reads a settlement's terms into the
record in open court and competent counsels represent both parties,
New York courts are reluctant to vacate the agreement. See, e.g.,
Burkart v. Burkart, 582 N.Y.S.2d 783 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); Zioncheck
v. Zioncheck, 470 N.Y.S.2d 950 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
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impaired her ability to understand the agreement's terms."'
In response, the appellate court referred to Elaine's trial
testimony and qupped, "If she said that she understood,
she understood." 5
Even more troublesome are cases like Mary Ann's in
which courts misconstrue a wife's equivocal testimony as
her willing acquiescence. 5" At the age of sixty-six, Mary
Ann Flynn filed for divorce from her husband George, a
fifty-four year old music professor.555 Mary. Ann had poor
health and little likelihood of employment.5" The agreement
her attorney urged her to enter provided no maintenance.557
Instead, it allotted her sixty-two percent of the marital
assets, including one-half of George's retirement account.5 8
Because of her age, Mary Ann could immediately remove
her portion of George's pension and draw from a life-long
annuity that would generate an annual income of $8,400.
5
The appellate court never indicated the value of the
remaining assets, or the amount of George's income."' At
final hearing, Mary Ann testified about the settlement, and
the trial court incorporated the settlement into the final
judgment of dissolution.55 ' Soon after judgment was entered,
Mary Ann, proceeding pro se, filed a petition asking the
court to vacate the agreement.6 ' She argued, that her
attorney coerced her into accepting the agreement563 and
that the agreement was unconscionable because it provided
no maintenance." The trial court denied her petition and
Mary Ann appealed. 65
In addressing Mary Ann's claim of unconscionability,
the appellate court quoted her trial testimony to illustrate
that Mary Ann knew that the agreement provided no
552. See Beattie, 368 N.E.2d at 182.
553. See id. at 183; see also In re Marriage of Steadman, 670 N.E.2d
1146, 1151 (IlM. App. Ct. 1996).
554. See In re Marriage of Flynn, 597 N.E.2d 709 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
555. See id. at 710, 713.





561. See id. at 711-12.
562. See id. at 712.
563. See id. at 713.
564. See id. at 712-13.
565. See id. at 712.
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maintenance and that she willingly acquiesced to the
agreement's terms.5 66 First, the court offered a colloquy
between Mary Ann and her attorney Mr. Bickley:
"[Bickley] Are you willing then to waive maintenance in
return for a higher percentage of the proceeds to be
acquired by the sale of the assets of this particular marital
property?
[Mary Ann] I'm just-I'm trying to do math in my head
and I'm not that good at it. So, I'm waiving maintenance for
all time, no matter what happens to me or what my
physical condition is?
[Bickley] That's correct. Once you waive maintenance-
[Mary Ann] For the sake of eight per cent being given to
me as opposed to being given to my husband?
[Bickleyl You are in effect being given between eight
and ten per cent more of the assets of this estate than you
would be entitled to under the current law.
[Mary Ann] Otherwise I get fifty per cent? Is that -
[Bickley] You get fifty per cent.
[Mary Ann] Yes."
56 7
The trial judge then explained to Mary Ann that the
marital assets need not be divided equally, but that the
court would consider the ability of each spouse to
accumulate additional assets in the future as well as what
assets Mary Ann would need to live comfortably without
maintenance.5 68 Bickley then made another attempt to elicit
appropriate responses from Mary Ann.
[Bickley] Well, the question that is presently pending
before the Court, is do you understand now * * * that if you
waive maintenance today, you can never come before this
Court or any other court and ask for an imposition of
maintenance for you, do you understand that?
[Mary Ann] Yes, I understand that. It's just such a big
thing to understand to say yes, and say yes, and I agree, I'll
do it. I'll never come back again, you know, no matter what
my situation is.
[Bickley] Well, that is why we are here in court, Mrs.
Flynn.
[Mary Ann] Yes.
566. See id. at 711-12.
567. See id. at 711.
568. See id.
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[Bickley] We are here to get a dissolution of marriage.
[Mary Ann] Yes.
[Bickley] And to reach an accord with respect to all of
the property rights between the parties.
[Mary Ann] All right.
[Bickley] Do you understand that?
[Mary Ann] I do understand that.569
The appellate court then quoted Mary Ann's responses
to the questions of George's attorney, Mr. Kuhs.
[Kuhs] Do you feel that this is a fair settlement of this
case under the circumstances?
[Mary Ann] A fair settlement? Is my answer going to
determine anything that is going to happen here?
THE COURT: Do you feel that it is fair and equitable?
Are you satisfied with it? Was there any force or coercion
used upon you to enter into this agreement?
[Mary Ann] No. It seems like the best we can do under
the circumstances.
THE COURT: Under the circumstances do you feel that
it is fair and equitable?
[Kuhs] No one has threatened you or coerced you to sign
this?
[Mary Ann] No one has threatened me.
[Kuhs] You are not under the influence of alcohol or any
other medication or drugs today, are you?
[Mary Ann] Nothing at all.
[Kuhs] Thank you.
Finally, the appellate court turned to an exchange with
Mary Ann at the conclusion of the hearing.
[Mary Ann] May I ask a question? Was the subject of
my health brought up?
THE COURT: Well, I would assume it was brought up
in negotiations.
[Mary Ann] Was it?
[Bickley] Anything further?
[Kuhs] Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: You're welcome. Good luck.57'
What the appellate court perceived as Mary Ann's
knowing acquiescence was probably the strongest protest
569. See id.




the sixty-six year old homemaker could muster.57 2 The
appellate court added insult by concluding, "[tihe fact that
Mary Ann has since changed her mind should not render
the settlement invalid."578
Courts minimize the duress mothers experience when
threatened with a loss of custody.574 For instance, in August
of 1994, Yolanda left her husband, Jeffrey, after nearly
twenty years of marriage.575 She took their three youngest
sons with her to the couple's summer home.76 The older two
boys stayed with their father in Bolingbrook, Illinois. 77
Jeffrey worked as a hospital administrator, earning
approximately $150,000 per year.578 Yolanda had not
worked outside the home during the marriage. The court
soon ordered Jeffrey to pay to Yolanda $2,400 per month for
unallocated family support.80
Sometime within the first year after separation,
Yolanda decided to move to Wixom, Michigan with her
three youngest sons.58' On August 28, 1995, Jeffrey filed an
emergency petition requesting the court to enjoin Yolanda
572. Chillingly Pateman reminds,
Civil mastery requires agreement from the subordinate and
numerous stories are spun in which slaves and women in chains
contract and consent to their subjection. In the famous
pornographic story, The story of 0, in which 0, a woman, is
imprisoned and used sexually by her captors, she is always
asked before each assault and violation whether or not she
consents. Men exercise their masculine capacity for political
creativity by generating political relationships of subordination
through contract.
PATEMAN, supra note 2, at 186-87.
573. In re Flynn, 597 N.E.2d at 714; see also Bryan, supra note 88, at
177-88; In re Marriage of Steadman, 670 N.E.2d 1146 (Ill. App. Ct.
1996); Crawford v. Crawford, 350 N.E.2d 103 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976)
(reversing the trial court's denial of the wife's petition to vacate).
574. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hoppe, 580 N.E.2d 1186 (IM. App. Ct.
1991) (reversing and remanding the trial court's denial of the wife's
petition to vacate). But see In re Marriage of Carlson, 428 N.E.2d 1005,
1011 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (considering the husband's threat to take
custody of the children one important factor in finding the agreement
unconscionable).
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from permanently removing the boys to Michigan.582 A
hearing was scheduled for three days later.583 On the date of
the hearing, Jeffrey and his lawyer and Yolanda and her
attorney appeared at the court.5 For two hours they all
negotiated in the hallway outside the courtroom. 5
Apparently, no discovery had been conducted prior to
negotiations.5"5 At her attorney's urging, Yolanda orally
agreed to accept what appears to be between seventeen and
twenty-three percent of the marital assets587 and three years
of minimal and non-modifiable rehabilitative spousal
maintenance,... in return for custody of her three youngest
sons.58 9 Rather than argue the merits of Jeffrey's emergency
petition, at the hearing Jeffrey, Yolanda, and their lawyers
presented the terms of an oral settlement agreement to the
trial court.59 ° On the basis of the testimony, the judge
agreed to enter judgment on October 5, 1995."9'
On October 5th, Yolanda appeared in court with her
new lawyer, Mr. Holden.59 Mr. Holden requested a
continuance, but the court declined and entered
judgment.593 On November 5th, Yolanda filed a motion to
vacate the judgment, arguing, among other things, that she
suffered from duress during negotiations because of her
extreme fear of losing her children.594 Yolanda's fear seemed
credible because she had already lost her two older sons to
Jeffrey, the court might have disapproved of her removal of
the three youngest sons to Michigan, she only had three
days notice of the emergency hearing, and she had minimal
financial resources with which to fight Jeffrey.595 Moreover,
the unfair financial terms to which she agreed suggested






587. See id. at 1149.
588. See id. at 1151-52.
589. See id.
590. See id. at 1148.
591. See id. at 1149.
592. See id.
593. See id.
594. See id. at 1149, 1151-52.
595. See id. at 1148.
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she felt she had no other choice. 96 The trial court, however,
denied Yolanda's motion to vacate and the appellate court
affirmed.597 In addressing Yolanda's duress argument, the
appellate court stated:
Wife bears the burden of showing duress by presenting clear and
convincing evidence that she was bereft of the quality of mind
necessary to make a contract. While wife's fear that she may lose
custody of her children no doubt caused her anxiety, we do not
recognize this as a factor impairing her ability to exercise her free
will and make a meaningful choice when the record reflects that
she agreed to negotiations, took part in the negotiations and then
presented the substance of these negotiations, under oath, to the
trial court. Many spouses may experience anxiety when appearing
in court because of a petition to dissolve a marriage and this
anxiety is no doubt heightened when one fears she may lose
custody of her children; however, this factor, without more, does
not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that one lacked the
598
ability to make a voluntary decision.
Wives who allege that their attorneys coerced them into
signing a poor agreement 99 or inadequately represented
596. At the settlement hearing Yolanda testified as follows:
MR. KOZLOWSKI [Counsel for Wife]: And that's the agreement
we worked out today in the hall, and we will reduce it to writing
with the joint custody [agreement], and you're satisfied with
that?
THE WITNESS [Wife]: I have no choice.
THE COURT: Well, ma'am, I want you to understand that you
do have a choice. We can sit down right now and have a formal
hearing and the parties can present evidence on both sides and
call any witnesses that you want and the Court will make a
decision.
THE WITNESS: Okay
THE COURT: The question is, is this your agreement?
THE WITNESS: At this time, yes, sir.
Id. at 1149.
597. See id. at 1148.
598. See In re Steadman, 670 N.E.2d at 1151-52 (citations omitted).
599.
An occasional variation on this theme arises when the wife
alleges that the trial court coerced her into a bad agreement by
exerting pressure to settle prior to hearing. For instance, in
Cantamessa v. Cantamessa, 565 N.Y.S.2d 895 (N.Y. App. Div.
1991), on the day of final hearing the judge encouraged the
parties to settle and consulted with the parties and their
attorneys during negotiations. At the court's urging, the wife
finally entered into an agreement. The wife testified that she
[Vol. 471264
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them get caught in a battle with their former attorneys."0 A
wife may claim, for instance, that when she signed the
agreement she did not know that she was entitled to half of
the marital assets. Her former counsel, however, in order to
protect him or herself, is likely to testify that he or she
advised the wife of her right to one-half of the marital
assets. Courts routinely find that the wife knew whatever
the lawyer claims to have told her.60 ' Likewise, trial courts
impute negligence to the wife when her attorney fails to
conduct discovery62 or fails to detect and correct errors in
understood the settlement's terms, she had sufficient time to
discuss the settlement with her attorney, and that she was
satisfied with the agreement and with her attorney's
representation. The court then incorporated the stipulated
settlement into the final judgment of dissolution. The wife
subsequently petitioned to vacate the settlement agreement.
The appellate court acknowledged that the property the
husband retained had substantially more value than that
retained by the wife and that the agreement was "improvident."
id. at 897. The court also noted that considerable conflict
surrounded the value of the husband's ownership interest in his
business, implying that discovery had yet to resolve this
question despite over four years of litigation. The appellate
court, however, did not recognize that this wife likely
experienced what many wives experience at divorce: the refusal
of the more powerful husband to comply with discovery
requests, the failure of the wife's attorney's to conduct adequate
discovery before negotiations "on the courthouse steps," the
capitulation of the wife to the overpowering nature of the
husband, his attorney, and the judge in pressured negotiations
just before trial, and the wife's ultimate inability to resist
pressures to enter an "improvident" agreement. Rather the
court found the wife's claims of emotional stress and unsettled
mental state unpersuasive grounds to set aside the stipulation,
particularly when the agreement was "freely" entered into the
record. Thus, no coercion. Similarly although the agreement
was admittedly "improvident" - the court found it was not one-
sided enough to support a finding of unconscionability.
Id.
600. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Foster, 451 N.E.2d 915, 917 (IMI. App.
Ct. 1983).
601. See, e.g., Bryan, supra note 88, at 177-88; In re Foster, 451
N.E.2d at 917; In re Marriage of Brandt, 489 N.E.2d 902, 901-905, (Ill.
App. Ct. 1986).
602. In a peculiar twist on this theme, one appellate court found the
wife's attorney's failure to determine the status of the marital property
unproblematic because an "unequivocal evaluation by the petitioner's




the final settlement provisions."3
Trial courts regularly ignore the pleas of wives who
have been badly represented by lawyers chosen either by
their husbands or by their husbands' attorneys.&" For
instance, after several months of marital discord and talk of
divorce, Lawrence Beck informed his wife Janice that he
had an appointment with an attorney."0 At the meeting, the
attorney persuaded Janice to sign a handwritten letter
addressed to another attorney whom Janice did not know.0
The letter, which requested the attorney to represent
Janice, specified the settlement terms that Janice allegedly
wanted the court to include in its decree.0 7 At no time did
Janice meet with or discuss her case with this attorney. 8
Nevertheless, this attorney appeared at the final hearing
without Janice and advised the court that he represented
603. See In re Steadman, 670 N.E.2d at 1153. In Boyle v. Burkich,
665 N.Y.S.2d 104 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997), the wife and husband
participated in mediation. The couple's contract with the mediator
stipulated that the mediator would assist the couple in developing a
consensual settlement agreement, that the mediator would not provide
legal advice, that the mediator would act as a neutral facilitator, and
that the husband and wife should retain independent counsel. During
the mediation the wife discovered that the husband was having an
affair with the mediator's daughter. When the wife brought this to the
mediator's attention and challenged her neutrality, the mediator told
the wife to leave the daughter "out of it." The wife then proceeded with
the mediation and ultimately entered a separation agreement. When
the wife took the mediated agreement to her lawyer, the lawyer told the
wife nothing could be done about the mediator's lack of neutrality and
the agreement's seemingly unfair terms. The agreement was
incorporated into the final judgment of dissolution. The wife
subsequently sought to vacate the agreement, alleging that the
husband and the mediator had acted in concert to fraudulently prevent
full disclosure of the husband's assets and income. In upholding the
trial court's refusal to vacate the agreement, the appellate court
emphasized that the wife had reasonable opportunity to confer with her
attorney prior to entering the agreement. No mention was made of the
attorney's representations to the wife that nothing could be done about
the terms of the mediated agreement or of the attorney's failure to
challenge that agreement. See Telephone Interview with James W.
Cooper wife's appellate counsel (Nov. 9, 1998).
604. See In re Marriage of Beck, 404 N.E.2d 972 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
(reversing trial court's decision in favor of wife).
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her."9 He testified that he did not know whether Janice
knew what property was included in the marital estate
when she signed her letter.61° He further testified that the
husband's attorney and the husband himself gave him the
only information he had regarding the alleged oral property
agreement.61" ' The husband paid the attorney fees." On
August 29th, the court entered final judgment,
incorporating the terms of the supposed oral property
agreement.6' Janice had no knowledge of the final hearing
or of the final decree.1 4 Lawrence and Janice continued
living together until September 6th when Lawrence threw
her out of the house and apparently refused to allow her to
visit their minor daughter. At the beginning of October,
Janice consulted an attorney about visitation with her child
and for the first time she learned of the divorce decree. 16
The trial court denied Janice's petition to vacate, but
fortunately, Janice had sufficient resources to take her case
to a more sympathetic appellate court that reversed the
decision and remanded.1
Courts find unrepresented and naive wives negligent
for failing to conduct discovery, and subsequently deny
their claims of fraud or misrepresentation. 618 For instance,
when Victoria married Albert he was an experienced and
successful businessman. 69 Their marriage lasted nineteen
years before Albert's dissatisfaction with Victoria's budding
business career led to his filing for divorce.20 The year
before he sought a divorce, Albert listed his net worth on a
609. See id. at 973-74.
610. See id. at 974.
611. See id.
612. See id.
613. See id. at 973.
614. See id. at 975.
615. See id. at 974.
616. See id.
617. See id. at 974, 976.
618. See, e.g., Berman v. Berman, 629 N.Y.S.2d 82 (N.Y. App. Div.
1995) (explaining that the wife sought damages for the husband's
fraudulent under-valuation of property during settlement negotiations,
and the court found unpersuasive the wife's statement that she relied
upon the husband's statement of net worth because the agreement
stipulated that both parties voluntarily restricted discovery and the
wife knew about at least one of the disputed pieces of property.)
619. See In re Marriage of Broday, 628 N.E.2d 790, 793 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993).
620. See id. at 793-94.
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credit application at $2,071,500.621 That same year Victoria
earned $16,000 from her business.
6 2
Albert informed Victoria that he had retained an
attorney to represent him in the divorce and suggested that
Victoria do the same.6 ' The attorney Albert chose was a
friend of Albert's and of Victoria's, and had previously
represented them both. ' According to the appellate court,
Victoria "refused" Albert's advice.626 When Albert and
Victoria first met with Albert's attorney, the attorney
informed Victoria that he represented Albert and that she
should retain separate counsel.126  Again, Victoria
"refused.,27
Albert's attorney prepared a separation agreement in
which Victoria and Albert acknowledged that each had fully
disclosed their respective incomes and assets, and that each
had been fully informed of the other's property.2812 The
agreement provided Victoria with $24,000 in cash, $93,000
in her business' assets, her $12,000 individual retirement
account, and maintenance of $2,180.56 per month over a six
year period.62 '9 At the divorce hearing, the court questioned
Victoria about her lack of representation. 0 Victoria replied
that she had chosen to proceed pro se."3 She also indicated
her satisfaction with the agreement.32  The court
incorporated the agreement in the final judgment of
divorce.633
Four months later Victoria consulted an attorney and
petitioned the court to vacate the agreement. 34 She claimed
that Albert had failed to disclose, among other items, a
$72,480 profit sharing plan and a $45,000 business
interest.63" The trial court granted her petition to vacate,
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but the appellate court reversed. 6 Crucial to its holding
was Victoria's failure to discover the assets that Albert had
not disclosed. 7 The court stated:
[T]he fact that Victoria could have discovered information about
Albert's financial status through her own investigation or by
hiring an attorney diminishes her claim of detrimental reliance on
Albert's alleged misrepresentations.638
The appellate court then upheld the trial court's order
that Albert pay a large portion of Victoria's attorney's fees,
noting that Victoria lacked the financial ability to pay them
herself. 9 In justifting its position the court stated:
The record in the present case evinces a great financial disparity
between the parties. As part of the divorce settlement agreement,
Albert agreed to pay Victoria a $24,000 lump sum to set up
housekeeping and $2,180.56 a month for 72 months. Victoria
became aware that she had a financial problem a few months after
she moved into her one bedroom apartment after the divorce since
"every penny was being spent just to pay rent and electric bills and
phone bills." Victoria expected to receive an inheritance of $20,000
to $25,000. In the meantime, the record shows that as of February
19, 1991, Victoria had only $1,000 in her personal bank account
and $800 in her business account besides her Individual
Retirement Accounts valued at $12,000. On the other hand, Albert
maintained a high standard of living which has not changed since
his divorce from Victoria. His admitted net worth including real
estate, personal property, marital property and what he
considered as non-marital property exceeds a million dollars.6
°
As illustrated above, courts do not consider highly
skewed property distributions one-sided enough to be
unconscionable. 1 Sharon and James Gorman, for instance,
636. See id. at 793.
637. See id. at 795.
638. Id.
639. See id. at 798.
640. See id. at 797.
641. See In re Marriage of Steadman, 670 N.E.2d 1146, 1152-53 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1996) (noting that after 19 years of marriage and five children,
the wife received between 17 and 24% of the marital assets and only
short-term and minimal spousal maintenance); In re Marriage of
Foster, 451 N.E.2d 915, 919 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (Kasserman, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the husband received at least $100,000 more
than the wife); In re Marriage of Beck, 404 N.E.2d 972, 975 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980) (discussing that the trial court characterized the settlement as a
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had been married for fourteen years when James sought a
divorce.6" Sharon signed a property settlement agreement
that the trial court incorporated into its final judgment. " '
Sharon later petitioned the court to vacate the property
settlement provisions, alleging that James had coerced her
into the agreement and that the terms of the agreement
were so one-sided as to be unconscionable.6" According to
James' figures he received seventy-one percent of the
marital assets.4' Sharon argued that he received closer to
seventy-eight percent. 6  The trial court found the
agreement unconscionable, but the appellate court
reversed, stating "[wie find that the division of the marital
property in the Agreement in the present case does not
remotely rise to the level of unconscionability.6"
The cases presented here, and many others like them,
illustrate that commercial contract doctrine, particularly
when applied by gender biased judges, proves insensitive to
the coercive context in which women must negotiate at
divorce. Under the pretense of respect for the autonomy and
the equality of women, contract doctrine and its application
provide no remedy and leave women mired in financial
despair and resentment.
CONCLUSION
Commercial contract law should not govern the
enforceability of divorce contracts. Nor should the private
resolution of divorce disputes be favored without regard to
fairness. Rather, courts should scrutinize settlements
carefully and refuse those that are unfair.6" Judicial
"bad deal," yet denied the wife's petition to vacate); Beattie v. Beattie,
368 N.E.2d 178, 183 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
642. See In re Marriage of Gorman, 671 N.E.2d 819, 821 (Ill. App. Ct.
1996).
643. See id.
644. See id. at 822.
645. See id. at 826.
646. See id.
647. Id. at 827 (emphasis added).
648. Even some settlement proponents argue that judges should
review settlements for fairness, particularly settlements requnirng court
approval and involving public interests. See Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 9, at 2686. Menkel-Meadow also suggests that the substantive
[Vol. 471270
1999] WOMEN CONTRACTING AT DIVORCE
rejection of unfair contracts would promote justice in
individual cases and level substantially the playing field
upon which divorcing women negotiate. If husbands and
their attorneys know that courts routinely reject unfair
agreements, they will likely offer wives better terms. In
fact, many of the adversarial tactics now used to gain an
advantage in divorce negotiations would prove futile,' 9 not
only improving outcomes but lessening hostilities as well.
Also, attorneys representing wives could not manipulate
their unsuspecting clients into unfair settlements.
Suggesting that judges reject unfair divorce contracts,
however, presupposes that judges can determine what
terms are fair. As noted, indeterminate substantive laws
provide little guidance. Although most trial court judges
refuse to vacate most judgements under the
unconscionability standard, many simultaneously
acknowledge that the challenged agreements are, in fact,
"bad deals." Many judges do have an intuitive sense of
fairness. Gender biased judges, however, will likely
continue to perceive unfair contracts as equitable. To
provide guidance on what is fair and to constrain judicial
bias, legislatures should enact more definitive spousal
maintenance, property distribution, and child custody
standards. A statute, for instance, might offer spousal
maintenance guidelines and a strong presumption in their
favor.50 Another statute might establish a presumption in
favor of the equal distribution of the marital estate and
standards used for review should consider the interests of other likely
affected by the outcome. See id.
649. A husband's threat of a custody claim that is designed to
frighten his wife into a poor financial settlement ultimately would fail.
Even if the wife agreed to the unfair settlement, the court would reject
it. Over time custody threats likely would become less frequent.
650. For a more a more developed proposal of substantive reforms
see PENELOPE EILEEN BRYAN, RECONSTRUCTING JUSTICE IN DIVORCE:
PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE REFORM (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author); see also A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY




specify limited circumstances that might justify deviation."5 '
A third might create a primary caretaker presumption with
specified exceptions.
Lack of information about the parties' respective
financial positions might also compromise a judge's ability
to determine whether an agreement is fair. A strongly
enforced requirement that both parties submit specified
financial information to each other and to the court well
before final hearing would facilitate judicial review.652
Obviously, requiring judges to review all divorce
agreements threatens to consume substantial judicial time.
To lessen the time needed for review, parties who plan to
submit divorce contracts for judicial approval should be
required to file, in addition to the aforementioned financial
affidavit, a pre-hearing settlement statement. The pre-
hearing statement should illustrate how the proposed
contract complies with relevant law. If the contract terms
do not reflect the law, the statement should so note and
should contain a justification for the deviation. If parties
fail to submit a financial disclosure affidavit or a pre-
hearing statement, the judge should refuse to hear the
divorce.
Judges should also abandon their reluctance to set
aside or vacate agreements that, upon closer observation,
seem unfair. Conceivably, judges may make mistakes in
reviewing divorce contracts at a final hearing. If one party,
within a reasonable period of time, brings an error to the
court's attention, the court should correct it. Moreover, if a
party has failed, for whatever reason, to list an asset or to
accurately reflect income on the mandatory financial
disclosure affidavit, the court should readily adjust the
divorce contract's terms. Adjustment alleviates injustice in
individual cases and encourages the candor necessary to
651. See BRYAN, supra note 650; see also A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOAMMNDATION
(Tentative Draft No.2, 1996).
652. For a more a more extensive proposal for procedural reforms see
BRYAN, supra note 650.
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reach fair results in all cases.
The above suggestions substantially restrict the
freedom of divorcing parties to contract. Restriction,
however, seems justified by the coercive context in which
wives must negotiate and the dysfunctional results
produced by a free-market approach to divorce. Moreover,
insistence on fair divorce contracts offers to enhance
women's autonomy and equality by improving their
financial positions and broadening their life choices.

